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The first state level PPP contract in Denmark 
On the 29th of June 2007 the Danish central Government entered its first PPP deal. A Special 
Purpose Vehicle, Pihl Arkivet A/S, has been contracted to finance, build, operate and maintain the 
new archive facilities for the Danish State Archives. The facilities are built on the old goods station 
site by Kalvebod Brygge in Copenhagen. It is the Palaces and Properties Agency, which belongs under 
the auspices of the Danish Ministry of Finance that on behalf of the State has entered the PPP 
contract with OPP Pihl Arkivet A/S. OPP Pihl Arkivet A/S has been designated by the Ministry of 
Culture, the Danish State Archives and the Palaces and Properties.  
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In the past three decades significant reorganization of public administrations has 
taken place in most Western countries. This change has been captured in scholarly 
titles such as ‘Public Administration: Lost an empire, not yet found a role’ (Hood 
1990), ‘The New Governance: Governing without Government’ (Rhodes 1996), 
‘Fundamental shifts in thinking about public administration’ (Peters and Wright 
1996) and ‘Reinventing Government’ (Osborne and Gaebler 1992). There has been a 
shift away from traditional public administration towards more management oriented 
(managerial) organizing styles together with a greater inclusion of markets and 
competition in the public service production. In brief, from the 1980s and onwards, 
there has been a shift away from nationalization towards neo-liberal policies in the 
shape of various forms of privatization. During the mid-1990s, a new policy tool 
emerged on the global public management agenda – public-private partnerships 
(PPP) – and PPP has today gained a similar position that privatization and 
contracting out had in the 1980s and 1990s. However, although widely disseminated, 
the defining features of PPP remain obscured, and our knowledge about how PPP 
functions in practice is dreadfully limited. The PPP term is popular but imprecise. 
This study seeks to expose, first, the different meanings attached to the PPP label 
and, second, to disclose how public and private actors cooperate (in practice) in 
implemented PPP projects. The ambition of this study is to bring forth the basis for 
a deeper understanding of PPP by unravelling the features of cooperation in 
operational projects. In addition to the enclosed cover introduction, this work has 
resulted in the following five articles:  
 
• Weihe, Guðrið. Forthcoming. Ordering Disorder – On the Perplexities of 
the Partnership Literature. Australian Journal of Public Administration. 
 
• Weihe, Guðrið. 2007. Offentlig-private partnerskaber: et mangetydigt begreb 
[Public-Private Partnershis: an Ambiguous Term]. Tidsskriftet Politik. 
 
• Weihe, Guðrið. 2008. Public-Private Partnerships and Public-Private Value 
Trade-Offs. Public Money and Management. 
 
• Weihe, Guðrið. Under Review. Beyond contracts. Utilizing alliance research 




• Weihe, Guðrið. Under Review. Unravelling Cooperation: Do Infrastructure 
partnerships involve cooperative behaviour? Public Management Review. 
 
The articles build on earlier and lengthier working papers that have been presented at 
public management conferences and seminar during the course of the past three 
years (see Weihe 2005; Weihe 2006; Weihe 2007a; Weihe 2007b; and Weihe 2007c). 
This process from working papers to articles has distilled the arguments making 
them more concise and straight to the point.  
iv 
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“Everybody is talking about public-private 
partnerships but to be honest nobody knows what it 
really is.” 
(Danish Member of Parliament) 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
This study departs from the observation that public-private partnerships (PPP) have 
hit the public management agenda globally, that it is widely spread, and that massive 
public as well as private resources are devoted to the implementation of PPPs. In the 
period 2004-2005 alone, around 206 PPP deals were closed worldwide with a value 
of approximately US$52 billion (PricewaterhouseCoopers 2005, 37). In the United 
Kingdom, more than 750 PPP projects with a total capital value of £37.6 billion were 
implemented in the period 1995-2007 (Partnerships UK 2007, 3).1 According to the 
Financial Times, the Australian PPP market is expected to grow from AUD $9 
billion between 2000 and 2006 to AUD $100 billion in 2016 (The Allen Consulting 
Group 2007, 12). In Denmark, although currently only two PPP projects have 
reached financial close, the potential marked for PPP has been estimated to be 
somewhere between DKK 22.4 billion and DKK 27.1 billion in the period 2005-
2010 (i.e. approximately £2.4-2.9 billion) (KPMG 2005). Throughout the Danish 
landscape, numerous ex ante PPP evaluations are currently being made; i.e. pre-
studies intended to estimate whether or not a project is suitable to be implemented as 
a PPP.2 These ex ante evaluations are typically co-funded by the Danish Central 
Government which until 2010 has earmarked approximately DKK 12 million for 
that purpose. In 2007 alone, the Danish Government co-financed 11 ex ante PPP 
evaluations (www.ebst.dk). Moreover, in 2004, the Danish Government made it 
obligatory to consider PPP as a procurement route in all construction projects 
                                                 
 
1This number does not include the Buildings Schools for the Future Program (BSF), the Local 
Improvement Finance Trust programme (LIFT) and the London Underground PPPs which taken 
together add several billion pounds to the above figure. 
2 Ex ante evaluations are appraisals of whether or not infrastructure projects are suitable to be 
procured as PPPs or if more traditional procurement models should be applied. The Danish term for 
this exercise is PPP ‘forundersøgelser’; which loosely translated means PPP pre-studies.  
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covered by the Danish law on state building activity.3 Thus although Denmark can be 
considered to be a latecomer to the PPP field, and although regulatory barriers for 
the implementation of PPPs have been identified (Petersen 2007), there are signs that 
PPP activities are about to intensify in the Danish case too. 
While PPP activity around the world is intensifying, in the literature on 
the subject matter, there is however little agreement on what constitutes a PPP. As 
harshly formulated by some scholars the word partnership is “little more than a 
jargonistic buzzword, …used, not for its intrinsic meaning, but as a hurrah-word” 
(Beckett 1998; quoted in van der Wel 2004: 3) and further that the “methods for 
carrying out such (private-public) partnerships are limited only by the imagination…” 
(Lyons and Hamlin 1991, 55; quoted in McQuaid 2000, 10). This gives occasion for 
the first research question which this study addresses: 
 
Research questions 1: What does PPP mean? 
 
The first objective of this study is to create an overview of the various uses of the 
term and in that way expose the different meanings attached to the PPP label. By 
unravelling the conceptual ambiguity of PPP, the study addresses a serious 
shortcoming in the literature which relates to that the international discussion on 
PPP takes place in a number of ‘watertight compartments’, where there is little 
communication between the different compartments, and further little awareness or 
acknowledgement within each compartment of the existence of other compartments 
(van der Wel 2004, 21). The Babylonian variety (Börzel 1998) of PPP concepts and 
applications is unfortunate since it impedes theoretical development and further 
obstructs the accumulation of clear policy guidelines. This part of the analysis goes 
beyond the usual conceptual exercises, and constitutes in itself an independent 
contribution to the field. The results of this part of the study are available in Section 
4, and in article 1 and article 2. 
In addition to clarifying the meaning of PPP, the staggering amount of 
resources spent on PPP programmes around the world also necessitates and justifies 
research that addresses how this policy tool functions in practice. How are these 
long-term public-private arrangements operating ex post contract signature? 
Regardless of whatever pros and cons there may be associated with PPP, it is 
important to understand not only formative and structural aspects of cooperation but 
                                                 
 
3 Government announcement no. 1394, 12 December 2004. 
3 
 
also the operational and social dimensions. Hitherto, research on PPP has been 
biased towards the former type of issues. There is therefore a gap in the scholarly 
literature vis-à-vis operational practice and our knowledge about how PPP projects 
unfold is limited. By studying the character of the cooperative relationship, this study 
is an effort in the direction of closing that knowledge gap. The second research 
question that is addressed here is the following:  
 
Research question 2: How do public and private partnership actors cooperate in practice in 
PPPs? 
 
In the context of this study ‘practice’ refers to the features of the interaction 
processes that take place in the operational stage of cooperation; what is studied here 
is thus the character of the inter-organizational relationship. The key aim is to 
uncover how the involved actors cooperate ex post contract signature. For a similar 
approach see Ysa (2007) and Reeves (2006). Understanding PPP practice is central to 
the testing of the general global idea about PPP.4 By global idea, I refer here to the 
general assumption in the literature and in policy practice that PPP presents a shift in 
governance style from hierarchical command-and-control based practices towards 
horizontal and trust-based public-private relations (more on this in Section 1.1). 
When investigating PPP practice, the UK can be considered to be a 
benchmark case which is particularly relevant to study because it is exemplary of the 
                                                 
 
4 Note that the ‘testing of theory’ should only be loosely understood here, as theory in this context 
loosely refers to the global idea about the phenomenon under study (i.e. PPP practice) and not to 
systematized confirmed experiences that can explain and/or predict certain outcomes as a more 
narrow definition of theory would imply (Andersen 2005, 29). Moreover, this exercise is not a matter 
of testing whether or not a global notion of PPP is true or false. Rather the ambition is much more 
modest aiming at exploring how our ideas about PPP fit with PPP practice. In that sense, this study 
differs from a traditional crucial-case design because it is not a deductive analysis aiming at testing a 
theory which is law-like in its precision, degree of elaboration, consistency and scope (Gerring 2007, 
235). The crucial case method was first proposed by Harry Eckstein several decades ago who, like 
many social science researchers at that time, was influenced by a deductive-nomological model of 
science (Gerring 2007, 235). Contrary to this, this study is influenced by an interpretative model of 
science. Rather than embracing the notion of covering-laws within social sciences, I am more attracted 
to the idea that social behavior is essentially irregular, complex and multifaceted. 
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particular phenomenon under investigation (Barzelay 2001).5 In addition to being a 
first mover (launching its first PPP programme in 1992), the UK also has the most 
extensive PPP programme to date both in terms of capital value and number of PPP 
projects implemented. Additionally, the UK model acts as a source of policy 
inspiration for other countries; PPP programmes and PPP policies around the world 
are being modelled after the UK experience.6 Choosing the UK case thus to some 
extent represents an example of a “crucial” case strategy (on the logic of crucial case 
studies see, for instance, Eckstein 1975; George and Bennett 2004; and Gerring 
2007). The crucial case can be described as one “that must closely fit a theory if one is 
to have confidence in the theory’s validity, or, conversely, must not fit equally well any 
rule contrary to that proposed” (Eckstein 1975, 118). If the facts of a particular case 
are crucial to the testing of a theory then that case can be considered a crucial case 
(Gerring 2007, 231). When the aim is to examine how PPPs unfold ex post contract 
signature, the relevancy of the UK case is further emphasised by the fact that the 
largest amount of operational PPP projects can be found within this particular 
country case. In brief, the UK case can be argued to be particularly informative for 
theory development vis-à-vis PPP. To the extent to which UK PPP practice fits the 
general, although vague, global idea about the nature of cooperation in partnerships, 
we can have confidence in the validity of those ideas.7 
                                                 
 
5 The idea of a ‘benchmark case’ is a methodological resort to study occurrences of specific instances 
in specific cases that are highly exemplary. The concept was developed by Michael Barzelay in his 
study of public management policy changes in the UK, Australia and New Zealand where the 
mentioned three countries serve as benchmark cases (2001).  
6 For instance, the ideas of the Dutch public expert centre on PPP have for the most part been 
adopted from the UK PFI/PPP model (Klijn and Teisman 2005, 99). Similarly, in the Australian 
context, the development of PPP policies has been influenced by the UK PFI/PPP model (English 
2007, 314-315). 
7 It is appropriate to point out here that a number of scholars reject a priori that the global idea about 
PPP fits with the type of PPP investigated here (for instance, Klijn and Teisman 2005). These claims 
are however not based on empirical observations about cooperative practice. Instead they are based 
on the formal structures of cooperation and assumptions about the character of cooperation are 
derived from the formal governance structure. A key argument here is that in order to determine the 




Below, the background and motivation for this study is delineated 
(Section 1.1). Subsequently, an account is given of how the study contributes to the 
PPP literature (Section 1.2). The introductory section is concluded with a summary 
of the five article contributions (Section 1.3) and an overview of the content of the 
cover introduction (Section 1.4). 
 
1.1 Background and motivation  
Some years ago, on an inbound plane to Copenhagen, Denmark, I was sitting next to 
a Danish parliamentarian (MP). As a spokesman on transport, the MP was keen to 
know more about public-private partnerships (PPP). He told me that PPP was a 
topic which occupied many of his colleagues, including him, and that there was a 
demand for more knowledge about PPP. How it works? What the barriers are for 
implementation? And what the promises and disadvantages of this particular 
organizational form are? These were some of the questions and concerns that he 
raised. However, shortly after, he added that although PPP received quite some 
attention it was not entirely clear to him exactly what a PPP is.  
Subsequently, I have experienced similar situations in different 
contexts. At PPP conferences, seminars and workshops, oftentimes the debates 
centre on conceptual clarification rather than on, for instance, questions of 
substantive nature such as those raised above. Similarly, in the literature there has 
within the past five years been an increasing amount of publications dealing with the 
conceptual boundaries of the term (Hodge and Greve 2005; Linder 1999; Tvarnø 
2005; Van der Wel 2004, Klijn and Teisman 2005; Wettenhall 2003). While 
publications on PPP have proliferated, and PPP has entered the public management 
agenda globally, there has not been a comparable reduction in the ambiguity of the 
term. This is the first general puzzle (of two) that has motivated this study.8 It relates 
to the first research question concerning the meaning of PPP (what does PPP mean)? 
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understand, and which has activated the motivation for addressing the research questions raised here. 
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meaning of the term.9 Thus, at the point when this study was implemented, there was 
no commonly accepted definition of PPP, and there was no commonly accepted 
classification of different forms of PPP. Moreover, the literature was unorganized in 
the sense that there was a lack of overview of the field. As noted earlier, different 
streams of PPP research existed with little acknowledgement of one another. By 
addressing these shortcomings, this study constitutes an important contribution to 
the advancement of the PPP literature.  
Now, let us turn to the second puzzle or brainteaser which has 
motivated this study. It relates to the second research question put forward above 
and concerns the character of cooperation in PPPs (how to PPP actors cooperate in 
practice). In recent times, I participated in a government sponsored workshop on PPP. 
The objective of the workshop was to educate civil servants in relation to using PPP 
as a policy tool. I was invited to speak about the meaning of PPP and also about the 
skills necessary to successfully manage PPP projects. The workshop was opened with 
an exercise where the participants, in groups of four to five people, were asked to 
describe what they understood by the term PPP. This resulted in a list of PPP 
characteristics. From the list, it became obvious that what the participants associated 
with PPP was some sort of close-knit, dialogue- and trust-based relationship with 
private sector organizations; the assumption was that this type of relationship would 
produce added value (synergy), which otherwise could not have been achieved. 
Unmistakably, the participants viewed PPP as a jump ahead compared to previous 
contracting practices; a shift from zero-sum to plus-sum arrangements where the 
involved actors cooperate more effectively than in the past. The type of relationships 
involved is expected to bring about added value in the form of some level of synergy. 
Similar assumptions can be identified in the literature (Huxham and Vangen 2000; 
Huxham and Vangen 2004; Klijn and Teisman 2005). The expectation is that 
precisely because of the closer and more collaborative relations more synergy and 
innovation can be achieved (for instance, Klijn and Teisman 2005, 97). Some 
                                                 
 
9 It may be precisely because of the conceptual vagueness that the PPP idea has travelled so far and 
has been implemented so extensively – much in a similar way as other ‘institutionalized super 
standards’, such as performance management and total quality management (TQM), have been 
diffused globally because of their nature as generalized ideas rather than specific step-by-step recipes 
(Røvik 1998). Regardless of the reasons why PPP activities have proliferated within the past 10-15 
years, it still remains important to address the meaning of the term as clear analytical constructs are 
crucial to theory building. 
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scholars emphasise that in order to be a ‘genuine’ PPP cooperation between the 
involved public and private organizations necessarily has to be close, trust-based, 
draw on social capital, involve principal-principal relationships and joint 
responsibility for project outcome and risk (Wettenhall 2006; Wettenhall 2007; Klijn 
and Teisman 2005). Only then, it is suggested, is it ‘semantically legitimate’ to apply 
the partnership term (Wettenhall 2005, 36). Similar lines of reasoning can be found 
elsewhere in the literature; some suggest that partnerships need to be enduring and 
relational (Grimsey and Lewis 2005, 13), others that that they involve principal-
principal relationships based on cooperation and trust (Mörth and Sahlin-Andersson 
2006, 11-12) and that PPP contracts are different from previous contracts in the 
sense that they constitute ‘second order contracts’ that can be viewed as ‘engines of 
possibilities’ (Andersen 2006). Thus in the literature on PPP there is a common 
assumption that PPPs break with previously known public-private arrangements such 
as contracting out and various forms of privatization. 
Similar assumptions – i.e. inferences about the nature of cooperation – 
are present among policy makers. On January 25th 2008 the current Danish Minister 
for Transport, Carina Christensen, held a speech about the Danish Government’s 
view on PPP. The Minister of Transport stressed that PPP should not in advance be 
locked as a predetermined process but that it instead should be adapted to individual 
projects. More importantly, she emphasised that the key thing was the bringing about 
of increased or more cooperation between public and private sector organizations. Other 
similar examples could be given but here it will suffice to simply point out that in 
academia, as well as in policy practice, there is a widespread belief, that PPP, relative 
to previous cooperative practices, presents something new, different and better 
compared to traditional modes of public-private interaction; i.e. that it implies more 
cooperative relations between the two sectors. Thus on the face of it, PPP heralds a 
new age of closer and more horizontal relations between the public and private 
sectors of society. This is what was coined the global idea of PPP on the opening 
pages of this cover introduction. 
Conversely, elsewhere, PPP is argued not to break away from previous 
contracting practices (for instance, Reeves 2006), and to be merely a continuation or 
another element of the already well-known New Public Management reforms of the 
1980s and 1990s (Broadbent and Laughlin 1999, 96 and 107). Thus it has been 
suggested that there is nothing new about the type of public private mixes that we 
today label PPP (Wettenhall 2005), and that it is merely a revamped form of 
tendering (Klijn and Teisman 2005, 103), yet another chapter in the privatization 
book (Hodge 2004, 37; Hodge and Bowman 2000, 213), rebadged privatization 
(Coghill and Woodward 2005, 81) or merely a matter of back-door-privatization as 
proposed by the British trade unions (Flinders 2005, 220). Some of the PPP 
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managers interviewed during the course of this study further suggest that PPP is 
more aggressive and inflexible than traditional procurement projects. This is the 
puzzle from which the second research question is derived: i.e. that while for some 
PPP is associated with horizontal and trust-based relations, for others it is a rigid, 
inflexible and aggressive organizational form. The second research question relates to 
the rhetorical promise, inherent in the partnership label; i.e. that PPP to some extent 
implies a partnership between the involved actors in the conventional understanding 
of the word.  
Thus the inconsistency in the theoretical and practical ideas about PPP 
begs the research question about what characterizes the nature of cooperation in a 
PPP. Is it different from previously known practices? If yes, how is it then different? 
What does cooperation actually look like ex post contract signature? Are the implicit 
promises about better and improved relationships between the public and private 
sector manifested in practice? Is cooperation in PPP more dialogue- and trust-based 
and less contractual than traditional public-private arrangements such as contracting 
out? The key objective in relation to the second research question is to uncover what 
characterizes cooperative practices in PPP projects. By exploring what cooperation 
actually looks like in practice, a discerning between expectations (ideas) about the 
cooperative processes in PPP on the one hand, and the actual processes that do take 
place in real life on the other hand is enabled. This is something, which has not been 
investigated systematically in the literature thus far. 
Immediately, it is tempting to ask: what is the use and relevance of 
studying PPP practice? Why be bothered to investigate the nature of cooperation? 
There are at least three important reasons for this. First, it is important in relation to 
enhancing conceptual clarity and the general understanding of PPP as a 
phenomenon. If the common conception is that PPP is a new and improved way of 
public-private cooperation; that it is a third way between nationalization and 
privatization entailing, for example, features such as high levels of trust, close 
relations and dialogue then it is important to clarify whether or not these 
expectations are founded in reality. This becomes particularly relevant when keeping 
in mind that these positive associations make PPP a very attractive policy tool. Who 
can, for example, be against working together in partnership? “Like ‘progress’ or 
‘improvement’, the warm glow of the partnership ethos cannot easily be dismissed” 
(Hodge and Greve 2005, 335). The political power of the PPP label is strong and, 
immediately, it seems to dissolve the traditional left-right ideological debates about 
pro-against private service delivery and ownership of public assets. “PPP, indeed, has 
the virtue of claiming a sort of middle ground between the hard-line positions 
occupied by nationalization at the left pole and privatization at right pole of the 
public-private spectrum” (Wettenhall 2005, 22). Keeping in mind the strong 
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rhetorical power of the PPP label it becomes only the more crucial to empirically 
determine the features of cooperation. If the popular wisdom is that PPP is 
qualitatively different relative to previously cooperative practices, then politicians and 
other decision-makers may easily be persuaded to implement PPP. However, since 
the accumulated knowledge about the character of cooperation is limited, and also 
because PPP can mean so many things, there is the potential danger that PPP will be 
implemented on a false basis. Although improved conceptual clarity is an important 
rational in its own right, the persuasive rhetorical power of PPP makes it only the 
more critical to study cooperative practices. A second reason for studying the nature 
of cooperation is that a widespread assumption is, as noted earlier, that precisely 
because of the features of cooperation, such as more intense interactions, knowledge 
exchange and coordination, that extra value in the form of synergy is expected to be 
realized. In other words, the relational characteristics of PPP are expected to have 
important performance implications. The mantra is, implicitly or explicitly, that due 
to the closer, horizontal and improved relations between public and private actors 
added value (synergy/collaborative advantage) can be generated which would not 
have been possible without cooperation. “It is important to recognize that having 
higher ambitions for achieving surplus value, […], also requires a more complicated 
and sophisticated organizational form” as argued by some scholars (Klijn and 
Teisman 2005, 97). This is also a viable justification for examining PPP practice. If 
features of the relationship are important performance antecedents, then certainly 
this aspect of cooperation should be explored further.10 
Finally, the third reason for studying PPP practice is simply that our 
knowledge about this dimension of cooperation is limited. There is a knowledge gap 
concerning how PPPs materialize in practice. For the same reason, there is a lack of 
guidelines concerning how to manage PPPs ex post contract signature. This also 
constitutes an important rationale for examining PPP practice. 
 
                                                 
 
10 In the context of this study, the sister discipline of alliance research is utilized in order to extract 
relevant analytical proxies for the empirical analysis; i.e. the alliance literature has informed the 
empirical analysis of PPP practice. 
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1.2 Contribution to the literature 
The overall aim of this study is twofold. First, to enhance the scholarly PPP field by 
offering novel and much needed input concerning the meaning of PPP. Second, the 
aim is to clarify how PPPs unfold in practice, and in that manner to test the idea and 
rhetoric of PPP against PPP reality. By doing so, this dissertational work constitutes 
valuable input to the scholarly debate and theory development on PPP. The 
dissertation contributes to the literature in two important ways. First, by mapping the 
literature as well as different usages and definitions of the PPP term, the analysis 
offers a number of PPP categories and definitions, which bring about increased 
conceptual clarity. Conceptual clarity and definitions are a prerequisite for theory 
development. Without some generally understood perspectives on PPP, studies of 
PPP are on shifting ground. Before analysing correlation between variables, it is 
indeed necessary to define and understand the dimensions of the particular variables 
that we are interested in.  
Second, this study offers descriptive theory about the nature of 
cooperation in PPP.11 This is something, which is currently missing in the PPP 
literature as most studies focus on formal aspects of cooperation, pre-contract 
signature issues (Ghobadian et al., 2004, p. 289; Reeve and Hatter 2004) and meso- 
or macro level aspects of cooperation: e.g. aspects relating to policy, societal or 
project level aspects of PPP (see Petersen and Weihe 2007 for an account of these 
levels). Micro-level studies of cooperative practice in PPP are however missing in the 
literature (Noble and Jones 2006), and key processual aspects of PPP have been 
neglected (Fischbacher and Beaumont 2003, 171). There is therefore a need for more 
academic reflection regarding the ways active PPPs operate (Ysa 2007, 51). It is 
rather paradoxical that so little scholarly attention has been devoted to exploring the 
nature of cooperation considering the aforementioned general assumptions about 
precisely this dimension of PPP (cf. the global idea about PPP). Effectively, the 
general assumptions about the nature of PPP are based on a rather limited number 
of observations.12 This emphasises further the relevancy of studying operational PPP 
                                                 
 
11 In this context, theory should be understood in the broadest sense of the word meaning knowledge 
about the phenomenon under study (Andersen 2005, 29). 
12 As stated in article 5 and in the section below on operational practice (Section 5), there is a body of 
literature which deals with the issue of cooperation and collaboration more generically without relating 
the theoretical reflections and analyses of these terms to PPP. Collaboration as a concept is, for 




projects. By illuminating how PPPs unfold in practice, and by mapping the 
characteristics of cooperation, further conceptual clarity can moreover be attained 
because this latter exercise allows us to inject some (empirically based) substance into 
the, at times, rather hollow ‘PPP container’. This is something, which has not been 
done thus far in the PPP literature. In other words, we go beyond contracts and look 
at cooperative practices in the form of interaction patterns, interaction frequencies, 
and relationship characteristics. In brief, we are opening up the black box of 
cooperation.13 
Finally, this analysis contributes more broadly to the public 
management literature in the sense that it constitutes an important input to the 
ongoing debate about public vs. private delivery of goods and services for the public. 
By empirically uncovering the substance of PPP, a further chapter can be added to 
the history of organizing in the public sector: from nationalization, over privatization 
to public-private partnerships. Thus, this work contributes also more generally to 
ongoing public management debates about shifting trends and fads in public 
administration; does PPP present a break from previous privatization practices or is 
it perhaps just another step along the learning curve.14 By scrutinizing PPP meaning 
and practice, and by developing models and taxonomies of PPP, the scholarly debate 
can be qualified further.  
                                                                                                                                     
 
instance, explored in the context of the garment industry and public policy initiation (see Wood and 
Gray 1991). 
13 The term ‘black box’ is used here in a similar way as it is used within political science in relation to 
demand-side models of the state. These have been argued to treat state institutions as ‘black boxes’ 
because they focus on political input processes. The internal operations of the state institutions is not 
analyzed directly but rather deduced from knowledge about the input processes (Dunleavy and 
O’Leary 1987, 108). A well known model of the political system that in a similar way treats the 
political system as a black box is the input-output model proposed by David Easton (see for instance, 
Easton 1957). In Eastons model, the political system is black boxed and analytical focus is directed at 
the inputs and the outputs of the political system. Similarly, in relation to PPP, research attention has 
primarily been directed at inputs (contracts, finances, and other technicalities pertaining to the pre-
contract stage) or outputs (i.e. PPP performance). Thus here opening up the black box of cooperation 
means investigating how the involved public and private actors cooperate in the PPP operational 
phase. A similar use of the black box phrase is applied by the two alliance scholars Shenkar and Reuer 
(2006, 7). 
14 This is a phrase borrowed from Professor Grahame Hodge (mail circulated privately).  
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offers a number of PPP categories and definitions, which bring about increased 
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11 In this context, theory should be understood in the broadest sense of the word meaning knowledge 
about the phenomenon under study (Andersen 2005, 29). 
12 As stated in article 5 and in the section below on operational practice (Section 5), there is a body of 
literature which deals with the issue of cooperation and collaboration more generically without relating 
the theoretical reflections and analyses of these terms to PPP. Collaboration as a concept is, for 




projects. By illuminating how PPPs unfold in practice, and by mapping the 
characteristics of cooperation, further conceptual clarity can moreover be attained 
because this latter exercise allows us to inject some (empirically based) substance into 
the, at times, rather hollow ‘PPP container’. This is something, which has not been 
done thus far in the PPP literature. In other words, we go beyond contracts and look 
at cooperative practices in the form of interaction patterns, interaction frequencies, 
and relationship characteristics. In brief, we are opening up the black box of 
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instance, explored in the context of the garment industry and public policy initiation (see Wood and 
Gray 1991). 
13 The term ‘black box’ is used here in a similar way as it is used within political science in relation to 
demand-side models of the state. These have been argued to treat state institutions as ‘black boxes’ 
because they focus on political input processes. The internal operations of the state institutions is not 
analyzed directly but rather deduced from knowledge about the input processes (Dunleavy and 
O’Leary 1987, 108). A well known model of the political system that in a similar way treats the 
political system as a black box is the input-output model proposed by David Easton (see for instance, 
Easton 1957). In Eastons model, the political system is black boxed and analytical focus is directed at 
the inputs and the outputs of the political system. Similarly, in relation to PPP, research attention has 
primarily been directed at inputs (contracts, finances, and other technicalities pertaining to the pre-
contract stage) or outputs (i.e. PPP performance). Thus here opening up the black box of cooperation 
means investigating how the involved public and private actors cooperate in the PPP operational 
phase. A similar use of the black box phrase is applied by the two alliance scholars Shenkar and Reuer 
(2006, 7). 




1.3 Delineation of article contributions 
The findings of this study are reported partly in this cover introduction and partly in 
the five enclosed articles which have been published in and/or submitted to 
international peer-reviewed public management journals. Article 2 was published in a 
Danish peer reviewed journal. Some of the articles have already been published 
(articles 2 and article 3), some have provisionally been accepted for publication 
(article 1), and finally some are under review (article 4 and article 5). Figure 1 
illustrates how the five articles relate to the two overall research questions of this 
study: i.e. What does PPP mean? and How do public and private actors cooperate in practice in 
PPPs? The first two articles (article 1 and article 2) relate to the research question 
concerning the meaning of PPP, and the three final articles relate to the research 
question concerning PPP practice (as indicated by the black arrows in Figure 1). The 
grey dotted arrows indicate that the two research questions are related. 
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The five articles, which will be briefly described below (see Table 1 for an overview), 
are based on earlier working papers presented at various conferences and seminars 
(Weihe 2005; Weihe 2006; Weihe 2007a; Weihe 2007b and Weihe 2007c). Relative to 
the working papers, the final articles are more compressed. In journal articles there is 
not the same extent of space for extensive accounts of, for example, empirical data 
and theoretical arguments. In this sense there are certain trade-offs between choosing 
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15 English translation of title: Public-Private Partnerships: an Ambiguous Term. 
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term, a number of different PPP approaches (PPP research strands) are identified. 
These are the urban regeneration approach, the policy approach, the infrastructure 
approach and the development approach respectively. Within these approaches the 
PPP term takes on a variety of qualitatively different meanings. The article exposes 
these different understandings and approaches to PPP. The article concludes that 
due to these differences, an authoritative definition of PPP – one that can encompass 
all the different variations of the concept – is not logically possible. The article has 
been submitted to the Australian Journal of Public Administration, and the journal 
editor has expressed interest in publishing it. 
The second article replicates the findings of the first article but adds 
another dimension to the classification and understanding of PPP. The argument is 
developed that PPP, in addition to being categorized along a number of formal 
structural traits, can be categorized alongside features of the cooperative process 
(informal process traits): i.e. characteristics of the relationship process. In this 
perspective, rather than being viewed as static formal structures, PPP is viewed as 
complex and dynamic processes which constantly change in a non-linear manner. By 
adopting a process perspective on PPP, it is argued, a more comprehensive 
understanding of PPP is enabled. This article was published in the Danish journal 
Tidsskriftet Politik in November 2007.  
In the third article, PPP is approached from the perspective of public 
values. The article distinguishes between material (tangible substance values) and 
procedural public values (traditional values of public administration), and reflects 
upon the extent to which PPPs deliver public value. The characteristics of 
cooperation in five PPP cases are portrayed and on that basis the implications for the 
production and safeguarding of material and procedural public values respectively is 
considered. The article suggests that there may be an inherent contradiction between 
achieving material value while at the same time safeguarding procedural public values 
in PPPs. This article was accepted for publication in August 2007, and published in 
the June 2008 issue of Public Money and Management. The empirical part of the 
article draws upon an earlier working paper which addresses the operational practice 
in the five PPP cases (Weihe 2007a). 
The fourth article substantiates the argument that strategic alliance 
research profitably can inform research on PPP. In particular, the alliance research 
dealing with informal aspects of cooperation are highlighted as being particularly 
relevant for PPP research. The article demonstrates that there is a demand for more 
knowledge about the managerial challenges pertaining to PPP and the people issues 
that may ultimately make or break a PPP. This article is based on a previous working 
paper which was presented the International Research Symposium for Public 
Management (IRSPM) in 2007 (Weihe 2007b). An earlier draft of the paper was 
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presented at a work-in-progress workshop at International Center for Business and 
Politics, Copenhagen Business School in 2006 (Weihe 2006). The article was 
submitted to International Journal of Public Management in April 2008 and is 
currently under review.  
The fifth and final article exposes the character of cooperation in five 
operational infrastructure PPPs and demonstrates how, despite similar contract 
structures, PPP practice differs markedly from case to case. It demonstrates further 
that infrastructure PPPs sometimes develop relationship features which are normally 
not associated with this type of PPP in the literature. This article draws upon findings 
reported in earlier working papers (in particular Weihe 2007a) and brings together 
the data from the two data collection phases that make up the empirical base of this 
thesis. The article was submitted to the journal Public Management Review in June 
2008 and is currently under review. 
 
1.4 Structure of cover introduction 
The rest of the cover introduction is organized in the following manner: First, the 
key research findings are summarized in the section below (Section 2). Second, the 
research strategy and the methods applied are outlined (Section 3). Third, the 
findings relating to the first research question (PPP meaning) are reviewed and 
debated (Section 4). This is followed by a section on the findings pertaining to the 
second research question (PPP practice) (Section 5). Subsequently, the conclusions and 
the conceptual, managerial and methodological implications of this study are drawn 
up (Section 6). Finally, the cover introduction is concluded with a suggestion for the 
direction of future research on PPP (Section 7). The cover introduction has been 
written in a manner so that it can be read independently from the enclosed article 
contributions. References are continuously made to the articles so that the reader can 
consult these as required. 
 
2 RESEARCH FINDINGS 
In relation to the first research question (i.e. what does PPP mean), this study 
demonstrates that there are multiple understandings and usages of the PPP term. The 
label covers, for example, short-term and long-term contracting arrangements, joint 
ventures, and network relations between public and private actors as well as general 
public-private policy set-ups. For the same reason, it is argued that it is neither 
feasible nor expedient to search for an overarching and authoritative definition of 
PPP – i.e. one which is capable of capturing all the different variations of public-
14 
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private arrangements that the PPP label covers today. This is not logically possible 
without rendering the definition so broad that it in reality becomes meaningless. As 
demonstrated in article 1 and article 2, most of the PPP definitions that currently can 
be found in the literature effectively exclude some usages of the term. Rather than 
pursuing a unitary and excluding conceptual approach, i.e. limiting the PPP term to 
being applicable to only a subset of the large variety of public-private mixes that in 
practice are labelled PPP, a more inclusive and practical stance is taken here. Instead 
of dismissing some of the arrangements today called PPP as not being real PPPs (a 
stance which is somewhat prevalent in the PPP literature; for instance, Klijn and 
Teisman 2005; Wettenhall 2007), it is suggested that a better way forward is to 
organize the various types of PPP into different categories. Then within each 
category of PPPs knowledge accumulation and guidelines for best practice can be 
developed. Following this logic, this study organizes the literature into a number of 
PPP approaches; the local generation approach, the infrastructure approach, the 
policy approach and the development approach (see article 1; article 2; and Section 4 
below). This practical stance has several advantages. It creates an overview of the 
multifaceted field, hence reduces conceptual bewilderment, makes the literature more 
accessible to newcomers as well as practicians, and moreover moves us beyond 
conceptual quarrels and directs our attention instead towards understanding the logic 
of different PPP models, how they function, and the promises and pitfalls associated 
with each model. This enables us better to accumulate knowledge, to learn from past 
experience, and ultimately to develop guidelines for good practice. This perspective 
implies identifying approach specific lessons (content) as opposed to debating 
correct usages of the term (form). In brief, what is suggested here is an intermediate 
position between dismissing the PPP label altogether as lacking any specific meaning 
on the one hand, and reducing it to encompass only a subset of the many public-
private mixes that are today labelled PPP on the other hand. Careful classification of 
different PPP families is a prerequisite for the development of an understanding of 
under which conditions the different types of PPP are more or less desirable as 
policy instruments. 
Now, turning to the second research question (i.e. how do the involved 
actors cooperate in practice), some prefatory remarks about the type of PPP projects 
studied here is in its place. The studied PPP cases all belong to the infrastructure 
family of PPP, i.e. capital intensive long-term construction projects where finance, 
construction, service and maintenance-elements are bundled into one contract (see 
article 1, article 2; and Section 4 below for a description of the infrastructure category 
of PPP). There are two important reasons for studying this particular branch of PPP. 
First, this is the context in which the PPP term increasingly is being used (Evans and 
Bowman 2005, 62; originally Evans 2003). For instance, most PPP databases around 
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the world exclusively contain information about this type of public-private mixes.17 
Moreover, when government representatives talk about PPP, the infrastructure type 
is effectively what they are referring to. Similarly, when statistics are published on 
PPP, they most likely refer to the infrastructure version of PPP. The domination of 
this particular understanding of PPP renders it particular relevant for closer scrutiny. 
The second rationale for studying infrastructure PPPs relates to a common 
conception that this particular type of PPP is the least collaborative type relatively to 
other PPP forms. Testing the general global idea about PPP against the infrastructure 
PPP thus constitutes a particular tough test. In that sense, choosing the infrastructure 
PPP for closer examination resembles somewhat the critical case study strategy as 
described by Flyvbjerg (1998, 149-151) as it enables the type of inference somewhat 
light-heartedly described by Levy as ‘’the Sinatra inference’, i.e.: “if it can make it 
here, it can make it anywhere” (Gerring 2007, 237; originally Levy 2002). In other 
words, if systematic empirical analysis can demonstrate that cooperative practice in 
infrastructure PPPs entails the type of features generally affiliated with PPP, then it 
can be logically deduced that this type of cooperative relations are likely to occur in 
most or all other categories of PPP.  
So what does cooperation look like in practice in the investigated PPP 
projects? Does the nature of cooperation correspond with the general sentiments 
about PPPs being close, trust-based, collaborative, dialogue-based and process-
oriented?18 The answer to this question is complex and ambiguous. On the one hand, 
the analysis reveals that the majority of the cases remain aspirational as opposed to 
practical. They do not present the expected shift towards cooperation based on trust, 
social capital and norms of reciprocity as the global idea about PPP would suggest. 
On the other hand, one of the investigated cases, the defence sector case (case 1), 
effectively displays features that converge with the conventional and widely spread 
ideas about PPP. In this particular case, a partnership has emerged in the sense that 
                                                 
 
17 See, for example, the PartnershipUK’s project database at 
http://www.partnershipsuk.org.uk/PUK-Projects-Database.aspx and the Australian National Public 
Private Partnership Forum at http://pppforum.gov.au/home 
18 Note that a distinction is made here between the two terms ‘cooperation’ and ‘collaboration’. They 
differ in relation to intensity and type of relationship where the latter signifies closer relationships and 
higher intensity and connection than the former (see for instance Keast et al. 2007 for an account of 
the differences between cooperation, coordination and collaboration; for a dissection of the 
collaboration term, see Thomson and Perry 2006). 
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the involved public and private actors share a strong sense of collectiveness and a 
highly trust-based and reciprocal relationship. Thus the empirical analysis reveals that 
the five examined PPP cases are dispersed in relation to the nature of cooperation. 
The findings are intriguing, since they suggest to us that PPPs with similar structures 
can materialize in different ways. This implies that governance structures and 
governance processes do not follow each other in a pre-established manner. 
Therefore this study suggests that there is strong reason to believe that partnership 
contracts in themselves are a limited source of information about PPP (see article 5). 
Moreover, the empirical material points in the direction that there is a connection 
between the features of the partnering relationship and partnership performance – 
even in an infrastructure PPP. Thus, although the written contract plays an important 
role in the infrastructure version of PPP, it is not the only determinant of the 
effectiveness of cooperation. As noted by one partnership manager; “The whole 
process is about people. That is a key thing actually! […]… the essence of all this is; 
it doesn’t matter what you have got drafted or what contracts you’ve got. It still relies 
on the right people in the right place; you can’t really legislate for that.”  
The empirical analysis here was informed by related research from 
strategic alliances. Deriving from this literature and from the research findings here, 
it is argued that more attention can profitably be directed towards cooperative 
processes as opposed to an exclusive focus on governance structures. It is further 
argued that distinguishing between different categories of PPP structures and 
different PPP processes (relations) can further mitigate conceptual ambiguity. By 
acknowledging that certain types of formal structures are not tantamount to certain 
types of relational features, conceptual clarity can be enhanced. This position allows 
us to escape the aforementioned debates in the theoretical discourse about PPP that 
concern whether or not something is a so called real PPP. According to the findings 
here, many of the features affiliated with a real PPP cannot be determined a priori.  
Advances in organizational theory during the past century – from 
Taylor’s scientific management paradigm (1997 [1912]), and Fayol’s general principles 
of management (1997 [1916]) to later human relations theories recognizing the 
importance of people in organizations (e.g. Mayo 1997 [1949]] – generally support 
the overall argument proposed here. I.e. that it is important not only to take into 
account formal organizational structures but also informal organizational traits if we 
are properly to understand PPP. In the light of the small number of PPP projects 
analysed here, some reservations can be made concerning the overall application and 





On the following pages, the research strategy adopted here is delineated. First, a brief 
overview of the core elements of the study is offered (Section 3.1). Second, the 
research purpose of this study is outlined (Section 3.2). Finally, the key characteristics 
of the applied case study strategy are described (Section 3.3). Note that the enclosed 
five articles also contain short accounts of the methods applied. 
 
3.1 Overview of research strategy 
This study is embedded within a public management research tradition that combines 
political science and organizational studies. It follows the footpaths of a string of 
public management scholars such as Hood (1991, 1998), Pollitt (1995, 2001), Pollitt 
and Bouckaert (2000), Kettl (2000), Osborne and Gaebler (1992), Ejersbo og Greve 
(2005), Christensen and Lægreid (2001), and Hansen (2003) in their efforts to 
enhance our understanding of public management, new public management tools 
and public management reforms generally. This line of research often draws upon 
qualitative and comparative case study research strategies in its efforts to clarify and 
categorize different aspects of public management (for instance, Pollitt and 
Bouckaert 2000; Christensen and Lægreid 2001; Barzelay 2001). By developing and 
utilizing typologies and classification schemes a middle-way between general 
explanatory (grand) theories and sheer description is achieved. The present study 
does in a similar way enhance our understanding of a recent development within 
public management, the appearance of PPP, and does so by combining theoretical 
discourse about PPP in the public management literature with insights from 
organizational research on strategic alliances. 
The applied methodology is twofold. The first research question – 
What does PPP mean? – is addressed by way of an extended review of the literature 
on PPP, and by mapping different usages of the term. The criterion for inclusion of 
publications in the review was the presence of the use of the PPP terminology. In 
other words, a nominal approach was adopted which means that the explicit use of 
the term PPP was decisive for inclusion in the analysis (for a similar approach, see 
Hansen and Hansen 2000, 159).19 The boundaries of the PPP term were hence not 
                                                 
 
19 In a study of Danish evaluation practice these two scholars include in their study reports and 
analyses that are labeled ‘evaluations’ by the practicians. Thus terminology (the use of the evaluation 
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delineated a priori. This open-ended and inclusive search made it possible to ferret 
out different facets of the PPP label. This approach further enabled an extensive 
mapping of differing approaches to PPP in the literature. Some scholars, for 
instance, study macro-level policy phenomenon such as the public-private 
institutional set-up of a specific policy sector (non-time limited and non-project 
based relations), while others address project level issues such as how risk is shared 
between the involved parties in a specific contractual form (time-limited and project-
based relations between the public and private sectors). These rather different 
organizational forms are studied under the same PPP heading. Hence, when aiming 
at clarifying the meaning of PPP, looking for definitions “leads nowhere” because 
many scholars use such abstract and broad definitions of PPP that it remains unclear 
what type of public-private arrangements are excluded from their definitions (van der 
Wel 2004, 7). Therefore, in this analysis, attention is directed towards different usages 
of the PPP concept in the literature. 
The second research question – How do public and private partnership 
actors cooperate in practice in PPP? – is addressed by way of a multiple case analysis 
of five operational infrastructure PPPs (on case selection, see section 3.3.1). Data 
collection proceeded in two phases. First, exploratory phase-to-phase interviews were 
conducted with public and private partnership managers at different levels in each 
PPP (Kvale 1997).20 For a profile of the interviewees, see table 1 in article 5. In these 
interviews, the partnership managers were asked to describe qualitatively the 
partnership relationship, the pattern of interaction and barriers/enabling factors in 
relation to cooperation (the interview guide is enclosed in Appendix 1). The key 
objective of the interviews was to gather detailed information about the cooperative 
characteristics, attitudes and approaches to working together in the selected cases. 
The qualitative interviews were subsequently transcribed and analysed for recurrent 
                                                                                                                                     
 
term) was decisive for what was included and excluded in this investigation of Danish evaluation 
practice. 
20 The following project representatives have been interviewed as part of this study: public sector 
partnership managers at the local level, public sector managers on the policy level, board members of 
the private sector consortia, project managers at consortia level, project managers on the prime 
subcontractor level, and finally project managers below prime subcontractor level. These partnership 
managers are key actors at the public-private interface and are therefore particularly relevant to 
interview when the objective is to uncover the features of cooperation at this interface. 
21 
 
themes pertaining to the cooperative relationship.21 In the second phase of data 
collection, follow-up telephone interviews were conducted. This interview phase 
involved close-end questions about the features of cooperation. Prior to the 
telephone interview a questionnaire was distributed to the participants (see Appendix 
2). For an overview of the participants in the second round of data collection, see 
table 2 in article 5. 
Interviewing both public and private sector representatives in the 
investigated cases follows the recommendations by Madhok who suggests that it is 
expedient to interview both partners in a partnership (1995, 72-73). Similarly Aulakh 
et al. point out that data collection from only one partner does not capture all aspects 
of the relationship (1997, 188). Different actors might have different perceptions of 
cooperation and the character of the partnering relationship. Therefore, by 
interviewing both public and private sector representatives a more comprehensive 
picture of the characteristics of cooperation can be attained. It is suggested in the 
literature on inter-organizational cooperation that interviewing key project actors is a 
reliable approach when the aim is to pinpoint certain characteristics of partnerships. 
General Managers are for instance argued to be a practical and reliable alternative to 
multiple respondents when studying performance in partnerships (Büchel and Killing 
2002, 758; originally Geringer and Hebert 1991). 
The first round of face-to-face interviews took place in November 
2005 and June 2006 and involved two field trips to the UK. Finally, the second 
round of interviews took place in the period August-October 2007. All in all, 
approximately 50 interviews have been conducted as part of this study.22  
                                                 
 
21 In some of the cases, the interviews were not transcribed. This was either due to bad sound quality 
or because the interview contained little relevant information about the research topic. This was in 
particular the case in one of the interviews, which contained primarily technical information about the 
project at hand. At the time this topic was concluded there was no time left for further questions. 
22 During the first phase of data collection, 17 face-to-face interviews (with 20 different persons) were 
conducted. The length of the face-to-face interviews varied from 42 minutes to two hours and 30 
minutes (the average length of the interviews was one hour and 36 minutes). Additionally four 
interviews were made which were not directly related to the five cases; one interview with a 
representative from the PPP prison sector, one interview with two representatives from the National 
Audit Office, one interview with a representative from a PPP transport project which was not 
included in this study, and finally a telephone interview with a departmental level representative from 
the transport sector. These interviews contribute with general background knowledge about PPP 
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By collecting the data in two different phases, and by adopting 
differing data collection techniques (initial open-ended and subsequent closed-end 
follow-up questions), a comprehensive picture of cooperative practice was enabled in 
each of the five cases. Additionally, a variety of case related documents was included 
in the study in an ad hoc manner in order to enrich the understanding of each of the 
five cases (official documents on the cases, news paper articles, internal reports etc.). 
Drawing upon different sources of evidence in this manner is a major strength of the 
case study approach (Yin 1994, 91). By studying the nature of cooperation in the 
selected cases at two different points in time moreover enabled the analysis to 
capture the dynamics of cooperation, revealing how cooperative relationships can be 
fluid, nonlinear, emerging and changeable rather than stable and fixed by the nature 
of the formal structure of the deal (i.e. the contract).  
Because much of the collected data consist of personal views, 
experiences and expressions of the involved partnership managers, the identity of the 
cases and the interviewed case representatives is not revealed. Retaining case 
anonymity has its advantages as well as disadvantages. The drawback is that detailed 
information about the cases cannot be revealed. On the positive side, however, an 
advantage is that by promising the participants anonymity, they may be more open 
and blunt in their accounts of the cooperative practices and further less urged to 
conceal problematic or sensitive issues. 
 
3.2 Research purpose  
This study is driven by an empirical motive aiming at uncovering how PPPs operate 
in practice, and in that way to contribute to theory development. This analytical 
effort is informed and guided by the scholarly literature on PPP and related research 
from the sister-discipline of strategic alliance research (private-private partnerships). 
More specifically, the subcategory of alliance research dealing with informal 
governance mechanism has been utilized in order to extract the analytical parameters 
that have been applied in the empirical part of the analysis. 
There are two general approaches to theory development. These 
approaches are deductive theory testing and inductive theory building respectively 
                                                                                                                                     
 
policies. In the second interview phase 26 follow-up interviews were conducted over the telephone. 
These interviews varied in length between 30 minutes and one hour. 
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(Perry 1998). This study belongs primarily to the latter category of research. It is 
however difficult in practice to separate the two processes of induction and 
deduction. Such processes will always to some extent be intertwined (Perry 1998; 
originally Richards 1993, 40; Miles and Huberman 1994, 17; Parkhe 1993, 252, 256). 
The inductive processes of this study were, as noted above, informed by the PPP 
literature as well as strategic alliance literature. Finally, the data collected at the early 
stages of inquiry also fed back into the subsequent steps of data collection and 
analysis.23 Nevertheless, it is the inductive theory building approach which is the 
dominant purpose here. Keeping in mind that this study enters into new terrain in 
the sense that it addresses aspects of cooperation that yet have not been addressed 
systematically, an inductive methodology is in its place. Inductive theory building is 
expedient in contemporary and pre-paradigmatic research areas where accepted 
principles and constructs have not yet been established (Perry 1998). This study is 
primarily descriptive with the aim to fill in an important gap in the literature. 
Ultimately the aim is to enhance our understanding of PPP by providing a descriptive 
theory of PPP practice. In other words building theory is of key concern here as 
opposed to the testing of existing theories. Rather than measuring causal relationship 
between variables, the interest here lies in exploring variables. A prerequisite for 
causal research is that we understand the variables we are measuring. Given the 
open-ended nature of the research issues addressed here, it does not require a cause-
                                                 
 
23 Although being an explorative study there is of course always an underlying direction and rationale 
for addressing certain topics and not others (as argued above, induction and deduction are always to 
some extent intertwined). Over and beyond the fact that there is a knowledge gap in the literature, the 
research here is guided by a general expectation – derived from the PPP literature and strategic 
alliance research – that operational processes and the relational dimension of cooperation influence 
PPP performance. A degree of rationale and direction like this should underlie every explorative 
research, a point which is well captured in the following statement: “When Christopher Columbus 
went to Queen Isabella to ask for support for his “exploration” of the New World, he had to have 
some reasons for asking for three ships (Why not one? Why not five?), and he had some rational for 
going westward (Why not south and then east?). He also had some (mistaken) criteria for recognizing 
the Indies when he actually encountered them” (Yin 1994, 22; originally Wilford 1992). Besides being 
informed by the literature, the direction and rationale of this analysis matured over the two phases of 
inquiry ranging from a low degree of formalization at the initial stage to a comparatively high degree 
of formalization at the final stage of data collection and analysis.   
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and-effect analysis to solve the two research questions which this study evolves 
around.  
The analysis is embedded within the interpretative family of research 
paradigms. The first exploratory interview phase evolved mainly around interpreting 
meaning, expressions and beliefs put forward by partnership projects managers about 
the partnerships they are involved with. This resulted in a rudimentary description of 
the partnering relationship in the five analysed cases (Weihe 2007a; article 3). 
Arguably, other scholars may have interpreted the interview findings differently as, at 
this stage of the project, the depiction of cooperation in the investigated cases relied 
on subjective interpretations of the stories told by the interviewed partnership 
managers. Any given interpretation of a social phenomenon can be argued to be 
more or less viable. As suggested by the hermeneutic research paradigm, 
explanations and interpretations can be more or less probable or more or less 
meaningful (Gilje and Grimen 1993, 156-161). In stead of talking about ‘correct’ and 
‘incorrect’ interpretations, focus should rather be directed towards examining which 
interpretations are the strongest (interpretative pluralism). Due to reflections about how 
details fit with the whole, and the extent to which interpretations correspond with 
the intentions of the interviewees it becomes possible to appraise whether or not one 
interpretation is more or less valid than another. Within the hermeneutic research 
paradigm such criteria for proper interpretation are labelled the holistic criteria and 
the actor criteria for correct interpretations respectively (Gilje and Grimen 1993, 158-
160). By interviewing public and private representatives on various levels of 
cooperation, and moreover by confronting the interviewees with the overall 
interpretations and findings of the study, the validity of the interpretations made here 
was strengthened following the logic of the holistic and actor criteria. 
The second phase of data collection departs somewhat from the initial 
phase as it represents a more close-end approach to analysing PPP practice. From 
the preceding analytical phase together with input from the alliance literature, a 
number of parameters of particular interest were pre-selected and analysed 
systematically across the five PPP cases. This stage of the analysis thus resembles 
more the positivist case study strategy (Blatter forthcoming) while the first stage 
resembles more closely the interpretative research paradigm as represented by for 
instance the naturalistic case study strategy recommended by Stake (1995). At the 
final stage of inquiry, the focus thus shifted somewhat from describing and 
understanding to explaining, from exploratory to confirmatory, and the role of the 
researcher became more impersonal relative to the earlier stages were subjective 
interpretations played an important role. This within study evolution from 
exploration to confirmation has been recommended in the case study literature (for 
instance, Perry 1998). However, it should be emphasised that the dominant logic of 
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inquiry was effectively the inductive theory building approach as opposed to 
deductive theory testing. The objective of this project, as expressed by the two 
research questions, is to understand the complex phenomenon of PPP, more 
specifically the meaning and practice of PPP, rather than to explain correlation 
between variables.  
Before moving on to describing specific elements of the case study 
strategy, an important note should be made at this point. Fierce ideological debates 
are taking place concerning the pros and cons of PPP. PPP as an idea has strong 
allies as well as opponents – both among politicians, practicians and researchers. 
While proponents suggest that PPP is “a marriage made in heaven” (Hodge 2004, 
39), opponents view it as a scheme that is “yet again screwing the taxpayer” and 
moreover caricature the private sector actors as “evil bandits running away with all 
the loot” (Bowman 2001, 27). Here, it should be stressed that this study does not 
take a stance as to whether or not PPP is an expedient policy tool. This study simply 
departs from the observation, as noted in the introduction, that PPP has hit the 
public management agenda globally, that it is widely spread, and that massive public 
as well as private resources are devoted to the implementation of PPPs. This 
necessitates and justifies a study of how it functions in practice. Regardless of 
whatever pros and cons there may be affiliated with this particular policy tool it is 
important to understand economical as well as social aspects of cooperation.  
 
3.3 Case study strategy 
The case study strategy has been chosen here because it enjoys a natural advantage in 
research that has an exploratory nature (Gerring 2007, 39), and research which has an 
affinity towards descriptive goals (Blatter forthcoming). Case studies moreover have 
a comparative advantage (relative to for instance large-N-studies) “in respect to the 
‘depth’ of the analysis, where depth can be understood as empirical completeness 
and natural wholeness or as conceptual richness and theoretical consistency” (Blatter 
forthcoming). Moreover, a qualitative case study approach is appropriate when the 
aim is to capture and elaborate on soft concepts such as cooperation, trust and 
relations between different parties because hard data sources are unlikely to capture 
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inquiry was effectively the inductive theory building approach as opposed to 
deductive theory testing. The objective of this project, as expressed by the two 
research questions, is to understand the complex phenomenon of PPP, more 
specifically the meaning and practice of PPP, rather than to explain correlation 
between variables.  
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3.3 Case study strategy 
The case study strategy has been chosen here because it enjoys a natural advantage in 
research that has an exploratory nature (Gerring 2007, 39), and research which has an 
affinity towards descriptive goals (Blatter forthcoming). Case studies moreover have 
a comparative advantage (relative to for instance large-N-studies) “in respect to the 
‘depth’ of the analysis, where depth can be understood as empirical completeness 
and natural wholeness or as conceptual richness and theoretical consistency” (Blatter 
forthcoming). Moreover, a qualitative case study approach is appropriate when the 
aim is to capture and elaborate on soft concepts such as cooperation, trust and 
relations between different parties because hard data sources are unlikely to capture 
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soft concepts (Parkhe 1993, 230).24 “The study of process requires an approach to 
data collection that differs from the conventional survey methods, or from reliance 
on secondary data sources” since an exclusive reliance on such methods, “is not 
likely to capture the dynamic elements of process” (Ring 1997, 289). 
The applied case study strategy belongs to the naturalistic strand of 
case study research. The aim is to generate practical and detailed knowledge about 
PPP practice in the five selected cases. Naturalism is a case-centered approach as 
opposed to a variable-centered approach. Research efforts are thus directed towards 
revealing “the authentic nature of a social phenomenon or the detailed elements of a 
causal process by getting as close as possible” (Blatter forthcoming).25 The case 
analysis has four basic characteristics (see Figure 2). First, it is a multiple case study 
strategy involving five PPP cases (Section 3.3.1 below deals with case selection). 
Second, the centre of attention is the dyadic relationship between the involved 
organizations. In other words an inter-organizational approach to cooperation has 
been adopted (see Section 3.3.2). Third, the analysis of the five cases is embedded at 
the micro-level of analysis meaning that attention is attuned towards individual level 
practices within each PPP project (Section 3.3.2). Studying micro-level factors can be 
argued to bring about a more complete understanding of the collective level 
phenomena under study (Coleman 1990). Finally, empirically this analysis addresses 
                                                 
 
24 Admittedly, some scholars would disagree with this point arguing that case study research is equally 
appropriate for explanatory purposes (Yin 1994, 3; Flyvbjerg 1998). However, in the context of this 
study, the case study strategy is chosen because of its ability to generate detailed knowledge about a 
topic which up until now has been relative unexplored in the public management literature – i.e. 
cooperative practice vis-à-vis PPP.  
25 The applied case study strategy moreover follows the recommendation to let the type of research 
question, the extent of control over actual behavioral events and the degree of focus on contemporary 
events determine the choice of method (Yin 1994, 4ff). The central question addressed here is how 
does PPP work in practice? The aim is to produce detailed and systematic knowledge about PPP 
practice. This renders the case study method relevant since it “allows an investigation to retain the 
holistic and meaningful characteristics of real-life events—such as […] organizational and managerial 
processes” (Yin 1994, 3). This line of issues is at the centrepiece of attention in this study; i.e. 
organizational processes with particular emphasis on relationship styles, roles, attitudes, and 
interaction patterns. The core aim here, as already argued above, is not to do explanatory research but 
rather to explore and describe cooperative practice in PPP and in that way help resolve the stated 
research question concerning PPP practice.  
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relational characteristics of cooperation as opposed to formal/structural features 
(Section 3.3.3).  
  
Figure 2 Research design 
Inter-organizational perspective 







































The analytical approach pursued here is innovative in the sense that it departs from 
previous perspectives on infrastructure PPPs. The analytical focus in much of the 
extant literature can be plotted in the upper left hand corner of Figure 2. Very few 
studies can be identified in the right-hand side of the figure, and fewer even in the 
bottom right-hand corner where this study is situated (see article 4 where a concise 
overview of the PPP literature is given). 
 
3.3.1 Case selection 
As already noted, five cases (five PPP projects) have been selected for this analysis. 
Five cases is a broadly accepted number of cases to include in a multiple case analysis 
(Perry 1998; originally Eisenhardt 1989, 545; Hedges 1985, 76-77; and Miles and 
Huberman 1994, 30; Stake 2006, 22). It is sufficient in the sense that it enables a 
qualitative and in-depth study of how cooperation unfolds in the selected PPP 
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projects while at the same time allowing insights about PPP practice in different 
contexts thus also retaining some breadth in the analysis. 
A key case selection criterion was the duration of the projects. The 
selected cases all reached operation between 2000 and 2003. Thus as a minimum, all 
the cases had been fully operational for at least three years at the point of selection.26 
When addressing PPP practice (how cooperation unfolds), there is a need to go 
beyond the formative stages of cooperation and to analyze what happens at the point 
when the projects are implemented. Therefore, choosing projects in their formative 
stages was not an option. The cases were further chosen from three different policy 
sectors; one project from the defense sector concerning a military establishment 
(case 1), two projects from the transport sector, a technology project and a road 
project (case 2 and case 3), two hospital projects from the health sector, one of 
which concerned the redevelopment of an existing site, and one concerned a new 
built hospital (case 4 and case 5 respectively). The reason for pursuing this cross-
sector approach was to allow the possibility for uncovering potential differences 
between different policy sectors. In this respect it can be beneficial to study industry 
specific cases since this can lead to the “discovery of different patterns in different 
kinds of industries” (Madhok 1995, 72-73). The ambition behind choosing several 
PPP projects from several sectors is to draw up a picture of PPP practice applicable 
beyond the individual cases: i.e. to present findings that represent a broad range of 
experience relating to the topic of PPP practice. Thus diversity was an important 
rationale behind case selection. As suggested by Stake, to examine how a 
phenomenon performs in different environments is an important reason for 
conducting a multiple case study (2006, 23). Following the logic of naturalistic case 
study research, access also played an important role in relation to case selection 
(Blatter forthcoming). Prior to gaining access to the five cases, unsuccessful attempts 
were made at including other PPP projects.27 
                                                 
 
26 As an exception, one of the investigated projects had a phased role out of services. 
27 Originally, the intention was to include two cases from the educational sector and one further case 
from the defense sector. The educational sector is highly relevant to look at because, although it only 
ranges fourth when it comes to the total capital value of PPP projects, it is the public policy sector 
with the second largest amount of implemented PPP projects in the UK. The defence, transport and 
health sector are together with the educational sector among the most capital intensive sectors when it 
comes to the capital value of the PPP activities within these sectors. These sectors are further among 
the policy sectors that involve the most intensive PPP activity when it comes to the total number of 




Finally, as already noted in the introduction, PPP practice is studied in 
the UK context which can be argued to be a benchmark case of PPP. It is exemplary 
of the particular phenomenon under study (Barzelay 2001). This choice is pragmatic 
in the sense that when interested in how PPP unfolds in the operational phase, the 
most extensive experience to date is available in the UK. In comparison, as noted on 
the opening page of the cover introduction, only two Danish PPP projects had 
reached financial close by 2007.28 UK is also a forerunner in the sense that it was in 
the UK context that the line of PPP studied here was first implemented back in the 
early 1990s. 
 
3.3.2 Analytical focus and level of analysis 
Generally, we can distinguish between two different strands of research on inter-
organizational relationships: a) research that investigates inter-organizational or dyadic 
factors pertaining to particular projects, and b) research that adopts an intra-
organizational perspective of inquiry (Heimeriks 2004, 14). In the latter line of 
research the analytical focus is the individual organization and how it manages its 
portfolio of partnerships. It is the capability of the individual organization to manage 
its partnerships that is the centerpiece of interest. Methodologically, this means that 
in the intra-organizational perspective internal organizational characteristics and 
processes of the individual organization are studied. For instance, how an 
organization shares and institutionalizes its experience with PPP. Internal 
organizational features are thus the focal point of inquiry in the intra-organizational 
perspective. In an inter-organizational perspective, focus shifts from the individual 
organization to the dyadic relationship. Here, the inter-organizational perspective is 
adopted which means that traits of the individual partnership relationship are 
analyzed. The focus is directed towards uncovering inter-organizational factors of 
cooperation. The analytical focus is moreover directed at the micro-level of cooperation 
meaning that individual level factors of cooperation are investigated. More 
                                                                                                                                     
 
projects implemented. A list of signed PPP deals is available at the homepage of the HM Treasury 
(www.hm-treasury.gov.uk).  
28 To compare with another PPP forerunner, Australia has only about 50 implemented projects. For 
information about the Australian PPP activity visit http://pppforum.gov.au/home 
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specifically what is analyzed here are the characteristics of the partnership 
relationship between the involved actors. 
 
3.3.3 The relational dimension 
Finally, the focus of this analysis is the relational dimension of cooperation. This means 
that this analysis is intended to produce knowledge about non-structural aspects of 
cooperation. Thus addressed in this study is for instance the level of trust between 
the involved actors, the relational quality in the dyadic relationship, interaction 
patterns and roles, and the norms and values that guide and characterize cooperation 
in the individual cases. This part of the analysis has, as already noted, been informed 
by research on private-private partnerships (strategic alliances). A key argument is 
here, that this literature is particular relevant to consult when we want to know more 
about the importance of non-formal aspects of cooperation (Section 5; article 4). 
To recapitulate, the present analysis of PPP practice draws on open-
ended face-to-face interviews and follow-up telephone interviews involving close-end 
questions. It is a multiple-case design and the analytical level of the study is 
embedded at the micro-level with the dyadic relationship as the unit of analysis. The 
key focus of analysis is cooperation at the public-private interface in each 
investigated PPP project – in particular the relational dimension of cooperation. The 
methodological approach is of an exploratory, inductive and descriptive nature. 
However, there are elements of deduction in that the analysis has been guided by the 
extant theoretical discourse about PPP as well as analytical parameters derived from 
the alliance literature. 
 
 
4 COMING TO TERMS WITH PPP 
This section concerns the findings relating to the first research question: What does 
PPP mean? (see also article 1; and article 2). This part of the study makes three 
contributions to the field. First, an overview of the PPP literature is offered by 
ordering the literature into four major streams of research (i.e. four PPP approaches) 
(article 1). Second, and based on the empirical findings of the case study, a 
provisional two-dimensional understanding of PPP that distinguishes between PPP 
structures and PPP processes is proposed (article 2; Section 6.1). Third, and 
complementary to the two previous contributions, a categorization of three 
prototypes of PPP is developed (Section 4.2).   
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A central finding from this part of the analysis is that PPP is a 
nebulous concept with little analytical leverage. Based on the findings, it is argued 
that the most expedient way forward, when it comes to curbing the conceptual 
bewilderment, is to explicitly acknowledge that there are different compartments of 
research adhering to different understandings of PPP. Then within each 
compartment, knowledge and lessons about best practice can be accumulated (article 
1). This solution is, as noted earlier, a middle ground between on the one hand 
operating with a very open-ended version of the term (for instance, Rosenau 2000; 
Mörth and Sahlin-Andersson 2006), and on the other hand reducing PPP to 
encompass only a subset of the many public-private mixes that are effectively 
labelled PPP today (for this approach, see for instance, Klijn and Teisman 2000).29 As 
noted earlier, there are several advantages by doing so. Mapping the PPP field 
reduces conceptual bewilderment, makes the literature more accessible to 
newcomers, and moreover moves us beyond conceptual quarrels and directs our 
attention instead towards substantive issues such as how PPP functions in practice, 
and the worth and merits of different PPP models. 
The timing of this study was fortunate in the sense that it provided a 
unique opportunity for contributing to a young scholarly field in rapid development. 
Future research can build on the classification of the literature and the definitions of 
PPP offered here and in that sense move quickly beyond the primal task of 
definition. 
 
4.1 Organizing the literature – the four PPP approaches 
As argued in article 1 and article 2, there are at least four different clusters of research 
(PPP approaches) within the PPP literature. These are: the infrastructure approach30, 
the local regeneration approach, the policy approach, and the development approach 
                                                 
 
29 I do however sympathize with this latter approach because it directs our attention to the fact that 
many of the public-private mixes today labeled partnerships do not diverge significantly from already 
known transactional contractual relationships. It is important that researchers, policy makers as well as 
other practicians are aware of this fact; i.e. that the PPP label is often used as a misnomer for strict 
principal-agent arrangements and traditional buyer-seller relationships. 
30 Note that the term ‘infrastructure’ is not limited to transport infrastructure but refers to economic, 
social as well as hard and soft infrastructure (Grimsey and Lewis 2004).  
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(see also Weihe, 2005). Each approach is embedded in a distinct context, involves 
different types of actors as well as distinct structures. Characteristically, there is little 
cross-communication between the different schools and scholars working within one 
perspective seldom explicitly recognize the existence of the other PPP approaches 
(van der Wel 2004, 21). Therefore, the PPP literature is somewhat fragmented with 
small islands of research that are not connected with one another (as illustrated in 
Figure 3 below). For the same reason, when surveying the literature at a glance, quite 
inconsistent and conflicting statements about PPP can be identified. This can give 
rise to quite some confusion (article 1). 
 

















Let me briefly recapitulate the key features of each approach. In the infrastructure 
approach the focus is on various types of infrastructure projects; or more precisely the 
delivery of infrastructure assets and associated services over a long term period 
(typically 25-30 years). This is, as argued earlier, currently the most dominant 
meaning of the PPP term. Within the infrastructure approach there is a broad and 
narrow understanding of the infrastructure PPP. The broad version includes more or 
less all types of infrastructure projects that involve some extent of private delivery. In 
the narrow understanding of the term, a project must include private finance, 
construction, design, operation and maintenance in order to qualify as an 
infrastructure PPP. It is the latter type of infrastructure PPP which is investigated in 
the context of this study. In the local regeneration approach, attention is directed towards 
local economical development and renewal. This approach to PPP originates from 
the urban policy literature and concerns different types of arrangements where local 
businesses and local governments join their forces in order to relieve the economic 
and social distress of their cities. A local regeneration PPP is characterized by 
principal-principal relations between public and private local actors which involve 
some sort of joint production, sharing of risk, and a durable character of 
cooperation. Local regeneration PPP does not include cases of buyer-supplier 
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relationships where the government identifies and defines the service to be delivered 
by the private provider. Rather, in the cases of local regeneration partnerships there 
is more of a genuine effort to achieve a joint goal: i.e. regeneration of the local area. 
Moreover, this type of partnership is often initiated by the business sector in a local 
community with a genuine interest in remedying the economical distress of that city. 
The policy approach on the other hand concerns non-project based and non time-
delimited public-private relations. It concerns the institutional set-up between public 
and private actors in different policy areas. In this approach, attention is directed 
towards how a specific policy area is organized and what characterizes the public-
private division of work within that particular area. Finally, in the development approach, 
there is a change of context and different actors are involved in the PPP. The focus 
within this approach is third world development, and, in addition to public and 
private actors, there are a number of governmental and non-governmental 
international aid-organizations acting as third-party facilitators/catalysts for 
cooperation. Thus this approach departs somewhat from the others in the sense that 
international organizations and other donor organizations play an important role in 
the advancement of PPP with the overall aim of achieving development goals.  
The four approaches are not claimed to be exhaustive nor absolute. 
Over time, approaches might be added and existing approaches can be refined. For 
example, one could argue for a fifth PPP approach called the governance approach 
(Weihe 2005) which captures the part of the PPP literature which is closely related to 
network research and the governance paradigm within public management research 
(for instance, Koppenjan and Klijn 2004; Rhodes 1997; Kooiman 1993; Kooiman 
2003). This perspective on PPP cuts across the four approaches proposed here. The 
key thing to emphasise here is that it is important to explicitly acknowledge that there 
are different compartments in the PPP literature because, as noted above, this allows 
us to accumulate approach specific lessons and moreover, provides us with a 
terminology that enables policy makers and other stakeholders to develop policies on 
a sounder basis. 
 
4.2 Three PPP prototypes - a supplementary way of categorizing 
As a supplement to organizing the literature into four PPP approaches, we can 
distinguish between three prototypes of structures: a) the contractual PPP, b) the 
organizational PPP, and c) the network PPP (see Table 2). The three prototypes are 
mutually exclusive in the sense that a contractual PPP cannot be a network PPP at 
the same time and vice versa. The structures are intrinsically different. However, 
within each category, there can be variations. The contractual PPP, for instance, can 
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(see also Weihe, 2005). Each approach is embedded in a distinct context, involves 
different types of actors as well as distinct structures. Characteristically, there is little 
cross-communication between the different schools and scholars working within one 
perspective seldom explicitly recognize the existence of the other PPP approaches 
(van der Wel 2004, 21). Therefore, the PPP literature is somewhat fragmented with 
small islands of research that are not connected with one another (as illustrated in 
Figure 3 below). For the same reason, when surveying the literature at a glance, quite 
inconsistent and conflicting statements about PPP can be identified. This can give 
rise to quite some confusion (article 1). 
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vary in length and content. Thus some contractual PPPs concern services only, while 
others (including the type of PPP analysed here) involve infrastructure elements in 
addition to associated services. Further some contractual PPPs may be relatively 
short term contracts, while others are long term. A key problem with much of the 
PPP literature is that we often do not know precisely what types of formal structures 
are addressed. This is in particular a difficulty in relation to what I have previously 
coined the governance approach to PPP because (due to the adoption of broad 
definitions of the term) it is not clear what types of public-private arrangements are 
included in the analyses (for instance, Edelenbos, Klijn and Steijn 2007, 64). 
Conceptual clarity can be enhanced by delineating not only the strand of research but 
also the particular formal structures that are investigated.  
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networks and general 
policy relations) 
Definition A policy instrument for 
the facilitation of 
contractual relations 
between public and 
private actors that 
involves commitments 
of private capital and 
labour over a sustained 
period of time and 
which ushers in new 
governance practices 
Durable cooperation 
between public and private 
actors which involves joint 
development of products, 
sharing of risks and which 
involves a joint 
organizational expression 
(adapted from Van Ham 
and Koppenjan 2001 & 
Klijn and Teisman 2005) 
Non-institutionalized 
network based policy 
relationships between 
private and public 
actors. 
Typical examples Infrastructure PPPs Local regeneration PPPs Policy networks, 
policy partnerships 
Illustration    
  
As also argued in article 5, a common distinction made in the theoretical discourse 
about PPP is PPP contracts (or concessions) and PPP as organizational cooperation 
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projects (Klijn and Teisman 2005). In the former different parts of infrastructure 
projects (design, construction, finance, operation and or maintenance) are integrated 
in a contract (Klijn and Teisman 2005, 98) while in the latter “different projects are 
integrated with each other in order to achieve surplus value”, and moreover the latter 
type of PPP is argued to involve more intensive interaction than the former type 
(Klijn and Teisman 2005, 98-100). Another author distinguishes between DBFM(O) 
projects (Design-Build-Finance-Maintain-Operate) and the alliance model (van der 
Wel 2004; for a similar distinction see Koppenjan 2005, 138). The alliance model 
refers to cases were cooperation has an organizational expression; i.e. a legal entity 
such as a joint venture (van der Wel 2004, 10) and the DBFM(O) model is similar to 
what Klijn and Teisman label PPP contracts. Correspondingly on a European 
Community level a distinction is made between the concession model and the joint 
venture model of PPP (Bergström 2006, 2; COM 2004). There thus appears to be 
increasing agreement about the existence of two main categories of PPP. First, that 
there is a group of PPPs that are exclusively made up of contractual links (different 
types of long-term contractual relations typically involving private finance, 
maintenance and/or operations). Secondly, that there is another group of PPPs 
which involves more integrated relationships between the involved public and private 
parties. Within this latter group there is a split between authors that explicitly assert 
that PPP involves some extent of joint organizational expression (e.g. COM 2004; 
van der Wel 2004; Wettenhall 2006), and other authors that stress that this version of 
PPP involves more cooperation in the sense that the involved public and private 
actors jointly find new solutions. In this latter understanding of the term, PPP has 
been defined as “co-operation of some durability between public and private actors 
in which they jointly develop products and services and share risks, costs and 
resources which are connected with these products or services” (Van Ham and 
Koppenjan 2001, 598; for a similar definition see Klijn and Teisman 2005, 96; and 
Klijn and Teisman 2000, 85). This definition does not limit the PPP term to joint 
organizational entities but broadens it to include a variety of different types of links 
between public and private actors. The structural form is not determined a priori 
(supposedly it can be a contract, a new organizational entity as well as a network). 
This lack of specification of what kind of structural arrangements cooperation 
involves can be argued to contribute to the conceptual ambiguity concerning PPP.  
In the first two PPP prototypes proposed here (contracts and 
organizational PPPs) cooperation involves some degree of institutionalization; i.e. 
cooperation is formalized. This is however not the case in relation to the third 
category – the network PPP. Here the PPP term is used much more broadly and 
encompasses loosely organized network structures and policy relationships which are 
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not project based (for instance, Rosenau 2000; Mörth and Sahlin-Andersson 2006; 
Marcussen 2007). 
The identification of different streams of literature (PPP approaches) 
and different prototypes of formal structures enables us to navigate more easily in 
the proliferating PPP literature. A further navigational tool can be added to these 
tools. The literature can be organized according to four different 
outlooks/perspectives on PPP (translated from the Danish term ‘blikke’). More 
specifically, we can distinguish between research that addresses project level, policy 
level and societal level issues. Finally, there is a fourth category labelled the discursive 
outlook on PPP, which can be described as a method rather than a distinct level of 
analysis. Within this latter outlook the researcher critically observes the phenomenon 
PPP while applying a discursanalytical method of inquiry (for a further elaboration of 
the four PPP outlooks, see Petersen and Weihe 2007). The majority of the extant 
research on PPP is related to project and policy level aspects of cooperation; e.g. 
descriptions of different types of PPP projects and different issues relating to PPP 
policies (for some examples, see Osborne 2000; Ghobadian et al. 2004; Hodge and 
Greve 2005). To a lesser extent PPP is studied as a general societal trend (for 
examples, see Mörth and Sahlin-Andersson 2006). The same goes for the discursive 
outlook on PPP (for some examples of this; see Andersen 2006; and Linder 1999). 
  Let me conclude this section by pointing out that there are cross-
country differences in the usage of the PPP term. While in the UK context, for 
example, PPP is explicitly used by the government as an umbrella term for many 
different types of public-private arrangements, in other countries, for instance 
Denmark, the government exclusively uses the term to refer to infrastructure PPPs 
(in the narrow understanding of the term); i.e. the design, build, finance, operate and 
maintenance of public infrastructure and associated services for a sustained period of 
time. In yet other countries, a broad version of the infrastructure PPP is adopted 
including any sort of infrastructure arrangement that falls between privatization on 
the one hand and full public provision of collective goods on the other hand (for an 
example of this approach visit the webpage of the Canadian Council for Public-
Private Partnerships; www.pppcouncil.ca). So in different policy contexts PPP can 
mean different things. This further adds to the conceptual ambiguity. 
 
5 BEYOND CONTRACTS – UNRAVELING PPP PRACTICE 
Let us now turn to the second research question: How do public and private partnership 
actors cooperate in practice in PPP? In other words, what characterizes the working 
relationship when we look beyond contracts? The initial empirical findings based on 
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the first data collection phase are available in compressed form in article 3 (the two 
data collection phases were described in Section 3.1). In article 3, the empirical 
findings are utilized vis-à-vis a discussion about PPP and public values. Article 5 
draws together the findings from the both data collection phases. In the present 
section, the findings about PPP practice will be briefly recapped. A more detailed 
analysis is available in Weihe 2007a and Weihe 2007c. The present section is 
structured in the following manner. First, the general logic and chronology of the 
empirical part of the analysis and the literature that has informed it is briefly outlined. 
Second, the reader is introduced to the main findings concerning PPP practice. As 
noted earlier, due to confidentiality issues, the identity of the cases is not revealed. 
 
5.1 Chronology of study 
The direction and logic of the study can be summarized into three logical steps (see 
Figure 4). First, a knowledge gap was identified in the PPP literature. Second, the 
strategic alliance literature was consulted because this body of literature contains 
relevant information about the aspects of cooperation that we are interested in here 
(see article 4). The third step was subsequently to study PPP practice empirically.  
 
Figure 4 Chronology of study 
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5.1.1 Step 1 – identifying the gap 
The analysis departs from the observation that there is a lack of knowledge about 
how PPPs operate in practice. This is in particular the case in relation to 
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infrastructure PPPs. As noted on the introductory pages, PPP research has until now 
primarily addressed structural and other technical aspects of cooperation (Ghobadian 
et al. 2004, 8, 289; Reeve and Hatter 2004; Langford 2002). Scholars have thus 
addressed formative aspects of cooperation such as designing the contract, political 
issues, risk issues, accounting issues as well as general PPP policy related issues (for 
instance, Evans and Bowman 2005; Hodge and Bowman 2004; Coghill and 
Woodward 2005; Corner 2005; Ball, Heafey and King 2004; Falconer and 
McLaughlin 2000). Some work has been made vis-à-vis PPP performance (for 
instance, Hodge and Greve 2007), and some work has moreover been done on PPP 
from a democratic accountability perspective, where questions concerning 
transparency and accountability have been addressed (Shaoul, Stafford and Stapleton 
2007; Mörth 2007). As noted above, some studies further address the PPP 
phenomenon from a discursive perspective (Linder 1999; Andersen 2006). Little to 
no attention has however been directed at the relational dimension of cooperation of 
PPP – we know very little about the cooperative processes that take place after 
contracts are signed; i.e., as argued in the introduction, operational as well as 
relational aspects have thus far been black-boxed. By now, however, scholars are 
increasingly beginning to point out that there is a need for more academic reflection 
regarding the ways active PPPs operate (see Ysa 2007, 51; Noble and Jones, 2006; 
Fischbacher and Beaumont 2003, 171). Thus despite the widely disseminated a priori 
assumptions about the character of cooperation in PPP arrangements, few studies 
actually address this dimension of cooperation and this is in particular the case 
relative to the infrastructure PPP. The generalized ideas about PPP are thus, as noted 
earlier, to a very little extent based on empirical observation. This, it is argued here, is 
inexpedient because the infrastructure understanding of the term is at the same time 
the most prevalent understanding. Moreover since, as noted in the introduction, 
billions of pounds are committed to this type of public-private arrangements every 
year, it is relevant to investigate how infrastructure PPPs materialize in practice.  
There are a handful of studies that address relational aspects of PPP. 
These do however not address PPP in the narrow understanding of the term (i.e. the 
infrastructure PPP). Examples are Edelenbos, Klijn and Steijn (2007), Noble and 
Jones (2006), and Ysa (2007). There are additionally studies that address the topic of 
coordination and collaboration generically but this work is not related specifically to 
PPP. Rather the focus is on understanding the concepts of cooperation, coordination 
and collaboration and/or themes in cooperation or the ingredients of effective 
cooperation (for instance, Huxham 1996; Huxham and Vangen 2004; Wood and 
Gray 1991; Thompson and Perry 2006; Rogers and Whetten 1982; Keast et al. 2007; 
Sullivan and Skelcher 2002). Rogers and Whetten are for instance only focusing on 
coordination among organizations and agencies in the public sector (1982), and Gray 
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and Wood dissect the collaboration concept drawing upon studies addressing as 
diverse topics as collaboration in the garment industry and public policy initiation at 
state level (1991). 
 
5.1.2 Step 2 – Consulting the alliance literature 
The second step in the analytical process was to confer with the alliance literature in 
order to learn from the related experience of a related discipline (see Weihe 2006 and 
article 4). In particular, the subcategory of alliance research that is concerned with 
processes and dyadic relationship aspects was reviewed (for instance, Ariño and de la 
Torre 1998; Doz 1996; Dyer and Singh 2004; Kanter 2002; and Ring and Van de Ven 
1994). This literature is particularly relevant because many of the features normally 
affiliated with PPP – e.g. trust, relational quality, and partnership processes – have 
been studied at quite some length within this subcategory of alliance research. 
Together with the theoretical discourse about PPP in the public management 
literature, this literature constitutes the general background against which PPP 
operational practice is studied. The alliance literature has guided the analytical focus 
of this analysis towards some aspects of cooperation as opposed to others. The key 
lesson/message of this body of literature can roughly be recapped in the following 
way: the way partnerships (alliances) materialize is not pre-destined by the nature of 
the deal itself or by the contractual features of cooperation (although these factors 
are certainly important as they condition cooperation and constitute the general 
framework in which social exchange takes place); rather partnerships evolve 
continuously and the way in which they evolve and the involved actors interact with 
one another can have important consequences for partnership performance. 
Relational features such as trust, relational quality, and the ability of the involved 
actors to bond with one another (relational competences) are highlighted as 
important performance antecedents (see article 4 and article 5). This suggests to us 
the importance of studying relational aspects of cooperation. From the alliance 
literature, three composite analytical parameters were derived that guided the analysis 
of PPP practice (see Appendices).31  
                                                 
 
31 The questionnaire used for the follow-up interviews in the second stage of data collection included 
two further parameters: management strategies and organizational features (i.e. tangible questions 
concerning project characteristics). In the case of the former, the evidence suggests that limited 
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Sullivan and Skelcher 2002). Rogers and Whetten are for instance only focusing on 
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and Wood dissect the collaboration concept drawing upon studies addressing as 
diverse topics as collaboration in the garment industry and public policy initiation at 
state level (1991). 
 
5.1.2 Step 2 – Consulting the alliance literature 
The second step in the analytical process was to confer with the alliance literature in 
order to learn from the related experience of a related discipline (see Weihe 2006 and 
article 4). In particular, the subcategory of alliance research that is concerned with 
processes and dyadic relationship aspects was reviewed (for instance, Ariño and de la 
Torre 1998; Doz 1996; Dyer and Singh 2004; Kanter 2002; and Ring and Van de Ven 
1994). This literature is particularly relevant because many of the features normally 
affiliated with PPP – e.g. trust, relational quality, and partnership processes – have 
been studied at quite some length within this subcategory of alliance research. 
Together with the theoretical discourse about PPP in the public management 
literature, this literature constitutes the general background against which PPP 
operational practice is studied. The alliance literature has guided the analytical focus 
of this analysis towards some aspects of cooperation as opposed to others. The key 
lesson/message of this body of literature can roughly be recapped in the following 
way: the way partnerships (alliances) materialize is not pre-destined by the nature of 
the deal itself or by the contractual features of cooperation (although these factors 
are certainly important as they condition cooperation and constitute the general 
framework in which social exchange takes place); rather partnerships evolve 
continuously and the way in which they evolve and the involved actors interact with 
one another can have important consequences for partnership performance. 
Relational features such as trust, relational quality, and the ability of the involved 
actors to bond with one another (relational competences) are highlighted as 
important performance antecedents (see article 4 and article 5). This suggests to us 
the importance of studying relational aspects of cooperation. From the alliance 
literature, three composite analytical parameters were derived that guided the analysis 
of PPP practice (see Appendices).31  
                                                 
 
31 The questionnaire used for the follow-up interviews in the second stage of data collection included 
two further parameters: management strategies and organizational features (i.e. tangible questions 
concerning project characteristics). In the case of the former, the evidence suggests that limited 
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In the open-ended initial phase of inquiry, the public and private partnership 
managers were asked to describe the partnership project they were involved with and 
the partnering relations. The second phase of inquiry involved close-end follow-up 
questions concerning the relationship features and interaction patterns. 
 
Collaboration vs. exchange 
Deriving from the alliance literature (Kanter 2002; Dyer and Singh 2004) and related 
research on collaboration (e.g. Thomson and Perry 2006; and Keast et al. 2007), a 
distinction can generally be made between a continuum of cooperative styles ranging 
from an exchange pole (which can be labelled selfish cooperation) to a collaboration 
pole (which can be labelled collective cooperation) (see also articles 3 and 5). The 
features of cooperation in the exchange pole are somewhat similar to what the 
contract literature labels transactional (hard) contracting, while the features of the 
collaborative pole resemble the features of relational contracting (Macneil 2000). For 
an overview of the features affiliated which the two ideal types of contracting, see 
Walker and Davis 1999; see also Ejersbo and Greve 2002). The features of the 
collaborative pole moreover coincide to some extent with the generalized idea about 
PPP as outlined on the introductory pages. The exchange pole on the other hand is 
quite similar to the way in which traditional contracting is normally depicted when 
contrasted with PPP (for instance, Klijn and Teisman 2005 and 2000). An important 
difference is however that Table 3 only encompasses relationship features, and not 
structural features of cooperation as do the other typologies (e.g. extent of 




                                                                                                                                     
 
deliberate management strategies in relation to altering organizational or relational features takes place. 
However, since different respondents interpret ‘management strategies’ differently, it is difficult to 
conclude anything from the answers. Finally the latter parameter concerning organizational features 
was used primarily as background information about each of the investigated cases.  
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Table 3 The cooperation continuum 
The exchange pole  
(selfish cooperation) 
The collaboration pole  
(collective cooperation.) 
Relational quality low 
Contract-centred (clear rules) 
Incomprehension 
Split purposes (lack of sense of joint goals) 
Minimal joint action 
Low intensity/connection 
Distanced relationship (no bonding) 
Unenthusiastic and reactive attitude 
Relational quality high 
Relationship-centred (trust) 
Attentiveness/empathy for partner 
Self-interest and collective interest aligned 
Joint decision and problem-solving 
High intensity/connection 
Close relationships (bonding) 
Positive and proactive attitude/mindset 
Source: article 5  
 
This general analytical distinction between an exchange pole and a collaborative pole 
provides us with a terminology that can be used for describing the features of 
cooperation – i.e. the partnership element – in the analysed PPP projects. It can be 
used as an analytical tool in relation to loosely classifying the identified collaborative 
practices. The features of the two poles can be debated, and the distinction between 
exchange and collaboration is a contestable one. In the context of this study, it is 
important to hold on to that the key objective is to highlight similarities and 
differences between operational practices in the examined PPP projects. Not to 
develop the conceptual understanding of the terms collaboration, cooperation and 
exchange (for efforts in this direction see, for instance, Keast et al. 2007; Wood and 
Gray 1991; and Thomson 2001). The objective here is instead to empirically look 
into how actors cooperate in practice, and for this purpose we have borrowed some 
analytical parameters that can guide our analytical attention towards some aspects of 
cooperation as opposed to others. 
In the type of alliance research utilized here, an assumption is that 
alliances that are closer to the collaboration pole will be more likely to achieve 
collaborative advantage. Collaborative advantage can been defined as “when 
something unusually creative is produced – perhaps an objective is met – that no one 
organization could have produced on its own and when each organization, through 
the collaboration, is able to achieve its own objectives better than it could alone” 
(Huxham 1993, 603). Thus some alliance scholars suggest that partnerships that 
involve “collaboration (creating new value together) rather than mere exchange (getting 
something back for what you put in)” are perceived as more successful (Kanter 2002, 
100; original emphasis by the author). By actually cooperating, the involved parties 




• Interaction patterns 
• Relational quality  
• Performance 
 
In the open-ended initial phase of inquiry, the public and private partnership 
managers were asked to describe the partnership project they were involved with and 
the partnering relations. The second phase of inquiry involved close-end follow-up 
questions concerning the relationship features and interaction patterns. 
 
Collaboration vs. exchange 
Deriving from the alliance literature (Kanter 2002; Dyer and Singh 2004) and related 
research on collaboration (e.g. Thomson and Perry 2006; and Keast et al. 2007), a 
distinction can generally be made between a continuum of cooperative styles ranging 
from an exchange pole (which can be labelled selfish cooperation) to a collaboration 
pole (which can be labelled collective cooperation) (see also articles 3 and 5). The 
features of cooperation in the exchange pole are somewhat similar to what the 
contract literature labels transactional (hard) contracting, while the features of the 
collaborative pole resemble the features of relational contracting (Macneil 2000). For 
an overview of the features affiliated which the two ideal types of contracting, see 
Walker and Davis 1999; see also Ejersbo and Greve 2002). The features of the 
collaborative pole moreover coincide to some extent with the generalized idea about 
PPP as outlined on the introductory pages. The exchange pole on the other hand is 
quite similar to the way in which traditional contracting is normally depicted when 
contrasted with PPP (for instance, Klijn and Teisman 2005 and 2000). An important 
difference is however that Table 3 only encompasses relationship features, and not 
structural features of cooperation as do the other typologies (e.g. extent of 




                                                                                                                                     
 
deliberate management strategies in relation to altering organizational or relational features takes place. 
However, since different respondents interpret ‘management strategies’ differently, it is difficult to 
conclude anything from the answers. Finally the latter parameter concerning organizational features 
was used primarily as background information about each of the investigated cases.  
41 
 
Table 3 The cooperation continuum 
The exchange pole  
(selfish cooperation) 
The collaboration pole  
(collective cooperation.) 
Relational quality low 
Contract-centred (clear rules) 
Incomprehension 
Split purposes (lack of sense of joint goals) 
Minimal joint action 
Low intensity/connection 
Distanced relationship (no bonding) 
Unenthusiastic and reactive attitude 
Relational quality high 
Relationship-centred (trust) 
Attentiveness/empathy for partner 
Self-interest and collective interest aligned 
Joint decision and problem-solving 
High intensity/connection 
Close relationships (bonding) 
Positive and proactive attitude/mindset 
Source: article 5  
 
This general analytical distinction between an exchange pole and a collaborative pole 
provides us with a terminology that can be used for describing the features of 
cooperation – i.e. the partnership element – in the analysed PPP projects. It can be 
used as an analytical tool in relation to loosely classifying the identified collaborative 
practices. The features of the two poles can be debated, and the distinction between 
exchange and collaboration is a contestable one. In the context of this study, it is 
important to hold on to that the key objective is to highlight similarities and 
differences between operational practices in the examined PPP projects. Not to 
develop the conceptual understanding of the terms collaboration, cooperation and 
exchange (for efforts in this direction see, for instance, Keast et al. 2007; Wood and 
Gray 1991; and Thomson 2001). The objective here is instead to empirically look 
into how actors cooperate in practice, and for this purpose we have borrowed some 
analytical parameters that can guide our analytical attention towards some aspects of 
cooperation as opposed to others. 
In the type of alliance research utilized here, an assumption is that 
alliances that are closer to the collaboration pole will be more likely to achieve 
collaborative advantage. Collaborative advantage can been defined as “when 
something unusually creative is produced – perhaps an objective is met – that no one 
organization could have produced on its own and when each organization, through 
the collaboration, is able to achieve its own objectives better than it could alone” 
(Huxham 1993, 603). Thus some alliance scholars suggest that partnerships that 
involve “collaboration (creating new value together) rather than mere exchange (getting 
something back for what you put in)” are perceived as more successful (Kanter 2002, 
100; original emphasis by the author). By actually cooperating, the involved parties 
can generate a supernormal profit (collaborative advantage) which they otherwise 
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could not have achieved (Dyer and Singh 2004, 351-352). The point to stress here is 
that ‘arms-length relationships’ (pure exchange relations) are not capable of 
producing supernormal profit (Dyer and Singh 2004, 351). That there is a connection 
between partnership performance and features of the partnership relationship is also 
suggested in the PPP literature (see Klijn and Teisman 2000 and 2005). It is 
important, though, to distinguish between different types of performance (e.g. cost 
savings, substantive improvement and innovative products; Klijn and Teisman 2005, 
97). Performance is generally difficult to establish in relation to partnerships because 
it can be measured in many different ways, and further there may be a distinction 
between process and output/outcome performance. Further, performance may vary 
depending on from what perspective it is assessed (public perspective, private 
perspective or project level perspective) (see article 5 and Section 5.2.3). 
 
5.1.3 Step 3 – Analysing PPP practice 
Finally, cooperative practice was studied in the selected PPP cases. The findings from 
this part of the study are concisely presented below (Section 5.2; see also article 3 and 
article 5). As noted earlier, the empirical analysis encompasses five PPP projects from 
three different policy sectors (defense, transport and health): 
 
1. A military establishment (case 1). 
2. A technology project concerning road network traffic management (case 2). 
3. A road project (case 3). 
4. A hospital project concerning the redevelopment of an existing hospital site 
(case 4). 
5. A hospital project concerning the new build of a hospital (case 5). 
 
A short description of each of the cases is available in article 5. 
 
5.2 Mapping PPP practice – opening up the black box 
When looking beyond contracts and instead attuning our attention towards how the 
involved actors actually co-labour (i.e. focusing on the partnership element of 
cooperation as opposed to institutional structures), a diversity of cooperative 
practices are revealed. While in some cases, there is a strong sense of partnership, in 
other cases, cooperation is adversarial and confrontational. The analysis reveals that 
the features of cooperation can vary markedly from case to case. Thus while on the 
surface, the formal organizing of the public-private relations is similar, beneath the 
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surface; the nature of cooperation varies. While the findings suggest that the majority 
of the examined cases are somewhat closer to the exchange pole, and thus remain 
aspirational relative to the global idea about PPP, this study also reveals that 
infrastructure PPPs can evolve into collaborative partnerships that converge with the 
general global idea about highly intense and trust-based relations, high levels of 
relational quality, joint decision-making and a sense of working together towards a 
joint goal. How cooperation unfolds in practice thus also seems to depend on how 
the involved actors manage and interpret the contract. This in turn seems to be 
connected with partnership performance as perceived by the involved actors (Section 
5.2.3). Although the contract is a central element in the infrastructure PPP, and 
although cooperation is highly formalized, relationship elements remain important 
too. Not everything in a contract is contractual (Ejersbo and Greve 2002, 18; 
originally Hodgson 1988, 57), and this leaves room for unforeseen events and issues 
that the involved actors have to manage in an ad hoc manner. How well such 
unforeseen events are managed depends partly on the type of working relationship 
that has been established between the involved actors. Therefore, the key argument 
here will be that no matter how onerous the contract, effective cooperation always to 
some extent relies on how the involved actors interact and work together in practice. 
The empirical findings of this study can be summarized into the following key points: 
 
1. The pattern of interaction varies from case to case. 
2. There is variation in the way in which the involved actors cooperate (i.e. the 
cases are scattered along the exchange-collaboration continuum with the 
majority of the cases resembling primarily the exchange pole).  
3. There are two outlier cases among the five cases, one of which displays many 
of the features affiliated with the collaborative pole (collective cooperation), 
and one which assumes many of the features of the exchange pole (selfish 
cooperation). 
4. There is a connection between how the involved actors cooperate and 
perceived partnership performance. 
5. Trust evolves over time (and generally tends to increase). 
 
Below, each of these five findings will be discussed chronologically.  
 
5.2.1 Ad 1 Varying Patterns of Interaction 
As already noted, infrastructure PPPs consist of highly complex contracts with a 
complex web of contractual agreements between various actors, including banks, 
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guarantors, subcontractors and dept financiers (see Figure 5). For the matter of 
simplicity, only the key institutional actors are depicted here. For a more detailed 
illustration of the PPP contract structure see Evans and Bowman (2005, 73). 
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The key actors in an infrastructure PPP are the public sector client and the Special 
Purpose Vehicle (SPV). It is between the public sector client and the SPV that the 
core PPP contract is. The SPV is normally a joint venture between a construction 
company and a service provider. The SPV has its own organizational identity and is 
regulated by UK company law. Below the SPV, there are two prime subcontractors 
(a PS construction company and a PS service provider), which both are normally 
affiliated with the companies in the SPV. Below the PS companies there are a 
number of further subcontractors that are in a contractual relationship with the PS 
companies. In the operational phase, the key interface is between the SPV, the public 
sector client, and the PS service provider. The PS construction company plays only a 
minimal role after the PPP has entered the service delivery period (see Figure 2 in 
article 3 for an overview of the different phases in an infrastructure PPP). This is 
reflected in differing partnering relationships between the different types of actors 
involved. This has implications for future research on PPP (see section 6). 
The analysis of interaction patterns further reveals that the patterns of 
interaction vary from case to case. While in some cases (case 3, the road case) all 
interaction at the public-private interface takes place between the SPV and the public 
sector client, in other cases (case 4, the rebuild hospital case) the SPV assumes a 
more distant role and most interaction takes place between the public-sector client 
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and the PS companies. In yet other cases, interaction takes place evenly between the 
public sector client, the SPV and the PS company (the defense case, the technology 
case, and the new built hospital). Hence, management styles vary across cases. In 
some projects, there is hands-on management by the SPV, in other projects the SPV 
primarily functions behind the scenes. What is important to hold on to in this 
connection is that interaction patterns and intensity of interaction varies not only 
from case to case but also within cases. Thus, when examining infrastructure PPPs, 
analyzing only one relational tie may not give an adequate picture of cooperation. 
This has implications for future studies of PPP, which is something that will be 
touched upon in Section 6.3. 
 
5.2.2 Ad 2 and 3 Divergent Partnership Practices 
The majority of the investigated PPP projects are, as noted above, closer to the 
exchange pole of cooperation than the collaboration pole (this is loosely illustrated in 
Figure 6). In other words, cooperation in most of the examined PPP projects does 
not match the typical global idea about PPP. Figure 6 loosely illustrates the type of 
cooperative relationships that were uncovered in the examined cases. Note that it 
does not illustrate the differences between the five cases in a quantitative or an 
absolute sense. Rather it depicts the cases in a comparative and qualitative sense.    
 
Figure 6 Case overview – distribution of cases according to cooperative practice 
  








* C1 = Case 1, C2 = Case 2 etc. 
** Source: article 5 
 
Closest to the exchange end of the continuum, the two transport sector cases can be 
positioned (i.e. the technology PPP = Case 2; and the road PPP = Case 3). These 
two cases displayed the least extent of collectiveness in the working relationship. In 
the technology case the public-private relations were strained and cooperation 
confrontational. There were clear signs of distrust and a lack of communication 
between the involved parties. Relational quality at the public-private interface was 
thus comparatively low. Further, in this case, there was also a discrepancy between 
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Closest to the exchange end of the continuum, the two transport sector cases can be 
positioned (i.e. the technology PPP = Case 2; and the road PPP = Case 3). These 
two cases displayed the least extent of collectiveness in the working relationship. In 
the technology case the public-private relations were strained and cooperation 
confrontational. There were clear signs of distrust and a lack of communication 
between the involved parties. Relational quality at the public-private interface was 
thus comparatively low. Further, in this case, there was also a discrepancy between 
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how the public and private partnership managers approached the PPP. While the 
public sector project managers put more emphasis on the contractual dimension, the 
private sector managers emphasise the importance of the relationship dimension. 
Thus the private sector representatives complained about a lack of partnering 
behaviour from the public sector counterpart. The development of a partnering 
relationship in this case was further impeded by the fact that external advisors 
(consultants) to a large extent were managing the contract for the public sector client. 
This reduced the possibility for a partnering relationship to emerge. Due to the 
adversarial and contractual approach in the technology cases, cooperation was 
experienced as slow, burdensome and painful and the managers complained about 
being bogged down into interpreting the wordings of contracts. In Huxham and 
Vangen’s terminology, cooperation in this case was marked by inertia rather than 
collaborative advantage (Huxham 2003, 403). In the other transport case (the road 
project: case 3), cooperation was also primarily exchange based and contract-centred 
but however did not involve the same degree of strained relationships and inertia as 
the technology case. The importance of working together was not emphasised as an 
important element of cooperation. Personal ties were further weak. The road case 
further involved limited interaction between the public and private project managers. 
This is partly explained by the fact that there is no co-location of partnership 
managers in this PPP.  
PPP practice in the defence case (case 1) differs significantly from that 
in the two transport cases. Here, the involved actors share a strong feeling of 
working together towards a joint goal, individual interests are aligned, there are high 
levels of trust at the public-private interface, and the working relationship is generally 
marked by mutuality and reciprocity. There are further strong personal bonds 
between the key public and private partnership managers on location. Particularly 
distinct with this case is that the involved partnership managers stress that they work 
together to find joint solutions, and moreover that success is achieved exactly 
because of these joint efforts. As noted by one of the interviewed managers: “This 
has been without shadow of a doubt a success for both of us […]. It is something 
that we worked out together” (my emphasis added). This case distinguishes itself in the 
sense that the importance of working together and the partnering relations are 
repeatedly highlighted by the involved actors. Another distinct feature is that there is 
a strong commitment and ownership to the project among the partnership managers. 
Uncertainties and unforeseen problems are managed effectively and cooperation 
unfolds in a harmonious manner. Conflicts are to a higher extent than in the two 
transport cases managed without automatic reference to the contract. The defence 
case can therefore be positioned closest to the collaboration pole (collective 
cooperation) on the cooperation continuum in Figure 6. 
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Between the two transport cases and the defence case, somewhat 
closer to the transport cases, the two hospital PPPs can be positioned. In both 
hospital cases, fairly constructive working relationships have been established. 
Cooperation does however not assume the same extent of collaborative features as 
the defence case (case 1). There is also a slight difference between the two hospital 
cases in the sense that in one of the projects, there is variation in cooperative 
behavior and attitudes among the various actors. Thus while on the SPV level, it is 
emphasised that cooperation is not so contractual and that both parties – public and 
private – want the project to be a success, on the PS level cooperation is depicted as 
being more conflicting and contractual. Therefore, one of the hospital cases (case 5) 
has been positioned somewhat closer to the exchange pole than the other hospital 
(case 4). 
 From the case analyses, the essential thing to draw attention to is the 
two outlier cases; the technology case and the defence case. These two cases display 
significantly different partnership practices. While the former is contract-centred, 
confrontational and adversarial (selfish cooperation), the latter is relationship-centred 
and involves a strong sense of collectiveness (collective cooperation). These 
pronounced case differences correspond with the partnership managers’ own ratings 
of the levels of trust, reciprocity and joint decision-making in the partnering 
relationship (see Figure 7). Thus when asked to rate these dimensions of cooperation 
on a scale from 1 to 10 where 10 was the highest grade possible, a similar pattern 
emerged as that depicted earlier in Figure 6. Again, we see pronounced case 
differences between the technology case (case 2) and the defence sector case (case 1). 
The same pattern (distribution of cases) re-emerges in relation to the general 
relational quality in the five PPPs (see Table 5 and Table 7 in Appendix 2; see also 
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Between the two transport cases and the defence case, somewhat 
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Figure 7 further suggests that there is a connection between relationship features and 
partnership performance (the figure above illustrates the partnership managers’ rating 
of performance on a scale from 1 to 10 where 10 was the highest score possible). 
The identified connection between the features of the partnering relationship and 
perceived performance is also consistent relative to other performance dimensions 
such as satisfaction with project outcome, innovation, and reputation enhancement 
(see questions 18-22 in Appendix 2). Partnership performance will be commented 
upon further in Section 5.2.3.  
The findings from the case analyses suggest that assumptions about 
how actors cooperate cannot be exclusively derived from formal structures. As we 
have seen above (and in article 3 and 5) there are quite large differences in the 
cooperative styles that have materialized in the different cases. This is in particular 
epitomized by the pronounced case differences in the defence case and the 
technology case. On this basis it can be argued that a partnership, understood as 
collaborative and trust-based relations, is not something that mechanically can be 
affiliated with certain types of structural arrangements as sometimes suggested in the 
literature (e.g., Wettenhall 2007). A partnership, can, based on the evidence of this 
study, also emerge in the type of arrangements that in the literature are speculated to 
be strictly exchange based. Thus, as argued in article 5, even an infrastructure PPP 
can involve collaborative behaviour.  
The findings further suggest that the prevalence of a global idea about 
PPP being something qualitatively different from previous practices is problematic. It 
is problematic for two reasons. First, the dominant meaning of the term relates to a 
public-private arrangement which involves little natural partnership. The 
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infrastructure PPP, as argued earlier, concerns contractual arrangements that do not 
diverge qualitatively from earlier contracting practices other than that there is an 
extension of the contracting period, involvement of private finance and further a 
bundling of different project elements (design, construction, operation, and 
maintenance). Second, and perhaps more importantly, the findings here suggest that 
the type of assumptions about cooperation that are contained in the global idea 
about PPP cannot be automatically prescribed to certain governance structures.  
 
5.2.3 Ad 4 Partnership Practice and Partnership Performance 
As noted earlier, partnership performance is difficult to measure and can further be 
measured in a host of different ways (Olk 2006). Performance is, in the context of 
this study, measured as perceived performance by the interviewed partnership 
managers. As argued in article 5, within strategic alliance research this is a relative 
commonplace and accepted way of measuring performance (Kale et al. 2002, 753) 
and a strong correlation has further been identified between such subjective 
measures of performance and financial/objective measures (Geringer and Hebert 
1991). Here the interviewed partnership managers were asked to rank performance 
on a number of dimensions, including satisfaction with project outcomes, 
innovation, reputation enhancement, cost savings, surplus value, and the extent to 
which the construction element of the project was finished on time and within 
budget (see Appendix 2). Bearing in mind the methodological caveats concerning 
measuring performance in this manner, interesting patterns do emerge. There is a 
clear connection between PPP practice and partnership performance. This is the case 
regardless how performance is measured. Thus while displaying the most 
collaborative features; the defence case (case 1) also appears to be the highest 
performing case in relation to all the performance dimensions noted above. At the 
same time, the exact opposite is the case for the other outlier case, i.e. the technology 
case (case 2), which displays the lowest levels of perceived performance. 
 However, as argued in article 5, premature conclusions concerning the 
connection between partnership practice and partnership performance should 
however not be made. First, the examined projects are only at the early stages of 
service delivery which makes it difficult to say anything conclusive about partnership 
performance. Second, we do not know the direction of the causality. It may very well 
be that the partnering relationship in the defence case is collaborative exactly because 
it performs so well. In other words, a collaborative and trust-based relationship has 
emerged on the basis of well-functioning project. However, regardless what direction 
the causality has, there is a clear connection between perceived performance and the 
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relationship features that can be identified in the identified cases. This finding 
corresponds with alliance research on the importance of intangible aspects of 
cooperation such as trust and relational quality (for instance, Dyer and Chu 2003; 
Büchel and Killing 2002; see also article 4 and Weihe 2006). 
 
5.2.4 Ad 4 Trust evolves over time and varies at different levels of the partnership 
Trust levels generally seem to increase over time, and this is particularly the case in 
relation to the level of trust between the public sector party and the private actors 
that are involved in the operation and maintenance of the asset in the long run (i.e. 
the PS service provider and the public sector party). A majority of the partnership 
mangers thus state that trust levels between the public sector party and the PS service 
provider has increased or strongly increased over time. This is also the case in 
relation to the relational tie between the SPV and the public sector body where 
approximately half of the managers assert that trust levels have increased over time. 
This finding corresponds with findings from related research on collaboration which 
suggests that trust is something that is gradually built up over time (see Huxham and 
Vangen 2004, 194-195). Correspondingly, scholars adopting a process perspective on 
inter-organizational cooperation suggest that trust levels can vary over time and 
propose that if commitments “are executed in an efficient and equitable manner, 
they will continue with or expand their mutual commitments. If these commitments 
are not executed in an efficient and equitable manner, the parties will initiate 
corrective measures by either renegotiating or reducing their commitments to the 
cooperative IOR [inter-organizational relationship]. Underlying these heuristics is a 
more complicated set of informal social-psychological dynamics that go on and that 
explain how and why cooperative IORs evolve through repetitive sequences of 
formal negotiation, commitment, and execution stages or events” (Ring and Van de 
Ven 1994, 99).  
In relation to the PS construction companies, trust does not evolve in 
the same way as in relation to the other two key institutional actors (i.e. the SPV and 
the PS service provider). Hence the majority of the partnership managers assert that 
trust levels between the public sector party and the construction company has 
remained the same or declined over time. This finding is not so surprising when 
considering the fact that, as noted earlier, construction companies leave the scene 
and move on to the next project soon after construction has been finalized. The 
construction companies are therefore not involved in the partnership in the long run 
to the same extent as the other actors in the PPP. The identified variation in 
relationship features across the different sets of relational ties is an important finding 
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relative to future research on cooperation in infrastructure PPPs (see Section 6.3 
which deals with methodological implications of this study). 
 
5.2.5 Some Emergent Findings 
One important question emerges from the findings: Why do similarly structured 
PPPs materialize in such different manners? Analysing how institutions influence 
cooperation was not a part of the research design of this study, however emerging 
inductively from the data is the finding that PPP practice differs somewhat from 
policy sector to policy sector. In brief, path-dependencies, cultural traits and 
structural features of the different policy sectors seem to influence PPP practice (see 
article 5). In particular there seems to be a difference between how infrastructure 
PPP is approached in the defence sector relative to the transport sector. PPP practice 
in the transport sector seems to be infused by a hard contract culture specific to the 
road industry while in the defence sector a more relationship-centred approach 
seems to be adopted. This is something that several of the private sector partnership 
managers with experience from both sectors point out. The fact that the Ministry of 
Defence (MoD) operates with a Soft Issues Bid Evaluation Tool (SIBET) when 
selecting its suppliers further supports the assumption that a relationship-centred 
approach is pursued. When selecting suppliers, the MoD not only evaluates the 
traditional hard issues (cost, quality, time and delivery) but also takes into 
consideration relationship factors, culture, strategy, and change management. SIBET 
is, according to the MoD, based on an interest in establishing close and collaborative 
relationships with suppliers.32 Nevertheless, the suggestions here remain rather 
speculative for several reasons. First, as noted above, institutional differences and 
how these influence cooperation have not been systematically studied in this research 
project. Second, the small N of this study hardly makes it possible to generalize 
about PPP practice in the concerned three policy sectors. More research it needed in 
order to determine the prevalence of policy sector differences. What we can say here 
is however that there are certain interesting patterns that future research can address. 
The identified patterns are intriguing in the sense that although the infrastructure 
PPP is presented as a somewhat generic policy tool, in practice we see that it can 
                                                 
 
32 For more information about SIBET, see www.aof.mod.uk (i.e. the webpage of the MoD’s 
Acquisition Operating Framework). 
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assume quite different features. Research on organizational translation (e.g. 
Czarniawska and Sévon 1996) and institutional theory (for an overview, see Hall and 
Taylor 1996) may offer important insights on this topic. As noted by Pollitt, 
convergence can occur on different levels, and convergence on the discursive and 
decisional level does not mean practice convergence too (2001). 
 Finally, as also argued for in article 5, individuals seem to play an 
important role in relation to how cooperation materializes. This is a recurrent theme 
in the interview data, where a majority of the partnership managers point out that the 
behaviour of key individuals is central for the effectiveness of cooperation (see 
statements in Box 1.1. in article 5). This gives grounds for analysing the determinants 
of the partnership behavior of individual partnership managers. For instance, we 
would like to know more about how factors such as professional and educational 
backgrounds, experience and the managerial mandate from the organizational parent 
influences the way in which PPP managers approach cooperation. Another aspect 
that can be explored further is how institutional differences between the public and 
the private sector can influence the cooperative relationship. A recurrent theme in 
the interview data was that actors within one sector (public or private) have a priori 
assumptions about the intentions and behaviour of actors in the opposing sector. 
More specifically, reservations and a priori prejudice (stereotyping practices) about 
the motives and work procedures of the opposing sector appear to be quite 
commonplace (Weihe 2007c). Such differences can be speculated to act as barriers in 
relation to moving cooperation beyond mere exchange relations and towards the 
type of collaborative relations that the private-private partnership literature prescribes 
as being decisive for realizing synergy and collaborative advantage in partnerships.  
 
6 CONCLUSION 
This dissertation commenced with two key observations from which the 
dissertation’s two research questions were derived:  
 
• What does PPP mean?  
• How do public and private partnership actors cooperate in practice in PPPs?  
 
The first observation was that although PPPs are widely disseminated, and that 
massive amounts of resources are spent on PPP policies globally, there is 
simultaneously surprisingly little convergence vis-à-vis the meaning of the term. PPP 
has become a catch-all label which encompasses more or less any arrangement that 
merely involves public and private actors. This gave the occasion for a re-
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examination of the meaning of PPP. The aim of this part of the study was to identify 
different usages of the term in the scholarly literature. This part of the analysis led to 
an organizing of the PPP literature, a classification of different categories of PPP, 
and the development of the definitions of three PPP prototypes (Section 4, article 2, 
and article 4). The conclusion concerning the meaning of PPP is, in brief, that it is a 
diluted term with little immediate value as an analytical concept. The nebulousness of 
the term seriously hampers theory development. As a middle-ground between 
abandoning the term altogether, and narrowing down the concept to mean only one 
specific thing however, this study proposes that a better way forward for future PPP 
research is to explicitly operate with different PPP approaches and to specify what 
category and prototype of PPP is being addressed. This sort of clarity is a 
prerequisite for future theory development in the field, and perhaps more 
importantly it is also a precondition for the enabling of policy guidelines that can 
direct future policies and decision-making processes concerning PPP. 
The second observation that this study departed from concerns the 
outspread and firm belief, in theory as well as in practice, that PPP heralds a new era, 
where classical adversarial relations between public and private actors are now 
evaporating and being replaced by cooperative trust-based relations. Seemingly PPP 
promises a new cross between the dogmatic positions of nationalization and 
privatization respectively where control is being replaced by trust, output- by a 
process-focus, hierarchy by horizontal structures, and principal-agent relations are 
being transformed into principal-principal relations. As opposed to previous 
practices, PPPs are taken to imply intense and trust-based co-labouring an altruistic 
behaviour rather than mere exchange-based opportunistic behaviour. This was on 
the introductory pages coined the global idea about PPP. However, although widely 
disseminated, little empirical research was available to support this notion of PPP. 
This second observation led to the analysis of PPP practice. The key aim of this part 
of the analysis was to empirically unravel the characteristics of the partnering 
relationship. The conclusion of this exercise is that, contrary to the general global 
idea about PPP, the most prevailing form of PPP (i.e. the infrastructure PPP) 
concerns hard line contract relations that have an affinity towards relations marked 
by exchange, inflexibility and separation─not trust and collaboration. Thus, relative 
to the broader public management literature, this analysis suggests that PPP in the 
infrastructure understanding of the term does not present a qualitative shift in public-
private relations. Rather, it seems to be just another step on the learning curve within 
the already well-known New Public Management Paradigm (Hood 1991). There is 
indeed very little natural partnership between the public and private actors in the 
infrastructure version of PPP, and further cooperative practice in the majority of the 
cases examined here resembles primarily the transactional and exchange-based style 
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the already well-known New Public Management Paradigm (Hood 1991). There is 
indeed very little natural partnership between the public and private actors in the 
infrastructure version of PPP, and further cooperative practice in the majority of the 
cases examined here resembles primarily the transactional and exchange-based style 
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of cooperation outlined in Section 5.1.2. This suggests that relative to the 
infrastructure PPP the term partnership can be accused of being somewhat of a 
misnomer. That being said however, the empirical analysis also reveals that 
embedded within these rigid contractual arrangements, partnerships in the general 
understanding of the word can emerge. Effectively, the empirical analysis reveals that 
similarly structured PPPs can materialize in highly different manners. This was in particular 
epitomized by the two outlier cases examined here. These two cases displayed 
qualitatively different styles of post-contract cooperation. The empirical findings 
suggest that there is reason to believe that partnership contracts in themselves are 
very limited sources of information about PPP practice.   
 
6.1 Conceptual implications 
In the scholarly discourse about PPP there is a common binary distinction between 
governance PPPs and infrastructure PPPs (see article 5). Further, in the literature, 
certain relationship features tend to be associated with each of these two general 
types of PPP. In particular, features such as collaboration, trust, and social capital are 
associated with the governance type of PPP, while the infrastructure PPP is 
renowned for a lack of such partnership characteristics (see article 5 where this 
argument is unfolded). The analysis here however suggests that the conventional 
binary distinctions are unfortunate since, as already argued above; governance 
processes do not mechanically follow governance structures. When keeping in mind 
that formal structures of cooperation do not mirror what goes on behind the 
contractual scene, the need for a re-conceptualization of PPP becomes evident. 
Based on the findings of this study, a two-dimensional approach to PPP, which 
distinguishes between PPP structures and PPP processes, can be advocated for (see also 
article 2 which contains a provisional typology of PPP based on this two-dimensional 
logic). This conceptualization simply means that a partnership in the traditional 
meaning of the word can emerge in various types of structures. Whether a 
contractual, network based or joint organizational PPP, ex post-contract cooperation 
can assume variable characteristics.  
    
6.2 Managerial implications 
The findings of this study suggest that a partnership is not something which 
automatically can be achieved by structural design. Rather, as already emphasised, 
similarly structured arrangements can involve varying degrees of partnership, as 
demonstrated in article 5 and Section 5.2. This implies that in addition to designing 
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appropriate governance structures, continuous and conscious managerial attention 
should be directed towards managing the partnering relationship. This becomes 
particularly pertinent when keeping in mind the identified connection between 
partnership practice and perceived partnership performance. Considerations about 
how to organize and manage the cooperative relationship over time may in the long-
run bring about more effective cooperation, open information exchange, lower 
transaction costs and perhaps more innovative solutions. The evidence from the 
defence case points in this direction. Keeping in mind the long-term nature of the 
infrastructure PPP (with an average length of 30-35 years) managing the relationship 
becomes only the more pertinent. Even so, few organizations have strategies for how 
to manage operational projects and how to interact with the opposing partner. In 
policy practice there is now a rising interest in this topic and the challenges that arise 
in operational infrastructure PPPs. Thus, in March 2006, on behalf of HM Treasury, 
Partnerships UK (which is itself a PPP between public and private sector actors with 
the aim to support PPP activity in the UK) published a report on Operational PFI 
Projects (see Partnerships UK 2006). In the same year, the HM Treasury published 
the policy document PFI: Strengthening Long Term Partnerships (see HM Treasury 
2006). And further, in 2006, an Operational Taskforce was established on behalf of 
the Treasury within PartnershipsUK. Moreover, the National Audit Office in the UK 
is now offering courses on how to successfully manage PPP relationships in 
operational projects.33 These latest developments suggest that practitioners are facing 
operational challenges and that there is a demand for guidelines on how to manage 
these challenges.  
 
6.3 Methodological Implications 
The empirical part of this analysis has generated a number of important 
methodological lessons, which can be utilized in relation to future research on PPP. 
In particular, three key lessons will be highlighted here. First, one of the major 
advantages of adopting a micro-level approach to studying cooperative practice is 
that detailed knowledge is gained about the various types of institutional actors 
involved in an infrastructure PPP. Infrastructure PPPs can be argued to be a 
collection or a pyramid of relational ties where each tie can assume different features. 
                                                 
 
33 See http://www.nao.org.uk/practice_areas/private_finance/programme.htm#managing 
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Thus the analysis here reveals that the drivers and approaches to cooperation vary at 
different project levels. The construction companies, for example, have different 
roles than the service providers. Further there is important variation in the degree of 
trust in the different relational ties with the lowest levels of trust appearing between 
the public sector party and the construction companies. These within project 
differences suggest that studies of PPP that only distinguish between public and 
private actors may not bring about a coherent depiction of the features of 
cooperation because the findings may vary according to what type of project actors 
are included in the analysis (e.g. representatives for the construction companies, the 
service provider or the SPV). This has implications for choice of interviewees or 
respondents. More specifically careful consideration must be made concerning choice 
of project representatives because this can be speculated to have consequences for 
the findings. Second, a similar argument can be put forward in relation to the 
maturity of PPP projects. Judging from the interview data, interaction modes vary 
throughout the different stages of cooperation. Hence analyses of cooperation in the 
formative stages may give a somewhat different impression than analyses of 
cooperation in the operational stage. This has implications for the selection of cases 
in PPP research because mature cases may display somewhat different features than 
cases in their early years of construction. A third lesson, and related to the first one, 
is that when aiming at achieving a deeper understanding of PPP, it is expedient to 
interview both the public and the private partners involved in the project. The reason 
for this is that accounts of a given PPP can vary depending on which party to the 
contract is interviewed. The public sector party, for instance, may give a rather 
different account of the project than the private sector counterpart. 34 Thus by 
interviewing actors from both sides of the contract, a more adequate picture of 
cooperation can be achieved. Finally, the finding that contextual factors may 
condition PPP practice suggests that a cross-sector comparative approach to studying 
PPP is beneficial because this gives a more representative picture of PPP practice. 
Studying only for instance PPPs in the defense sector may not bring about a 
representative portrait of PPP practice in the UK. 
  
                                                 
 
34 For example, in one of the cases examined here, there were important differences in the public and 
private sector representatives’ accounts of cooperation. 
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6.4 Limitations of Findings 
There are a number of limitations associated with the findings of this analysis. Here, 
it will suffice to highlight three such limitations. The first relates to the choice of 
interviewees. It is conceivable that a different group of actors – for instance, in 
relation to the hospital cases, this could be local politicians, clinical staff, patient 
groups and other stakeholders – would have characterized the examined cases 
somewhat differently than the public and private partnership managers that have 
been interviewed here did. Further, it is possible that the interviewed partnerships 
managers to some extent are inclined to conceal problematic issues since they 
themselves have a stake in the performance of the partnerships. This may have 
skewed the findings somewhat. The second limitation concerns that this study 
focuses on the early years of the operational phase. The period from when the idea 
about PPP is first conceived over the prolonged tendering phase to the final stages of 
the operational phase has not been included in the analysis. Therefore, the findings 
of this study may be accused of being limited to only a subset of the partnership life-
cycle. Third and related to this is the concern that it is too early to say anything final 
about performance in the investigated projects – they are still in their relative early 
days of service delivery. Further, since performance relative to PPP is 
multidimensional (e.g. cost savings, quality, durability, innovation, reputation, and 
synergy) it is difficult to say anything conclusive about this – even when projects are 
completed.  
Finally, in light of the small number of PPP projects analysed here, 
some reservations must be made concerning the overall application and 
generalizability of the findings. The analysis here has generated detailed knowledge 
about PPP practice in five cases but this cannot, however, be generalized to the 
broader population of PPP projects in a statistical way (Yin 1994, 31). Further, since 
all the cases are studied within the UK, the concern may also be raised that the 
revealed features of cooperation are specific to the UK context. Future studies will 
have to determine whether or not, for instance, the features of cooperation in Danish 
PPP projects resemble those of the UK counterpart. The Varieties of Capitalism 
literature within the scholarly field of political economy suggests to us that there are 
important difference between a liberal marked economy (LME), such as the UK 
economy, and the Danish coordinated marked economy (CME), where in the latter 
case political and social institutions have played a more active and direct role in 
shaping economic action (see Hall and Soskice 2001). Historically the public-private 
divide has been shaped somewhat differently in the two countries, and there are 
therefore reasons to believe that cooperation may materialize somewhat differently in 
these different contexts. Correspondingly, within the related discipline of strategic 
56 
 
Thus the analysis here reveals that the drivers and approaches to cooperation vary at 
different project levels. The construction companies, for example, have different 
roles than the service providers. Further there is important variation in the degree of 
trust in the different relational ties with the lowest levels of trust appearing between 
the public sector party and the construction companies. These within project 
differences suggest that studies of PPP that only distinguish between public and 
private actors may not bring about a coherent depiction of the features of 
cooperation because the findings may vary according to what type of project actors 
are included in the analysis (e.g. representatives for the construction companies, the 
service provider or the SPV). This has implications for choice of interviewees or 
respondents. More specifically careful consideration must be made concerning choice 
of project representatives because this can be speculated to have consequences for 
the findings. Second, a similar argument can be put forward in relation to the 
maturity of PPP projects. Judging from the interview data, interaction modes vary 
throughout the different stages of cooperation. Hence analyses of cooperation in the 
formative stages may give a somewhat different impression than analyses of 
cooperation in the operational stage. This has implications for the selection of cases 
in PPP research because mature cases may display somewhat different features than 
cases in their early years of construction. A third lesson, and related to the first one, 
is that when aiming at achieving a deeper understanding of PPP, it is expedient to 
interview both the public and the private partners involved in the project. The reason 
for this is that accounts of a given PPP can vary depending on which party to the 
contract is interviewed. The public sector party, for instance, may give a rather 
different account of the project than the private sector counterpart. 34 Thus by 
interviewing actors from both sides of the contract, a more adequate picture of 
cooperation can be achieved. Finally, the finding that contextual factors may 
condition PPP practice suggests that a cross-sector comparative approach to studying 
PPP is beneficial because this gives a more representative picture of PPP practice. 
Studying only for instance PPPs in the defense sector may not bring about a 
representative portrait of PPP practice in the UK. 
  
                                                 
 
34 For example, in one of the cases examined here, there were important differences in the public and 
private sector representatives’ accounts of cooperation. 
57 
 
6.4 Limitations of Findings 
There are a number of limitations associated with the findings of this analysis. Here, 
it will suffice to highlight three such limitations. The first relates to the choice of 
interviewees. It is conceivable that a different group of actors – for instance, in 
relation to the hospital cases, this could be local politicians, clinical staff, patient 
groups and other stakeholders – would have characterized the examined cases 
somewhat differently than the public and private partnership managers that have 
been interviewed here did. Further, it is possible that the interviewed partnerships 
managers to some extent are inclined to conceal problematic issues since they 
themselves have a stake in the performance of the partnerships. This may have 
skewed the findings somewhat. The second limitation concerns that this study 
focuses on the early years of the operational phase. The period from when the idea 
about PPP is first conceived over the prolonged tendering phase to the final stages of 
the operational phase has not been included in the analysis. Therefore, the findings 
of this study may be accused of being limited to only a subset of the partnership life-
cycle. Third and related to this is the concern that it is too early to say anything final 
about performance in the investigated projects – they are still in their relative early 
days of service delivery. Further, since performance relative to PPP is 
multidimensional (e.g. cost savings, quality, durability, innovation, reputation, and 
synergy) it is difficult to say anything conclusive about this – even when projects are 
completed.  
Finally, in light of the small number of PPP projects analysed here, 
some reservations must be made concerning the overall application and 
generalizability of the findings. The analysis here has generated detailed knowledge 
about PPP practice in five cases but this cannot, however, be generalized to the 
broader population of PPP projects in a statistical way (Yin 1994, 31). Further, since 
all the cases are studied within the UK, the concern may also be raised that the 
revealed features of cooperation are specific to the UK context. Future studies will 
have to determine whether or not, for instance, the features of cooperation in Danish 
PPP projects resemble those of the UK counterpart. The Varieties of Capitalism 
literature within the scholarly field of political economy suggests to us that there are 
important difference between a liberal marked economy (LME), such as the UK 
economy, and the Danish coordinated marked economy (CME), where in the latter 
case political and social institutions have played a more active and direct role in 
shaping economic action (see Hall and Soskice 2001). Historically the public-private 
divide has been shaped somewhat differently in the two countries, and there are 
therefore reasons to believe that cooperation may materialize somewhat differently in 
these different contexts. Correspondingly, within the related discipline of strategic 
58 
 
alliance studies, research suggests that there are country and regional differences in 
how organizations cooperate with each other. North American alliance managers are 
for instance said to focus on the business aspects of alliances, Latin American 
managers to prefer to build the relationship prior to conducting business, and Asian 
managers to have an even more pronounced focus on the relationship (Spekman, et 
al. 2000, 62; see also Kanter 2002, 100; Dyer and Singh 2004; 368).  
Despite the mentioned limitations relative to overall generalizability, 
this study does however reveal important patterns and offers novel information 
about operational PPP projects that future research can draw upon. In that sense it 
paves the way for future generalizations. It is in particular in this light that the value 
added of this study should be viewed. On a final note, this analysis challenges the 
conventional wisdom that infrastructure PPPs do not involve trust-based and other 
collaborative features. Thus there is some scope for analytical generalization in the 
sense that the empirical findings here can be contrasted with the extant theoretical 
discourse about PPP (Yin 1994, 31). After all, as pointed out by Stake, by counter-
example grand generalizations “can be modified by case study” (Stake 1995, 7). 
 
 
7 FUTURE RESEARCH 
Deriving from the alliance literature and from the research findings of this study, this 
concluding section will argue generally for a shift in research focus towards a 
relational view (a process perspective) on PPP as opposed to economic perspectives 
on cooperation (see Table 4). In a relational perspective, the pattern of interaction 
can be equally as important for efficiency as structural properties (Aulakh and 
Madhok 2002, 27; originally Granovetter 1985). In other words, the success or failure 
of cooperation is not exclusively determined by formal structures. A relational 
perspective suggests that it is expedient to direct attention towards the web of 
interactions that take place inside PPP projects. The main difference between what is 
here labelled economic perspectives and relational perspectives respectively is that in 
the latter category it is acknowledged that successful partnerships require effective 
cooperation throughout the full life-cycle of collaborative arrangements and that 
contracts alone do not ensure successful cooperation. Formal structures ensure only 
the very minimum level of cooperative behaviour (Madhok 1995, 59). When the deal 
is made, and contracts are signed, cooperation can, as demonstrated above and in 
article 5, evolve in many different directions; regardless of the structures that govern 
the relationship. In order to fully understand cooperation, we therefore need to know 
more about the relations between the involved parties and perhaps more importantly 
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what determines or conditions the way in which partnerships materialize in practice. 
Some suggestions concerning this emerged inductively from the empirical analysis 
but systematic analyses of conditioning factors such as institutional context are still 
lacking.  
Note that the two perspectives do not refer to fully fledged theories 
about cooperation but simply to two different ways at looking at cooperation. In 
each perspective, the binoculars are adjusted to look at only certain dimensions of 
cooperation as opposed to others. The logic is somewhat similar to the metaphorical 
approach suggested by Gareth Morgan in Images of Organization (1997). Morgan 
simply suggests that different metaphors (e.g. the learning organization or the 
political organization) reveal different aspects of organizing. In a similar way, the two 
perspectives on PPP, economical and relational, offer two different ways to read and 
understand public-private partnerships. 
 
Table 4 Two perspectives on inter-organizational cooperation 
 Economical perspectives Relational perspectives 
Source of efficiency in a 
partnership 
Governance structures Governance relationship  
Focus of analysis Structures and technical aspects of 
cooperation 
Processes and intangible 
relationship aspects 
Actors Opportunistic Trusting 
Primary interest Ex ante contract signature Ex post contract signature 
 
The argument here is not that the nature of the deal and formal structures are 
unimportant, and that it does not matter how contracts are drawn up. Rather, the 
claim is that formal structures do not exclusively determine the success or failure of 
cooperation, and that by addressing relationship characteristics, a more 
comprehensive understanding of PPP can be achieved. To paraphrase Granovetter, 
both undersocialized and oversocialized approaches should be avoided (1985). “In 
order to understand interorganizational relationships, it is useful to view them as 
having a structural and a social dimension” (Madhok 1995, 59). The aim here is not 
to propose a knock-out theory that explains everything about PPP but rather to 
explore an important part of the jigsaw puzzle which is the social and processual 
dimension of cooperation. “In the relationship-centered approach, sole emphasis on 
the contract would not be adequate to ascertain desirable action by the partner, other 
than the very minimum required. This needs to be supplemented by a positive social 
atmosphere, revolving around trust, within which the exchange is conducted. Such 
an atmosphere evolves through interaction. Whereas the contract-centered approach 
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attempts to reduce uncertainty and manage the flow of information more formally 
through the legal form of the transaction, the relationship-centered view attempts to 
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The literature on public-private partnerships (PPP) has proliferated in recent years. However,
confusion about the actual meaning of PPP still abounds. As a consequence, contradicting
findings and statements about PPP flourish in the literature. This article reviews the lit-
erature, and argues that there are different streams of PPP research which operate with
qualitatively different notions of the PPP concept. Accordingly the literature is divided into
four different PPP ‘approaches’. By doing so the article offers some clarification concerning
an increasingly complex concept. The article concludes that an authoritative definition of
PPP – one that can encompass all the different variations of the concept currently in use –
is not logically possible.
Key words: public-private partnerships, urban regeneration, policy approach, infrastructure
approach, development approach
The public-private partnership (PPP) concept
is a contested concept. Over the years, many
different definitions and classifications of the
term have been put forward (for example see,
Linder 1999; Van Ham and Koppenjan 2001;
Hodge andGreve 2005a, 2005b;Klijn and Teis-
man 2005; Tvarnø 2005; Wettenhall 2006) but
an authoritative definition or a classification
of PPP remains to be seen. Paraphrasing Wet-
tenhall (2003:98) there have been previous ef-
forts at classifying partnership arrangements
but ‘there is much more to be done’. This arti-
cle is an effort in this direction.
Conflicting findings and inconsistent state-
ments about theworth andmerits of PPP appear
in the literature.While some scholars argue that
a downside with PPP is a lack of transparency
and public participation (Shaoul 2003), oth-
ers conclude the exact opposite, namely, that
PPP can act as a channel for local mobilisa-
tion and participation (Andersen 2004). Some
scholars note that it was the United Kingdom
(UK) Labour government that first introduced
the PPP concept in the 1990s (Spackman 2002);
however, a survey of the literature reveals that
the PPP label has been in use since at least
the late 1970s (see for instance, Fosler and
Berger 1982), and that it first appeared in the
United States (US) urban policy literature. Yet
others state that the UK is leading the way
in the development of PPP (Ghobadian et al.
2004). This article argues that such contradic-
tory findings can be found because there are
different streams of PPP research. Four general
PPP approaches are identified in the literature;
ie, four different strands of research that cluster
around somewhat similar understandings of the
PPP concept. Confusion occurs because there
is little explicit acknowledgement of the dif-
ferent perspectives, and limited communica-
tion takes place across the different approaches.
The identified approaches are: a) the urban re-
generation approach; b) the policy approach;
c) the infrastructure approach; and d) the devel-
opment approach. An approach in this context
is not a specific type of research with a spe-
cific methodology, ontology and epistemology;
rather it refers to general patterns and tenden-
cies in the literature. The terms ‘fields’, ‘tradi-
tions’, ‘compartments’ and ‘strands/streams of
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literature’ are used synonymouslywith the term
‘approach’. The four approaches have been
identified through an inductive review of the
PPP literature.1
The Urban Regeneration Approach
In the urban regeneration approach, the fo-
cus is on public-private partnerships in rela-
tion to urban economic renewal and develop-
ment. This approach seems to have its roots
primarily in the American urban governance
literature (for instance, Buencker 1973; Fos-
ler and Berger 1982; Boyer 1983; Davis 1986;
Barnekov, Boyle and Rich 1989; Squires 1989).
Urban regeneration partnerships are typically
initiated by the response of private businesses
to urban crises (eg, high unemployment, high
crime rates and deteriorating revenue base).
Thus an urban regeneration partnership often
begins as a partnership between businesses or
business leaders. This private to private coop-
eration subsequently paves the way for a more
formal stage, where public, private and non-
profit actors work together. This has been sug-
gested by Davis (1986:1) and was corrobo-
rated by Macchiarola’s (1986) account of the
New York City Partnership (NYCP). In the
late 1970s, New York City was on the brink
of bankruptcy. Consequently, business leaders
took the initiative to address the troubling state
of the city by establishing a business commu-
nity partnership. This initiative was ‘an effort
to unite the business community and work with
the public sector “to make NewYork City a bet-
ter place to live to work and to conduct busi-
ness”’ (New York Times 10 November 1985).
The NYCP ‘linked the New York Chamber of
Commerce and Industry and the Economic De-
velopment Council and created a 120 member
board with representatives from large and small
businesses, nonprofit organisations and univer-
sities from all five boroughs’ (New York Times
10November 1985). The partnership ultimately
hosted a large number of different develop-
ment programs, including the creation of sum-
mer jobs for disadvantaged youngsters, hous-
ing programs, Join-A-School programs, and a
Crime Stoppers program (Macchiarola 1986).
The point to emphasise, here, is the key role of
private businesses as initiators and drivers of
urban partnerships. In the case of the NYCP,
business leaders did not only initiate the part-
nership, they also had the leading role in the
overall programwith almost 90%of the funding
coming from the private sector (Macchiarola
1986:128). This division of roles between pub-
lic and private might, however, vary from
context to context and in some instances the
public sector might play a more prominent
role than in the case of the New York City
Partnership.
Generally urban regeneration partnerships
are about how private businesses cooperate
with local governments in order to enhance ur-
ban development. Such cooperation can take
on a variety of formal structures as precise def-
initions of what types of (contractual or non-
contractual) arrangements constitute a PPP
within the urban regeneration approach, to the
best of this author’s knowledge, are absent in
the literature. What in particular characterises
this type of partnership is that each participant
is a principal. It is not a matter of traditional
buyer-seller relationships as is the case in some
of the other PPP approaches (see below). The
exchanges between the partners tend to be ‘un-
forced exchanges’, which are based on ‘induce-
ment and mutual interest’, not command (for
instance, Harding 1998:78).
The urban regeneration approach existed
prior to the appearance of New Public Man-
agement (NPM). Already in the late 1970s,
American scholarswere occupiedwith explain-
ing the worth and merits of public-private part-
nerships in urban economic development. As
early as 1984, one author notes that every
year ‘the public-private concept is growing and
taking on new meanings and new advocates’
(Durenberger 1984:7). Another scholar claims
that public-private partnerships became a pol-
icy tool in the US during the Carter adminis-
tration (Lyall 1986). Keeping this in mind, it
is difficult to uphold the claim that PPP is a
natural continuation or a part of the NPM or, as
for instance the trade unions in the UK some-
times suggest, that PPP can be viewed as ‘back-
door-privatisation’ (Flinders 2005:220). There
might be some truth in these statements within
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some of the identified PPP approaches, but not
necessarily in relation to the urban regeneration
approach.
The urban regeneration approach appears to
be the precursor of many of the contempo-
rary contributions in the PPP literature that em-
phasise the importance of ‘co-production’ and
‘risk-sharing’ and ‘principal-principal relation-
ships’ as key defining characteristics of PPP
(eg, Van Ham and Koppenjan 2001; Klijn and
Teisman 2005). The more recent contributions
however focus more broadly on public service
delivery and are thus not limited to the local
regeneration context.
The Policy Approach
The policy approach can be identified within
the American public policy literature (for in-
stance, Rosenau 2000). In this approach, the
PPP concept does not necessarily encom-
pass specific collaborative projects but focuses
instead on describing and analysing public-
private constellations within specific policy ar-
eas. Thus the institutional set up of public-
private cooperation in different policy fields is
the focus of analysis. For instance, Rosenbaum
talks about the institutional challenges in rela-
tion to PPP in the commercial nuclear power
sector in the US. More precisely, he talks about
the industry’s ‘institutional misdesign’ refer-
ring to legal and political structures (Rosen-
baum 2000:65). Similarly, Stiglitz andWallsten
(2000) address government support of private
sector research and development in the US
as being an example of a public-private part-
nership. In the same way, the US RECLAIM
emission trading system is considered to be a
PPP (Kamieniecki, Shafie and Silvers 2000).2
Other scholars talk about PPP in education re-
ferring to the linkages between the public and
private sectors in elementary and secondary ed-
ucation. For instance, public assistance to pri-
vate schools and private support of schools is
considered to constitute a formal partnership
(Levin 2000).
As the examples above illustrate, in the pol-
icy approach the PPP term refers broadly to the
relations between the public and private sector
in certain policy areas and policy setups. It does
not necessarily refer to specific collaborative
projects. Rather in the policy approach, schol-
ars describe and examine the appropriate role
for, respectively, the public and the private sec-
tor in various policy fields.
Thus while the urban regeneration approach
focuses on specific projects and programs, the
policy approach focuses more generally on pol-
icy design and general public-private relations
in different policy settings. Furthermore, the
latter seems to be more inclined (although not
exclusively so) towards a federal or state level
focus, while the urban level is the centre of
attention in the urban regeneration approach.
Thus here we see differences between the two
approaches in relation to context, actors, objec-
tives as well as formal structure.
The Infrastructure Approach
Today, the PPP term is increasingly used in the
context of private provision of infrastructure
and associated services (Evans and Bowman
2005): ie, ‘arrangements whereby private par-
ties participate in, or provide support for, the
provision of infrastructure’ and the delivery of
public infrastructure-based services (Grimsey
and Lewis 2004:2). When government repre-
sentatives around the world talk about PPP,
they typically refer to some version of the in-
frastructure partnership. Furthermore, most of-
ficial PPP homepages address infrastructure
partnerships, and it is typically infrastructure
projects that are registered in PPP databases.3
Similarly, much of the recent PPP literature
deals with infrastructure partnerships (for in-
stance, Yescombe 2007; Grimsey and Lewis
2004; Savas 2000).
There are a variety of different types of in-
frastructure PPP arrangements. For example,
joint ventures/joint purpose companies (which
some scholars refer to as PPP alliances; see
below) and a number of mutual financial ar-
rangements such as BOT (build-own-transfer),
BOOT (build-own-operate-transfer) and sale-
and-lease back arrangements where local gov-
ernments sell their buildings and rent them
back on a 20 or 30 year contract (Hodge and
Greve 2005b:5). Some scholars also include
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franchises, and divestments in the defini-
tion of infrastructure PPP (for instance, Savas
2000:241; see Grimsey and Lewis (2004:10–
12) for an overview).
Within the infrastructure approach, there are
broad and narrow usages of the PPP term. The
narrow version covers only arrangements that
include private finance and the bundling of
design, construction, operation, and/or main-
tenance into a single contract. Particularly the
presence of private finance, the allocation of
risk to the private sector, and the integration
of construction and maintenance/operation are
defining characteristics of the narrow under-
standing of the infrastructure PPP. The broad
version of the term however covers all of the
above mentioned varieties, including for in-
stance joint ventures, leasing and management
contracts.
The infrastructure PPP firmly entered the
public management agenda after the launch of
the UK based Private Finance Initiative (PFI)
in the early 1990s. It was launched by the
Conservative government and came about in
order to increase the amount of privately fi-
nanced projects. More specifically it was an ef-
fort ‘to address the underinvestment in public
assets to secure the long-term future of pub-
lic services’ (Ghobadian et al. 2004:6).4 By
2005, agreements for about 700 PFI projects
were signed across a wide range of sectors
in the UK (Partnerships UK 2006). The pol-
icy has now been adopted in many countries
around the world. In Australia, for instance, by
July 2007, 37 projects were contracted or com-
pleted, seven projects were in the marked (ten-
der or bid selection), and another 24 projects
were in the pipeline (Allen Consulting Group
2007). In Denmark, there are to date only two
signed deals (Weihe 2007:7–8). However, con-
sidering the relative large amount of ex ante
evaluations that are now taking place, more
projects seem to be underway (see for instance,
www.ebst.dk/OPPforundersoegelser).
The launching pad for the increased interest
in PPP in the 1990s and in the beginning of the
21st century appears to have been the UK-based
PFI policy. Only after the launch of this policy,
PPP rhetoric and policy activity intensified and
scholarly work on PPP proliferated. However,
as argued by several scholars, different types
of infrastructure PPPs existed long before the
introduction of the PFI program (for instance,
Grimsey and Lewis 2004; Wettenhall 2005b;
Yescombe 2007). France, for example, has a
long-established tradition of using PPPs to pri-
vately finance public infrastructure (Grimsey
and Lewis 2005:xiii).
PFI projects were not conceived as part-
nerships at their inception but have been
reconceptualised as such under Labour (Ruane
2002:201). Labour adopted the PFI scheme and
the number and average value of PFI projects
have increased under Labour (Ghobadian et al.
2004:7). The change of terms is in all proba-
bility a key source to the continuing confusion
about themeaning of the PPP concept. The term
‘partnership’ insinuates that relationships are
close and trust-based and that to some extent
actual ‘collaboration’ takes place rather than
pure exchange. However, the infrastructure ver-
sion of PPP is first and foremost an exchange
relationship. For the same reason some scholars
argue that infrastructure PPPs present nothing
more than a new and extended way of procur-
ing public services (Klijn and Teisman 2005);
and that they can be viewed as the latest chapter
in the privatisation book (Hodge 2004) or ‘re-
badged privatisation’ (Coghill and Woodward
2005:81). Others have correspondingly argued
that infrastructure partnerships are not ‘real’
partnerships (Wettenhall 2005a). These find-
ings appear valid; however, since a large part
of the PPP literature, as well as PPP policies,
concern infrastructure PPP projects, it seems
legitimate to assert that there is a PPP infras-
tructure approach.
In infrastructure PPPs, the actors, the con-
text, the project objectives and the contract
structures vary from those of respectively the
local regeneration approach and the policy ap-
proach. Particularly the contract structure de-
parts from the other two PPP versions since
infrastructure PPPs are capital intensive long
term projects with strict principal-agent rela-
tions. Moreover, risk is not ‘shared’ but rather
transferred or divided between the involved
public and private actors.
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Developments in Infrastructure PPPs
Over the years the use of infrastructure PPP
has expanded into new areas. For instance,
in the UK and Australia, infrastructure PPPs
were originally largely applied to economic in-
frastructure (eg, motorways, bridges, tunnels)
while now being applied to social infrastruc-
ture such as schools, hospitals and prisons
as well as social housing, urban regeneration,
and waste management (Grimsey and Lewis
2004:7). Thus the Australian PPP infrastruc-
ture marked, for instance, has evolved through
two distinct phases. An initial phase, where
project finance and instruments were devel-
oped for BOT and BOOT projects vis-a`-vis
transport infrastructure. And a second phase
where social infrastructure projects that involve
significant facilities management over the life
of the project became more prevalent (Allen
Consulting Group 2007:12). Accordingly, the
nature of the Australian infrastructure PPPs has
been more varied within the past five years
(Yescombe 2007:42–43).
A parallel development has taken place in
the UK, and similar trends are now occur-
ring across Europe and in other places where
the UK-type model has been implemented
(Grimsey and Lewis 2004:35). This tells us that
the infrastructure PPP is continuously evolving.
Thus today, infrastructure PPPs are not limited
to hard economic transport projects but also
encompass a range of soft and social infras-
tructure projects. Another development is that
there is now a greater focus on risk-sharing and
relationship management than was the case in
the early nineties. Moreover, policy guidelines
regarding relationship management are devel-
oped (for instance, NAO 2001) and courses on
how to successfully manage PPP infrastructure
projects are held for public as well as private
PPP managers (www.nao.gov.uk).
The Development Approach
In recent years, partnerships have also taken
on an important role in relation to advanc-
ing development. A key moment in relation
to utilising partnerships for such purposes was
the United Nations Global Compact in 2000
(Reed and Reed 2006:2). This process was fur-
ther strengthened at the United Nations World
Summit for Sustainable Development in Johan-
nesburg in 2002 (Reed and Reed 2006:2). Ac-
cordingly there has been a marked increase of
partnership activities in the development area
since 2002.5 The central focus in the develop-
ment approach is achievement of development
goals. Here PPPs are means to achieve such
broad ends as to reduce poverty and social de-
privation, reduce corruption and environmen-
tal improvement. Although they are typically
not directly engaged in partnerships, key actors
in development PPPs are national and inter-
national (non)governmental aid organisations.
Their role lies primarily in that of promoting
and creating environments conducive to PPP in
recipient countries.
For instance the United Nations Develop-
ment Program (UNDP) has a PPP program for
the Urban Environment (PPPUE) aiming at al-
leviating poverty through public-private part-
nerships. The goal is ‘to increase access of
the urban poor to basic services such as water,
sanitation, solid waste management and energy
by promoting inclusive partnerships between
local government, business and communities’
(emphasis added).6 Thus here UNDP acts as
a facilitator of local partnerships. The organi-
sation plays the same role in relation to other
PPP initiatives. For instance, the Supporting
Entrepreneurs for Environment and Develop-
ment (SEED) initiative, which is a program that
focuses on innovative partnerships between lo-
cal stakeholders from the public, private and
the civil sector in recipient countries.
Similarly, the World Bank has a Public-
Private Partnership in Infrastructure (PPPI)
program, which has the goal of establishing a
business environment conducive to the devel-
opment of PPP for the provision of infrastruc-
ture services. Among other things, the program
aims at providing knowledge on options and
mechanisms for securing PPPs, educating reg-
ulators and authorities on modern regulation
tools, and providing an understanding of the
interests of main contracting parties in an in-
frastructure project transaction.7 Thus, just like
the UNDP PPP program referred to above, the
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aim is to facilitate partnerships. The specific
type of partnership is slightly different in this
particular case, and the recipient actors are dif-
ferent too, however the common theme in both
cases is that third party organisations act as fa-
cilitators of PPPs in less developed countries in
order to meet development goals.
The development partnership, driven by a
third party organisation, is different from the
infrastructure partnership, the policy partner-
ship and the urban regeneration partnership dis-
cussed above. The actors are different, the aims
are different and the context is different too.
The essential point here is that there is a distinct
PPP development field where international or-
ganisations and other governmental stakehold-
ers continuously try to establish an environ-
ment in developing countries that is conducive
to different types of PPP. What unites this as
an approach is that third party actors play a
vital role in initiating and also overseeing dif-
ferent type of partnerships in order to enhance
development.
Previous Attempts at Defining and
Classifying PPP
An often employed definition views PPP as
‘. . . cooperation of some sort of durability be-
tween public and private actors in which they
jointly develop products and services and share
risks, costs and resources which are connected
with these products’ (Van Ham and Koppenjan
2001:598). This is a broad definition which al-
lows for significant variance across parameters
such as time, closeness of cooperation, types
of products/services produced, costs, and com-
plexity, level of institutionalisation as well as
number and type of actors involved. However,
despite allowing for significant variance, this
definition does not apply to all the different
ways in which the PPP label is used as indicated
above. For instance, some would argue that in-
frastructure partnerships do not involve ‘joint
development’ of products. Rather the extent of
actual co-production tends to be limited (ie, to
exchange rather than collaboration) (see Klijn
and Teisman 2005). The private actor signs a
contract after which he is obliged to deliver a
fixed service, at a fixed time and for a fixed
price. Typically, in case of time and cost over-
runs, the private actor carries the consequent
commercial losses. Therefore, risk is not shared
in this type of project, it is transferred.8 The
notion that cooperation involves public and pri-
vate actors does similarly not apply to the devel-
opment approach where public and private as
well as third party actors are involved. Equally,
the definition does not apply to the type of PPPs
that belong to the policy approach. Policy PPPs
do not necessarily concern specific instances
of cooperation (ie, collaborative projects), and
therefore strictly speaking there is no joint
development/co-production of products or ser-
vices. Additionally, risk-sharing is not neces-
sarily an issuewithin the policy approach. Prob-
lems like this also emerge when other similar
definitions are weighed against the different
PPP approaches identified here. For instance,
some scholars have similarly argued that PPPs
as a minimum involve a) a public and a pri-
vate actor; b) an enduring cooperation between
these actors/continuing relationships; c) risk-
sharing; and d) a principal-principal relation-
ship (see Peters 1998; Andersen 2004; Klijn
and Teisman 2004). These defining character-
istics are similar to the ones used by Van Ham
and Koppenjan and therefore in the same way
they do not apply to all the different ways in
which the concept is being used in practice.
Each participant in an infrastructure PPP is not
a principal. The public sector actor is the prin-
cipal while the private sector actor is the agent;
and an extensive monitoring regime is estab-
lished to ensure that the agent fulfils his obliga-
tions. Similarly, the argument that partnerships
are long term continuing relationships does not
fit all PPPs. For instance a development PPP
does not necessarily mean anything more than
a brief period of contracting relations between
a public and private sector party with a third
party facilitating the contract. The validity of
the different definitions is thus limited to cer-
tain PPP approaches.
Similar problems occur when previous at-
tempts at classifying PPPs are weighed against
the different types of PPP and PPP approaches
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identified here. They too fail to capture the va-
riety of PPP approaches in the literature. For in-
stance, Klijn and Teisman distinguish between
PPP contracts and organisational cooperation
projects (2005). Although this distinction cap-
tures some of the differences in the literature, it
does not reveal that there are different streams
of research that operate with qualitatively dif-
ferent understandings of the PPP concept (eg,
the policy PPP). Moreover, the distinction be-
tween ‘organisational’ and ‘contractual’ PPPs
is somewhat perplexing in that all PPPs (per-
haps with the exception of the policy version
of the term) include some extent of contracts
and organisational structures. What Klijn and
Teisman intend to do is to clarify that the in-
frastructure version of PPP (which they label
a PPP contract or a PPP concession) is not a
PPP in the true sense of the word because a real
PPP involves co-production (close interaction)
and risk-sharing (Klijn and Teisman 2005:98–
103). Although useful for such purposes this
distinction fails to help the ‘outside’ reader
to understand the diversity of the field, and
to illuminate that there are different research
traditions in the literature. Additionally, it is
not entirely clear what constitutes an ‘organi-
sational PPP’. In practice most public-private
relations that include co-production and risk-
sharing, and which have an enduring relation-
ship can be labeled a PPP. Consequently, with
this classification, PPP still remains an elusive
concept.
Correspondingly, Hodge and Greve
(2005b:6) base their PPP typology on the
nature of organisational and financial relation-
ships. The former type refers to how tightly the
relationship between public and private actors
is organised (Hodge and Greve 2005b:5), and
the latter refers to how different actors are
involved financially in the project. Like Klijn
and Teisman (2005), the intention here is most
probably to illuminate that some PPPs are
mostly financial (infrastructure PPPs), and do
not entail co-production and organisational
collaboration. Hodge and Greve (2005b)
moreover argue that the biggest divide in the
literature seems to be between those who view
PPP as a governance tool and those who see it
as a language game. Again, in some instances
it would be useful to operate with this division
but it does not capture the rich variety of
PPP approaches identified here. The same
argument applies to Koppenjan’s distinction
between respectively the ‘alliance model’
and the ‘concession model’ (Koppenjan
2005:137–138). Alliance PPP refers to cases
where joint corporations are established in
order to develop, maintain and operate an
infrastructure facility (Koppenjan 2005:138;
originally Klijn and Teisman 2000) while
concessions PPPs are more equivalent to the
infrastructure PPP referred to earlier (see Van
der Wel 2004 for a similar classification).
This is an important distinction, but just
as the earlier classification schemes it falls
short of illustrating the different research
compartments in the literature.
A range of further PPP typologies can be
extracted from the literature along some of
the following dimensions: degree of transac-
tion costs (Stoker 1998:40); the extent of the
target (broad/limited); types of agents (na-
tional/local); the degree of formalisation; and
motivations (Andersen 2004:4). Other parame-
ters could be: ‘purpose’ (and whether the part-
nership is strategic or project driven); ‘who’
(key actors and the structure of their relation-
ship); ‘when’ (the timing or stage of develop-
ment of the partnership process and changing
relationships and activities over time); ‘where’
(the spatial dimension); and ‘how’ (how the ac-
tivities are carried out, implementation mech-
anisms) (McQuaid 2000:12–19). Another ex-
ample is Linder and Rosenau’s use of ‘revenue
sources’ and the ‘legal standing’ of the enti-
ties involved as parameters for classification
(Linder andRosenau 2000). Yet another scholar
distinguishes between policy level partnerships
and project-based partnerships (Dunn 2000)
while another differentiates between defensive,
offensive and shotgun partnerships (Harding
1998:74).9 These different dimensions might
be used within each PPP approach in order to
facilitate approach specific typologies but they
fail to illuminate that there are different PPP re-
search traditionswith different accumulation of
knowledge; knowledge which cannot be easily
transferred from one PPP approach to another.
Hence, instead of searching for some critical
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core of PPP, it may be more expedient to settle
for the idea that multiple cores exist; ie, within
each PPP approach there is some core to the
PPP concept. Because of the different clusters
of PPP research (and usages of the concept),
it is not logically possible to put forward one
single and over-arching definition of PPP. Para-
phrasingVan derWel (2004:8), it does notmake
sense to search for enlightening definitions of
PPP. Rather, a more promising way forward is
to acknowledge the existence of different com-
partments of PPPs and PPP research, and to
explore the boundaries of the concept within
each of these compartments. Therefore neither
a broad nor a narrow definition of PPP appears
helpful, and deeming the concept as being en-
tirely an empirical one does not help much with
regard to alleviating the conceptual confusion
either.
The Merits of Adopting the Four PPP
Approaches
Some scholars would probably defy being cate-
gorised in any of the four approaches delineated
above. However, although there are not neces-
sarily waterproof shutters between the different
PPP approaches, and although there might be
alternative ways of ordering the PPP literature,
the approaches identified here seem to be ca-
pable of mitigating some of the bewilderment
about the PPP term.
What essentially separates the different ap-
proaches is that to some extent formal struc-
tures, actors, context and project objectives
differ from approach to approach. In the ur-
ban regeneration approach, a PPP is a col-
laborative project involving principal-principal
relations and co-production. In the policy ap-
proach, PPP does not refer to specific projects
or specific collaborative arrangements. Rather
the focus ismore generally on policy design and
policy networks. The infrastructure approach
deals with infrastructure projects, where pri-
vate finance is typically involved, and where
different elements such as construction, main-
tenance and operation are integrated. The de-
velopment approach focuses exclusively on de-
velopment projects and programs, where third
party international organisations act as PPP fa-
cilitators (see Table 1 for an overview).
Today, there seems to be a tendency to draw
general conclusions about PPP without speci-
fying what is actually meant by PPP, and since
the PPP label, as we have seen, has many dif-
ferent meanings, this leads to problems. As put
very bluntly by Van der Wel (2004: 21), it is
‘striking to see how few authors (or for that
matter governments or international agencies)
seem to be aware of the existence of other in-
terpretations of the term PPP than the one they
happen to use themselves. It looks as if the in-
ternational discussion on PPPs takes place in
a number of watertight compartments, while
those in one compartment hardly seem to be
aware of what goes on in the others’.
Delineating which PPP approach one does
research within enables more apt generalisa-
tions about the pros and cons of PPP, more ana-
lytical clarity, and last but not least it helps us to
avoid statements such as: PPP is a recent phe-
nomenon that should be viewed in the context
of the shift from government to governance;
that the UK is a leading country in relation to
the use of PPP; or that PPP can act as a channel
for local mobilisation and participation. These
statements are only valid within certain PPP
approaches.
Summary and Conclusion
This article has identified four PPP approaches:
a) the urban regeneration approach; b) the pol-
icy approach; c) the infrastructure approach;
and d) the development approach. By recognis-
ing the existence of these dissimilar approaches
it is suggested that some of the current concep-
tual bewilderment can be avoided.
Previous attempts at defining and classifying
the PPP concept do not acknowledge explicitly
and clarify that there are different research
compartments in the partnership literature. As
a result of the multiple meanings of the PPP
term, it is not possible to construct an over-
arching definition of PPP; ie, one that can en-
compass all the different usages of the PPP
label. Certainly not without making the defini-
tion so broad that it in reality becomesmeaning-
less. As a compromise between abandoning the
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Table 1. The Four PPP Approaches
URBAN
REGENERATION POLICY INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT
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concept altogether on the one hand and finding
a universal core on the other hand, it is sug-
gested that a fruitful way forward is to look at
how the term is being used differently in differ-
ent compartments of the literature. In this way,
contradictory statements and conclusions about
PPP can to a greater extent be avoided in the
future. The offered taxonomy of the literature
is not claimed to be exhaustive. It should rather
be viewed as a suggestion on how to navigate
in the burgeoning PPP literature, and over time
it could be further developed.
We have seen that the PPP label covers both
horizontal and vertical relationships, dyadic
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and multi-actor relationships, they can be more
or less formalised (contractual links, network
based links and joint organisational expres-
sion), and the extent of co-production and risk-
sharing can vary greatly. It could be claimed
that not all of these arrangements are ‘real’
PPPs (Wettenhall 2006) but the aim here has
merely been to illustrate how the term is used
to cover multiple practices and how the liter-
ature can be organised into different PPP ap-
proaches. As noted earlier, several definitions
stress that PPP involves co-production, risk-
sharing, and principal-principal relations and
additionally that relationships are more trust-
based, close-knit and equal in PPP than in
traditional cooperative arrangements (for in-
stance, Wettenhall 2006 and Mo¨rth and Sahlin-
Anderson 2006). Thus a general notion tends to
be that, relative to contracting-out and privati-
sation, PPP is a qualitative jump ahead (Hodge
and Greve 2005b:2). Whether this is actually
the case is an open question since so far there
has been very little research on micro-level
processes and the actual character of cooper-
ation ex post contract signature (for some no-
table exceptions, see Klijn 2006; Reeves 2006;
and Noble and Jones 2006). Future research
could appropriately address the character of
cooperation beyond the characteristics of the
formal contract. At what point is cooperation
‘close’ and ‘trust-based’ or ‘genuine collab-
orative’? When is decision-making ‘consen-
sual’ and how can we measure whether ‘trust
and respect’ are exploited as ‘forms of so-
cial capital’ in the partnership (see Wetten-
hall 2006: Appendix 1)? Future empirical re-
search couldwith benefit address some of these
questions.
On a final note, the dangers of applying
the same concept to different realities should
be noted. Contradictory conclusions about the
promises and pitfalls of PPP reforms emerge
when it is not clear what practices the con-
cept covers. Consequentially, PPP policies can
potentially be based on an erroneous foun-
dation, as policy-makers for instance could
choose to implement infrastructure PPPs in or-
der to achieve more collaborative and trust-
based cooperation with the private sector. An-
other danger of the conceptual ambiguity is that
the actors entering a PPP might have divergent
expectations about the nature of cooperation.
Such differing expectations can in the worst
case be the direct cause of cooperative difficul-
ties or even failure to cooperate.
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Endnotes
1. Note that the identified PPP approaches do
not represent the author’s normative view on
how the PPP label ‘ought to’ be employed.
Rather the effort here is, as loyally as possi-
ble, to illustrate how the term is being used
qualitatively different by different authors.
2. The system was initiated in 1994 by the US
South Coast Air Quality Management District.
It is a market based approach to reduce the
emission of sulphur oxides and nitrogen oxides.
3. For examples, visit the homepage of
the Canadian Council for Public-Private
Partnerships (www.pppcouncil.ca), the
National Council for Public-Private Partner-
ships in the US (www.ncppp.org) and the
Federal Highway Administration in the US
(www.fhwa.dot.gov). For examples of PPP
databases see for instance, Partnerships UK
(http://www.partnershipsuk.org.uk/index.html)
and the HM Treasury (http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/).
4. Shaoul observes that ‘the objectives and ra-
tionale of the policy [ie, the British PFI/PPP
policy] have changed over time’. In the be-
ginning the major argument was that PPPs
would enable the public sector to access fi-
nance for capital investment without breaching
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the commitments under the Maastricht Treaty
(macro economic argument). Recently the mi-
croeconomic argument about ‘risk transfer’ and
‘value formoney’ is put forward (2003:186; see
also Flinders 2005).
5. Presentation by Peter Lund-Thomsen at a
PPP workshop on sustainable development at
the Copenhagen Business School, 15 August
2006.
6. http://pppue.undp.org/, August 2005.
7. For more information visit www.
worldbank.org
8. It should be noted here that some scholars
argue that risk transfer in the context of es-
sential services is fundamentally flawed (for
instance, Shaoul 2003:193; see also Flinders
2005).
9. A defensive partnership takes form when
agency A can no longer achieve what it pre-
viously achieved by itself, eg, because of a
reduced resource base. An offensive partner-
ship is a partnership which is established when
Agency A wants to achieve new objectives that
require resources, expertise or knowledge be-
yond its competence. Finally, shotgun partner-
ships refer to situations where the governing
authority demands that A enters into a partner-
ship, ie, externally induced partnerships.
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Offentlig-private partnerskaber (OPP) er et meget omtalt forvaltningspo-
litisk redskab både på nationalt og internationalt plan. I de senere år er 
der blevet publiceret utallige artikler og bøger om emnet, og der findes 
ligeledes mange officielle rapporter, OPP vejledninger, og evalueringer af 
OPP. Populariteten til trods hersker der fortsat usikkerhed omkring be-
grebets egentlige betydning. Denne artikel søger at besvare spørgsmå-
let ’hvad er OPP?’ og samtidig skitsere en ny typologi.
Offentlig-private partnerskaber (OPP) kom for alvor på 
den internationale forvaltningspolitiske dagsorden i lø-
bet af 1990’erne, og siden er der blevet sagt og skrevet 
meget om OPP. Alene indenfor det sidste år er der i Nor-
den udkommet to bøger om OPP (Mörth og Sahlin-An-
dersson 2006; Åkerstrøm Andersen 2006). I udlandet 
er der også publiceret en lang række bøger om emnet (fx 
Pierre 1998; Rosenau 2000; Osborne 2000; Ghobadian 
et al. 2004; Hodge og Greve 2005; Bult-Spiering og 
Dewulf 2006). Dertil kommer et stort antal artikelbi-
drag om OPP i internationale tidsskrifter. Et nærmere 
eftersyn viser, at de forskellige bidrag anvender OPP-be-
grebet på ganske væsensforskellige måder. Formålet 
med nærværende artikel er at kortlægge de forskellige 
fortolkninger og anvendelser af OPP-begrebet i littera-
turen, og på den måde vise at OPP er et mangetydigt be-
greb. Der har været flere tidligere forsøg på at definere 
og klassificere OPP (fx Linder 1999; Van Ham og Kop-
penjan 2001; Van der Wel 2004; Klijn og Teisman 2005; 
Tvarnø 2005), men mange af disse forsøg har ikke for-
mået at indfange OPP begrebets mangetydighed, idet 
definitionerne og klassifikationerne typisk læner sig op 
ad én bestemt forståelse af OPP. Der er derfor fortsat be-
hov for begrebsafklaring. 
Som en konsekvens af OPP-begrebets flertydighed fin-
des der ganske modsatrettede udmeldinger i litteratu-
ren om fordele, ulemper og udfordringer forbundet med 
OPP. Mens nogle forskere kritiserer OPP for uigennem-
sigtighed og manglende offentlig deltagelse (Shaoul 
2003), vurderer andre, at OPP netop kan medføre øget 
lokal mobilisering og deltagelse (Andersen 2004). Atter 
andre steder kan man læse, at det var den britiske rege-
ring som introducerede OPP-begrebet i 1990’erne 
(Spackman 2002), mens der samtidig findes litteratur, 
der beskæftigede sig med OPP – i USA – for mere end 20 
år siden (f.eks. Fosler og Berger 1982). OPP forbindes 
ofte med tætte og tillidsbaserede relationer mellem of-
fentlige og private aktører, men nyere analyser indike-
rer, at det også langt fra altid er tilfældet (Reeves 2006; 
Weihe 2007a). Som det vil fremgå på de følgende sider, 
er det på nuværende tidspunkt ikke muligt at opstille én 
entydig definition af OPP, som kan omfatte alle de må-
der begrebet bliver brugt på. 
 Artiklen identificerer fire overordnede ’OPP-tilgan-
ge’. Ved ’tilgange’ forstås forskellige måder at anvende 
OPP betegnelsen på. De modstridende udmeldinger om 
OPP forklares netop ved, at de kun relaterer sig til én 
bestemt tilgang til OPP-begrebet. Ved at illustrere hvor-
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dan forskellige (og nogle gange modstridende) betyd-
ninger bliver knyttet til etiketten OPP og ved at inddele 
litteraturen i overensstemmelse med disse forskellige 
anvendelsesmåder, er forhåbningen, at dette bidrag kan 
være med til at reducere noget af den begrebslige forvir-
ring. Sagt med andre ord er formålet at illustrere, hvor-
dan den samme betegnelse (OPP) bliver brugt til at be-
tegnehelt væsensforskellige aktiviteter/samarbejdsfor-
mer mellem offentlige og private aktører. De forskellige 
tilgange identificeres og organiseres i forhold til følgen-
de tre parametre: kontekst (hvor og med hvilke formål 
bliver OPP anvendt?), struktur (hvilke formelle struktu-
rer er der tale om?) og aktør(relationer) (hvilke aktører 
deltager i OPP, og hvilke aktørrelationer er der tale om?). 
Artiklen konkluderer, at det er vigtigt at være opmærk-
som på de forskellige anvendelser af OPP begrebet, såle-
des at vurderinger og erfaringer indenfor de forskellige 
tilgange ikke bliver blandet sammen. Afslutningsvis til-
byder artiklen et bud på en OPP typologi, som tager af-
sæt i et proces-perspektiv på OPP. Typologien er todi-
mensional, og der argumenteres for, at OPP ikke kun 
bør klassificeres ud fra kendetegn ved de formelle sam-
arbejdsstrukturer, men også ud fra kendetegn ved de 
faktiske samspilsrelationer. Vi ved fra relateret forsk-
ning, at de to dimensioner ikke nødvendigvis følger hin-
anden, men at samarbejdet i stedet kan betragtes som 
evolutionære processer, der løbende udvikler sig over 
tid (Ring og Van de Ven 1994; Doz 1996; Ariño og De la 
Torre 1998). Derudover, så tyder relateret forskning 
også på, at måden hvorpå samarbejdet udfolder sig i 
praksis kan have en betydelig indflydelse på partner-
skabsperformance (se f.eks. Kanter 2002; Spekman et 
al. 2000). Enkelte forskere går så langt som at sige, at 
den egentlige merværdi skabes undervejs i partner-
skabsforløbet, og bestemmes ikke af selve aftalegrund-
laget (Doz og Hamel 1998: x). Derfor bør fokus ikke kun 
rettes mod formelle samarbejdsstrukturer, men også 
mod hvordan samarbejdet idriftsættes og udfolder sig i 
praksis. I det følgende præsenteres indledningsvis de 




Kontekst: Den første tilgang, og efterhånden også den 
mest omfangsrige, beskæftiger sig med offentlig-private 
bygge- og anlægsprojekter (privat finansiering, design 
og drift af eksempelvis veje, broer, skoler og hospitaler). 
Det er indenfor den kontekst, at OPP begrebet i stigende 
grad bliver anvendt (Evans og Bowman 2005: 62; oprin-
deligt Evans 2003). Det gælder både den internationale 
litteratur om OPP samt policy praksis i mange lande (det 
samme gælder også for de fleste bidrag i nærværende 
temanummer). I en dansk kontekst er det også bygge- og 
anlægstilgangen, der er den mest fremherskende. Det 
fremgår bl.a. af de eksisterende offentlige publikationer 
om OPP herhjemme (f.eks. Økonomi- og Erhvervsmini-
steriet 2004) samt det vejledningsmateriale, der er til-
gængeligt på de danske offentlige myndigheders hjem-
mesider (f.eks. www.ebst.dk). Så når danske 
beslutningstagere taler om OPP, refererer de typisk til 
bygge- og anlægsprojekter. 
 Struktur: I bygge- og anlægstilgangen defineres 
OPP snævert som et projekt, hvor finansiering, design, 
etablering og drift er koblet sammen i ét udbud; derud-
over skal der være et vist omfang af risikodeling mellem 
den offentlige og den private part (Økonomi- og Er-
hvervsministeriet 2004). Det helt centrale i denne 
(snævre) forståelse af OPP er, at den private del af finan-
sieringen er substantiel. Samarbejdsformen stammer 
fra Storbritannien, hvor den er bedre kendt under nav-
net ’the Private Finance Initiative’ (PFI). Det Britiske 
PFI program blev lanceret i starten af 1990’erne. Formå-
let med programmet var at øge antallet af privat finan-
sierede anlægsprojekter. Først senere opstod argumen-
ter om risikodeling og ’value for money’ (Shaoul 2003: 
186; Flinders 2005). Oprindeligt blev PFI-projekter ikke 
betragtet som ’partnerskaber’, men blev blot relanceret 
som sådan, da Labour regeringen kom til i 1997 (Ruane 
2002: 201). I dag bliver modellen brugt til at opføre 
mange forskelligartede projekter såsom skoler, hospita-
ler, veje, broer, forsvarsmateriel og forskellige IT og tek-
nologi projekter.1 I Danmark er der et vist efterslæb i 
forhold til udbredelsen af denne type OPP-projekter. 
Projekterne kan fortsat tælles på én hånd: Vildbjerg 
Skole, nye arkiver til Rigsarkivet og udbygning af en 
Som en konsekvens af OPP-begrebets flertydig-
hed findes der ganske modsatrettede udmeldin-
ger i litteraturen om fordele, ulemper og udfor-
dringer forbundet med OPP.
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Sønderjysk motorvej. Heraf er kun førstnævnte i imple-
menteringsfasen, mens de to øvrige projekter er hen-
holdsvis i udbuds- og planlægningsfasen (Helby Peter-
sen 2007, 6).
 Forskellige kontraktmodeller på anlægsområdet så-
som BOT (build-own-transfer), BOOT (build-own-ope-
rate-transfer), DBF (design-build-finance), DBFO (de-
sign-build-finance-operate) og sale and lease-back 
modeller (hvor offentlige myndigheder sælger deres 
bygninger og lejer dem tilbage via 20-30-årige kontrak-
ter) kan også inkluderes i bygge- og anlægstilgangen 
(Hodge and Greve 2005: 5; Savas 2000). Sidstnævnte 
model er i Danmark bedre kendt under betegnelsen ’Fa-
rum—modellen’ (Helby Petersen 2007, 14). Hvorvidt 
alle disse kontraktmodeller kan betegnes som OPP er 
der imidlertid delte meninger om. I Danmark er det pri-
mært den helt snævre definition af OPP der gør sig gæl-
dende (dvs. projekter der inkluderer både projektering, 
udførelse, vedligeholdelse, drift og finansiering af et 
projekt). Andre steder er OPP et samlebegreb for mange 
forskellige typer bygge- og anlægsprojekter. En ekspo-
nent for den helt brede tilgang er Savas (2000).
 Aktørrelationer: I bygge- og anlægstilgangen kan 
relationerne mellem de involverede parter beskrives 
som traditionelle principal-agent relationer. Den offent-
lige aktør bestiller et bestemt output til en bestemt pris, 
der skal leveres på et bestemt tidspunkt. Det egentlige 
’samarbejde’ mellem den offentlige og den private aktør 
er derfor i udgangspunktet ganske begrænset. Derfor 
kan man vove at påstå, at det er ganske paradoksalt, at 
netop denne form for samarbejde i stigende grad er ble-
vet synonym med OPP-betegnelsen. 
 Det bør imidlertid bemærkes, at nyere forskning ty-
der på, at på trods af kontrakternes umiddelbare ’hårde’ 
karakter,2 så kan der indenfor rammerne af den hårde 
kontrakt over tid udvikles tætte og tillidsbaserede prin-
cipal-principal relationer mellem de involverede offent-
lige og private aktører (Weihe 2007a). Sagt med andre 
ord så kan der selv indenfor rammerne af hårde og om-
stændelige kontrakter opstå bløde kontraktrelationer.
Byudviklingstilgangen:
OPP som lokale byudviklingsprojekter
Kontekst: Bygge- og anlægstilgangen er imidlertid langt 
fra den eneste tilgang til OPP, og det er heller ikke her, vi 
skal finde OPP-begrebets oprindelse. Allerede tilbage i 
slutningen af 1970’erne og i starten af 1980’erne under-
søgte amerikanske forskere, hvordan OPP kunne bidra-
ge til udvikling af byer i økonomiske og sociale vanske-
ligheder (for eksempel Fosler og Berger 1982; Davis 
1986). I denne sammenhæng fokuseredes der imidlertid 
på nogle helt andre samarbejdsformer end dem, som vi 
forbinder med bygge- og anlægstilgangen ovenfor.
 Struktur: De lokale byudviklingsprojekter, som de 
amerikanske OPP-forskere beskæftigede sig med for 
snart 30 år siden, blev typisk initieret af det private er-
hvervsliv som en reaktion på økonomisk lavkonjunktur, 
høj arbejdsløshed, voksende kriminalitet og faldende 
indtjeningsmuligheder for offentlige såvel som private 
virksomheder (f.eks. Davis 1986; Macchiarola 1986). 
Det helt centrale i den type OPP projekter er, at lokale 
aktører går sammen om at løse lokale problemer. Det 
drejer sig om samarbejdsformer og -relationer, som er 
mindre formaliserede end bygge- og anlægspartnerska-
berne. I byudviklingspartnerskaberne mødes aktørerne 
med en fælles interesse og et fælles mål. Midlerne (og 
den specifikke institutionelle form) til at nå målet finder 
parterne frem til i fællesskab. Et eksempel på et byud-
viklingspartnerskab er ’New York Partnerskabet’, der 
blev oprettet i 1979. I slutningen af 1970’erne var byen 
på fallittens rand, og på den baggrund dannede byens 
erhvervsliv et partnerskab med henblik på at ”forene er-
hvervsliv og samarbejde med den offentlige sektor med 
henblik på at gøre New York til et bedre sted at leve, ar-
bejde og gøre forretninger i” (New York Times 10. no-
vember 1985). Partnerskabet fik et organisatorisk ud-
tryk i form af en partnerskabsbestyrelse, som 
administrerede en række udviklingsprogrammer (f.eks. 
boligprojekter og kriminalitetsprogrammer). Finansie-
ringen var 90 procent privat og 10 procent offentlig.
 Aktørrelationer: Byudviklingspartnerskaberne er 
kendetegnet ved et samarbejde mellem ligeværdige par-
ter (principal-principal relationer) som etableres med 
henblik på at opnå fælles mål. Det drejer sig endvidere 
om mere eller mindre langvarige forhold, hvor begge 
parter bidrager til partnerskabet, og hvor begge parter 
deler ansvaret for partnerskabets udfald (Peters 1998). 
Samarbejdet behøver ikke at involvere en egentlig kon-
trakt (samarbejdet kan også være baseret på en net-
værksstruktur eller oprettelsen af en fælles organisato-
risk enhed, jvf. eksemplet ovenfor). I modsætning til 
bygge- og anlægspartnerskaberne, som pr. definition in-
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volverer specifikke kontraktstrukturer, så defineres by-
udviklingspartnerskaberne således primært ud fra ken-
detegn ved samarbejdsrelationerne.
 Det er indenfor rammerne af byudviklingspartner-
skaberne, at vi skal finde rødderne til mange af de OPP 
definitioner, som er ganske udbredte i litteraturen i dag 
(f.eks. Klijn og Teisman 2004: Van Ham og Koppenjan 
2001: 598).3 OPP indenfor denne tilgang beskrives ty-
pisk som ”et samarbejde af en vis varighed mellem of-
fentlige og private aktører, hvor de i fællesskab produce-
rer produkter og services og deler risici, omkostninger 
og ressourcer forbundet hermed” (Van Ham og Koppen-
jan 2001: 598; egen oversættelse).4 Definitionen under-
streger fællesproduktion og risikodeling som afgørende 
karakteristika ved OPP. I modsætning til de tidligere 
studier indenfor byudviklingstilgangen begrænser disse 
senere bidrag sig ikke til byudviklingskonteksten (byer i 
økonomiske vanskeligheder), men undersøger i stedet 
en bred vifte at forskellige samarbejdsrelationer på for-
skellige områder, som blot opfylder kravene om risiko-
deling, fællesproduktion m.m.
Policy-tilgangen:
OPP som generelle policy-relationer
Kontekst: I policy-tilgangen bliver OPP-betegnelsen 
brugt til at betegne generelle policy-relationer mellem 
offentlige og private aktører. Genstandsfeltet er policy 
design; dvs. hvordan et spefickt policy-område er orga-
niseret, og hvad der kendetegner den offentlig-private 
rollefordeling og samspil på et givent politikområde; f.
eks. analyseres, hvordan offentlige og private aktører 
samarbejder om at håndtere kriser såsom strømafbrud-
det i USA og Canada i 2003 og fængselsskandalen i Abu 
Ghraib (Svedin 2006) eller udviklingen i relationerne 
mellem den svenske stat og forsvarsindustrien (Britz 
2006). OPP-begrebet begrænser sig dermed ikke til en 
specifik kontekst eller en specifik projektform. Det, der 
er i fokus er generelle policy-relationer. 
 Strukturer: Indenfor policy-tilgangen anvendes 
OPP-betegnelsen således ikke til at betegne egentlige 
projektbaserede relationer mellem offentlige og private 
aktører (hvilket er tilfældet i både bygge- og anlægstil-
gangen og byudviklingstilgangen). OPP er et langt mere 
’åbent’ begreb. Der fokuseres på at beskrive og analysere 
offentlig-private relationer og institutionelle strukturer 
på et givent politikområde. Yderligere eksempler er Ro-
senbaum, der analyserer juridiske og politiske struktu-
rer på det kommercielle kernekraftsektorområde i USA 
(2000); Stigliz og Wallsten (2000) som analyse rer of-
fentlig støtte af privat forskning, og omtaler det fæno-
men som OPP; og Kamieniecki, Shafie og Silvers (2000), 
der analyserer et system til forhandling af kvoter for ud-
ledning af henholdsvis nitrogen oxid og svovl oxid.5
 Aktørrelationer: Indenfor policy tilgangen er relati-
onerne mellem de offentlige og private aktører ikke ken-
detegnede ved bestemte karakteristika. 
 
Policy-partnerskaberne adskiller sig dermed frabyud-
viklingspartnerskaberne, hvor samarbejdet er defineret 
ved nærmere bestemte aktørrelationer. En af grundene, 
til at man alligevel kan tale om en særskilt policy-til-
gang, er, at den adskiller sig fra bygge- og anlægs- og 
byudviklingstilgangen i og med, at der ikke er tale om 
egentlige projekter, og fordi at OPP bliver brugt til at be-
tegne helt generelle relationer mellem offentligt og pri-
vat (der er hverken tale om specifikke formelle kontrakt-
strukturer eller aktørrelationer). Det er indretningen af 
et bestemt politikområde, som er det centrale fokus og 
ikke relationerne mellem offentligt og privat. Dermed er 
tilgangen og forståelsen af OPP væsensforskellig fra de 
to tidligere tilgange. 
Udviklingstilgangen:
OPP som udviklingsredskab
Kontekst: Den fjerde og sidste tilgang til studiet af OPP 
finder vi på bistands- og udviklingsområdet. Her ses 
OPP som et middel til at fremme udvikling i modtager-
lande. Denne praksis er relativ ny – i hvert fald på det 
retoriske niveau, da man ikke har omtalt ’OPP’ som ud-
viklingsredskab tidligere. OPP blev sat på udviklings-
dagsordenen i forbindelse med FN’s Global Compact-ini-
tiativ, der blev lanceret i 2000 (Reed and Reed 2006: 2).6 
Ideen om partnerskaber som udviklingsredskaber blev 
yderligere styrket i forbindelse med FN’s verdenskonfe-
rence om bæredygtig udvikling i Johannesburg i 2002 
OPP kan både være komplekse bygge- og 
anlægsprojekter, netværksbaserede relationer 
mellem offentlige og private aktører og udvik-
lingspartnerskaber mellem internationale og 
nationale (ikke)statslige offentlige aktører.
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(Reed and Reed 2006: 2). Et dansk eksempel er Danida’s 
OPP-erhvervsprogram, som blev lanceret i 2004 inden-
for rammerne af Global Compact initiativet. Program-
met opfordrer danske virksomheder og organisationer 
til at ’igangsætte socialt orienterede aktiviteter, innova-
tive tiltag og investeringer til styrkelse af arbejds- og 
levevilkår i udviklingslandene’.7 Konkret indebærer er-
hvervsprogrammet, at Danida tilbyder rådgivning og 
medfinansiering af danske virksomheders sociale initi-
ativer i udviklingslande.8
FN’s udviklingsprogram (UNDP) har ligeledes et OPP-
program, der hedder OPP for ’Urban Environment’ (PP-
PUE). Programmets overordnede formål er fattigdoms-
bekæmpelse i byer. Mere konkret er målsætningen at 
forbedre de fattiges adgang til grundlæggende forhold 
som vand, sanitære faciliteter og energi, og det gøres 
ved at fremme partnerskaber mellem lokale myndighe-
der, virksomheder og diverse samfundsgrupper. Pro-
grammet omfatter forskellige former for partnerskaber, 
herunder kontrakter, joint ventures og lokale agenda 21 
strategier.9 I Verdensbanken findes der ligeledes et OPP-
udviklingsprogram, hvor formålet er at forbedre vilkå-
rene for etablering af bygge- og anlægspartnerskaber. 
Det sker eksempelvis ved at formidle teknisk viden om 
OPP (OPP i snæver forstand, jf. bygge- og anlægstilgan-
gen) og ved at uddanne offentlige myndigheder, således 
at de bliver i stand til at regulere og styre bygge- og an-
lægspartnerskaber. Fællesnævneren for de mange for-
skellige typer udviklingspartnerskaber er, at interna-
tionale organisationer eller statslige aktører fra 
donorlande aktivt forsøger at fremme udbredelsen af 
offentlig-private samarbejdsprojekter med henblik på 
at fremme udvikling.
 Strukturer: Udviklingstilgangen refererer dermed 
ikke til specifikke samarbejdsstrukturer eller en be-
stemt type samarbejdsrelation mellem offentlige og pri-
vate aktører. Som eksemplerne ovenfor har vist, så 
sammenblandes flere af de forudgående OPP forståel-
ser/tilgange i udviklingskonteksten. Det er problema-
tisk, idet man dermed risikerer at sammenblande erfa-
ringerne fra forskelligartede udviklingspartnerskaber. 
Grunden, til at jeg alligevel vil argumentere for, at man 
kan tale om en egentlig ’udviklingstilgang’, er, at der er 
tale om nogle særlige kendetegn, der adskiller OPP på 
udviklingsområdet fra de øvrige tilgange. Det afgørende 
kendetegn er, at OPP ses som et udviklingsredskab, og 
at en tredje part (internationale statslige og ikke-stats-
lige aktører) indgår som koordinator og/eller katalysa-
tor for udbredelse og implementering af forskellige 
former for offentligt-privat samarbejde. Aktørkonstel-
lationerne og konteksten er dermed væsensforskellige 
fra de forudgående tilgange. 
 Aktører: OPP-projekterne indenfor udviklingstil-
gangen har således nogle fællesnævnere, der ikke kan 
genfindes i de øvrige tre tilgange. For det første, og som 
nævnt ovenfor, så er der ikke udelukkende tale om et 
samarbejde mellem offentlige og private aktører, men 
partnerskaberne involverer også internationale aktører 
(både statslige og ikke statslige aktører, f.eks. Danida og 
FN) samt private virksomheder fra donorlande. I visse 
tilfælde er der tale om partnerskaber mellem f.eks. dan-
ske virksomheder og erhvervsliv i modtagerlande (uden-
om lokale myndigheder). Der er dermed tale om kvalita-
tivt anderledes aktørrelationer end dem, der gør sig 
gældende i de tre øvrige OPP-tilgange. Derudover bliver 
partnerskaberne implementeret specifikt i en udviklings-
kontekst, hvor formålet er fattigdomsbekæmpelse, anti-
korruption og lignende udviklingsrelaterede formål.
Et mangetydigt begreb 
Gennemgangen ovenfor illustrerer, at betegnelsen OPP 
kan andrage ganske forskelligartede betydninger. OPP 
kan både være komplekse bygge- og anlægsprojekter, 
netværksbaserede relationer mellem offentlige og pri-
vate aktører og udviklingspartnerskaber mellem inter-
nationale og nationale (ikke)statslige offentlige aktører 
(jf. tabel 1). Forskellene mellem de forskellige OPP-til-
gange er ganske omfattende.
 OPP som et bygge- og anlægsprojekt omfatter en 
kompleks, detaljeret og outputfokuseret kontrakt mel-
lem offentlige og private aktører. Arbejdsdelingen mel-
lem parterne er klart defineret. Det er egentlig et para-
doks, at samarbejdsformen bliver kaldt OPP, da det i 
udgangspunktet ikke drejer sig om et ’partnerskab’ i or-
dets bogstavelige forstand. Det er i langt højere grad tale 
om en traditionel bestiller-udfører relation mellem of-
fentlige og private aktører. Det ’nye’ ved kontraktformen 
er anvendelsen af privat finansiering og sammenkobling 
af de forskellige projektfaser i et udbud.10 Derudover 
drejer det sig om et samarbejde, der strækker sig over 
flere årtier. Bygge- og anlægspartnerskabet præsenterer 
umiddelbart ikke en kvalitativ ny måde at samarbejde 
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på, hvilket forventningerne til OPP ofte tilsiger (jf. Hod-
ge og Greve 2005: 2; Mörth og Sahlin-Andersson 2006: 
11-12; Wettenhall 2006: appendix 1). De samspilsfor-
mer, der fokuseres på indenfor rammerne af byudvik-
lingstilgangen, kommer tættere på gængse forventnin-
ger om tætte og mere tillidsbaseret relationer mellem 
offentlige og private organisationer. Det skyldes, at fæl-
lesproduktion, risikodeling og principal-principal agent 
relationer er indeholdt i selve definitionen af OPP inden 
for den tilgang. En ulempe ved byudviklingstilgangen 
kan være, at den er relativ tavs om hvilke formelle struk-
turer, et OPP består af (er samarbejdet baseret på en 
kontrakt, løse netværksstrukturer eller en fælles orga-
nisatorisk enhed?). Blot samarbejdet indeholder oven-
nævnte kendetegn (fællesproduktion, principal-princi-
pal relationer osv.), så kan det klassificeres som OPP. 
Hvorvidt den relativt åbne definition er en ulempe eller 
ej, er en smagssag. Nogle forskere ville utvivlsomt mene, 
at det ikke er hensigtsmæssigt at ’lukke’ begrebet, så det 
kun omfatter særlige kontrakttyper eller bestemte orga-
nisatoriske fællesskaber. I stedet bør OPP udforskes em-
pirisk (Mörth og Sahlin-Andersson 2006). Et modsvar 
til det kunne være, at erfaringsopsamling dermed bliver 
problematisk, da der er en overhængende fare for, at 
man sammenligner ’pærer og æbler’. Et andet spørgsmål, 
der også rejser sig, er: Hvad adskiller OPP fra tidligere 
former for offentlig-privat samspil? Som enkelte forskere 
har påpeget, så kan man argumentere for, at OPP har ek-
sisteret i århundreder (Wettenhall 2005b). Samme kritik 
gør sig gældende i forhold til policy-tilgangen til OPP. 
Hvad er det nye og særegne ved OPP i et policy perspek-
tiv? Er der ikke blot tale om, at et nyt ord bliver brugt til 
at betegne noget, som har eksisteret længe? 
 I forhold til byudviklings-, policy og udviklingstil-
gangen kunne man argumentere for, at OPP er ganske 
udbredt i Danmark (det bliver bare kaldt noget andet), 
mens i forhold til bygge- og anlægstilgangen så er de 
danske OPP-erfaringer (som tidligere nævnt) meget be-
grænsede sammenlignet med eksempelvis Storbritan-
nien og Australien. 
Det kan være problematisk, at det samme ord (OPP) har 
så mange forskellige betydninger. For det første, så er 
det svært at fremstille én overordnet definition på OPP. 
For det andet, så er der en fare for, at karakteristika ved 
de forskellige OPP tilgange bliver blandet sammen. For 
eksempel kan man foranlediges til at tro, at bygge- og 
anlægspartnerskaber nødvendigvis involverer tætte og 
tillidsbaserede samarbejdsrelationer mellem offentlig-
private aktører – hvilket i udgangspunktet ikke er til-
fældet. For det tredje, så er der en risiko for, at erfarin-
Kontekst 
Bygge- og anlægs- tilgangen Byudviklingstilgangen Policy tilgangen udviklingstilgangen
Offentlige bygge- og 
anlægsprojekter, drift/
vedligeholdelse.
Afhjælpe økonomisk og 
sociale problemer i byer.
I dag udbredt til en lang 
række andre kontekster.
Rollefordeling ml. offentligt 





(inddragelse af nye aktører 
i udviklingsarbejdet)
Strukturer Bygge- og anlægskon-
trakter; langsigtede 
(typisk +30 år), 
detaljerede kontrakter; 
finansiering, design, 
etablering og drift koblet 
sammen i ét udbud*
Forskellige formelle 
strukturer. Tætte relationer, 
fællesproduktion, risiko-
deling, samarbejde over tid 
(kan både være forskellige 
kontraktformer og 
selskabslignende 
relationer mellem offentligt 
og privat)
Ikke projektbaserede 





internationale statslige og 
ikke-statslige aktører 
agerer som katalysatorer 




Principal-agent. Principal-principal. Generelle relationer mellem 
offentligt og privat.
Multiple aktører.
* Bygge- og anlægstilgangen kan som tidligere nævnt også omfatte andre kontraktformer såsom BOOT, BOT, sale and lease back arrangementer m.m.
g. WeIHe  Tema  11
Tabel 1: De fire OPP perspektiver
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gerne fra en type OPP bliver blandet sammen med 
erfaringer fra andre OPP-typer. Derved kan man afsted-
komme til at tro, at bygge- og anlægspartnerskaber f.
eks. medfører øget lokal mobilisering og deltagelse (jf. 
Andersen 2004). Sidst men ikke mindst, så er det umu-
ligt at sige noget generelt om fordele, ulemper, succes-
kriterier og faldgruber ved OPP. Svaret vil altid afhænge 
af, hvilken konkret OPP form man taler om. 
Der er givetvis overlap mellem de forskellige tilgange. 
Der kan især i forhold til udviklingstilgangen stilles 
spørgsmålstegn ved, om der er tale om en egentlig til-
gang for sig, da flere af de øvrige tilgange blandes sam-
men indenfor denne. Jeg har indtil videre valgt at be-
holde udviklingstilgangen alligevel, netop på baggrund 
af den særskilte rolle, som en tredje part spiller i udvik-
lingspartnerskaberne. Og yderligere fordi det giver me-
ning at tale om en særlig forgrening af OPP litteraturen, 
som beskæftiger sig med OPP i et udviklingsperspektiv. 
Udviklingsfeltet ser også ud til at leve et ganske uafhæn-
gigt liv set i forhold til den øvrige OPP-litteratur. Formå-
let med inddelingen her har desforuden ikke været at 
skabe vandtætte skodder mellem forskellige definitioner 
og forståelser af OPP, men snarere at illustrere mange-
tydigheden, uklarhederne og de forskellige felter, der 
eksisterer i praksis. Hvis gennemgangen blot har illu-
streret, at der er forskellige måder, hvorpå forskere og 
praktikere anvender betegnelsen ’OPP’, og at man der-
udover helt overordnet kan tale om forskellige forgre-
ninger i litteraturen, så er formålet nået. 
 Begrebets mange anvendelsesformer taget i betragt-
ning, så er det ikke besynderligt, at der hersker forvir-
ring omkring, hvad et OPP er.11 Der forekommer umid-
delbart tre overordnede måder, hvorpå forvirringen kan 
håndteres: a) Man kan argumentere for, at der kun fin-
des én rigtig måde at forstå OPP på; dvs. påpege, at der 
kun er en ’rigtig’ anvendelse af begrebet (som eksempel 
på den løsning, se Wettenhall 2006 eller Klijn og Teis-
man 2005):12 b) Eller man kan argumentere for, at OPP 
er et relativt åbent begreb, der skal udforskes empirisk 
(se f.eks. Mörth og Sahlin-Andersson 2006), dvs. begre-
bets grænser defineres ikke på forhånd: c) Alternativt 
kan man anerkende, at der findes forskellige forgrenin-
ger (tilgange) i litteraturen, og at OPP-begrebet andra-
ger bestemte betydninger indenfor hver enkelt af de til-
gange. Fordelen ved sidstnævnte løsningsmodel er, at 
den i højere grad muliggør erfaringsopsamling og gene-
raliseringer inden for hver enkelt tilgang. Sidstnævnte 
løsningsmodel synes derfor umiddelbart at være den 
mest attraktive af de tre. På de følgende sider vil jeg 
komme med et forslag til, hvordan forskellige OPP-mo-
deller yderligere kan klassificeres. Typologien går på 
tværs af de ovenfor gennemgåede OPP-tilgange og er-
statter derfor ikke, men supplerer blot disse.
En alternativ OPP-typologi 
OPP-forskningen har indtil videre primært interesseret 
sig for økonomiske og tekniske forhold ved OPP (Lang-
ford 2002; Ghobadian et al. 2004, 8, 289; Reeve and 
Hatter 2004). Der er blevet lagt en del energi i at analy-
sere kontraktstrukturer, finansieringsspørgsmål, for-
sikringsspørgsmål osv., mens der er forsket ganske lidt i 
OPP processer og relationer. Relaterede studier af alli-
ancer (private-private partnerskaber) viser imidlertid, 
at forhold, der finder sted, efter at kontrakterne er blevet 
underskrevet, kan have en afgørende betydning for 
samarbejdets effektivitet og performance (f.eks. Tall-
man and Phene 2006: 140; Spekman et al. 2000: 33; 
Kanter 2002; Doz 1996). Antallet af sådanne studier er 
ganske imponerende.  Der findes for eksempel et relativt 
stort forskningsområde, som analyserer hvilken betyd-
ning tillid har for et effektivt samarbejde (se f.eks. 
Rousseau et al. 1998; Dyer og Chu 2002). Et andet felt 
forsøger at identificere hvilke organisatoriske og indivi-
duelle kompetencer bidrager til et succesfuldt samar-
bejde. I den forbindelse identificeres både tekniske og 
relationelle kompetencer som værende vigtige for part-
nerskabsperformance (se f.eks. Spekman et al. 2000, 
Heimeriks 2004; Dyer and Singh 2004). Den omfatten-
de erfaringsopsamling, der har fundet sted indenfor al-
liance-forskningen tyder på, at man med fordel kan 
rette mere opmærksomhed mod samarbejdsrelationer-
ne og -processerne i forhold til OPP. Typologien, der 
skitseres her, bygger netop på et sådant procesperspek-
tiv. Det vil sige, at OPP overordnet betragtes som en dy-
namisk proces, hvor samarbejdets karakter ændrer sig 
over tid (Ring og Van de Ven 1994; Doz 1996; Ariño and 
De la Torre 1998). I et procesperspektiv kan OPP betrag-
tes som sociale mekanismer for kollektiv handling, som 
løbende formes og omdannes af de involverede aktører 
(Ring and Van de Ven 1994: 96). Partnerskaber kan i 
dette perspektiv ikke a priori designes til at fungere på 
bestemte måder, og derfor bliver det væsentligt at af-
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dække og analysere, hvad der sker, efter at kontrakterne 
er underskrevet, og det egentlige samarbejde træder i 
kraft. Dermed ikke sagt, at det formelle aftalegrundlag 
ikke er væsentligt. Pointen er, at sociale relationer – i 
tillæg til de formelle strukturer – kan have en afgørende 
indflydelse på samarbejdets karakter og effektivitet. Det 
fordrer en dynamisk kategorisering af OPP (jf. tabel 2). 
Dvs. en typologi, der anerkender, at: a) der findes grund-
læggende forskellige formelle OPP strukturer; og b) 
forskellige typer sociale relationer, der c) også kan va-
riere over tid. 
 Ved at skelne mellem formelle og relationelle (ufor-
melle) samarbejdskarakteristika kan noget af den eksi-
sterende begrebsforvirring formildes. Som gennemgan-
gen ovenfor har illustreret, så defineres OPP i nogle 
tilfælde som bestående af bestemte formelle strukturer 
(f.eks. bygge- og anlægstilgangen; se f.eks. Tvarnø 
2005), mens andre definitioner primært tager udgangs-
punkt i karakteristika ved samarbejdsrelationerne (se 
bl.a. Klijn og Teisman 2005; Wettenhall 2006; Mörth og 
Sahlin Andersson 2006). I et procesperspektiv udeluk-
ker bestemte strukturer imidlertid ikke a priori bestem-
te relationer, og derfor bliver det mere hensigtsmæssigt 
at klassificere OPP ud fra træk ved både den formelle 
struktur og de mere uformelle samarbejdsrelationer. På 
strukturdimensionen kan man overordnet skelne mel-
lem tre former for formelle strukturer: a) kontrakter, b) 
fælles offentlig-private organisatoriske enheder (f.eks. 
dannelse af offentlig-private selskaber) og c) netværks-
relationer. Den relationelle dimension er lidt mere tricky 
at definere, da den refererer til en række ikke-håndgri-
belige og svært ’målbare’ forhold ved samarbejdet. Den 
refererer overordnet til kvaliteten ved samarbejdsrela-
tionerne (f.eks. omfanget af tillid, gensidighed, empati 
og ejerskab). Grundtanken er, at jo bedre relationerne 
mellem nøgleaktørerne er, desto mere effektivt og pro-
duktivt vil samarbejdet være. En væsentlig pointe er 
endvidere, at selv i projekter med enslydende formel 
struktur kan samarbejdsrelationerne være grundfor-
skellige. En britisk OPP-leder - der var involveret i to 
relativt ens OPP-projekter - fortæller eksempelvis, at 
han brugte syv-otte gange så meget tid på at få samar-
bejdet til at fungere i det ene projekt netop på baggrund 
anstrengte relationer mellem de involverede parter. En 
anden britisk OPP-leder understreger, at samarbejdsre-
lationerne er helt centrale: “The whole process is about 
people. That is a key thing actually! […]... the essence of 
all this is; it doesn’t matter what you have got drafted or 
what contracts you’ve got. It still relies on the right 
people in the right place. You can’t really legislate for 
that.“ For enkelthedens skyld kan vi her nøjes med at 
sige, at den relationelle dimension består af et antal be-
standdele, som er indbyrdes forbundet. Disse er f.eks.: 
tillid, fleksibilitet/gensidighed, empati, parternes ind-
stilling til samarbejdet (positiv vs. negativ), intensiteten 
(tætheden) i relationerne samt oplevelsen af at have fæl-
les mål (se i øvrigt Weihe 2007b; samt Weihe 2008). En-
kelte alliance-forskere bruger samlebetegnelsen ’relati-
onel kvalitet’ (relational quality), og definerer det som 
det omfang, parterne er trygge ved og villige til at forlige 
sig på tillid i relationen til hinanden (Ariño, De la Torre, 
Ring 2001: 111). Hvis vi skelner mellem tre kategorier af 







grad af relationel kvalitet i partnerskabet
Lav Medium Høj
Fælles organisatorisk 
enhed Type I Type II Type III
Kontraktbaseret Type IV Type V Type VI
Netværksbaseret Type VII Type VIII VIIII
Tabel 2: en OPP-typologi baseret på et procesperspektiv på partnerskaber
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Fordelen ved at tænke på OPP som både formelle struk-
turer og sociale relationer er, at et mere dynamisk per-
spektiv på OPP muliggøres. Et perspektiv der anerken-
der, at samarbejdets karakter ikke udelukkende 
determineres af formelle strukturer, men at det løbende 
udvikles og ændrer sig over tid (Aulakh and Madhok 
2002; Granovetter 1985). Typologien tvinger os endvi-
dere til at være eksplicitte i forhold til, hvad vi mener 
med OPP. Refererer vi til bestemte strukturer (specifik-
ke kontraktformer) (jvf. f.eks. Tvarnø 2005)? Eller 
handler det om bestemte typer samarbejdsrelationer (fx 
tillidsbaserede og procesorienterede relationer mellem 
to ligeværdige parter) (jvf. Klijn og Teisman 2005; Wet-
tenhall 2006)? De forskellige formelle og relationelle 
karakteristika bliver tit blandet sammen i litteraturen, 
og det er en af grundende til, at der opstår forvirring 
omkring OPP begrebet. 
 Typologien kan videreudvikles/præciseres yderli-
gere for derefter at fungere fx som et redskab til diag-
nose af OPP praksis; dvs. et redskab til at kigge bagom 
den til tider måske rosenrøde OPP retorik. Hvilke prak-
siser gemmer der sig egentlig bagved OPP betegnelsen? 
Typologien kan ligeledes hjælpe os med at komme uden-
om diskussionerne om hvad et OPP er eller ikke er (f.
eks. Klijn og Teisman 2005; Wettenhall 2006), idet den 
anerkender, at der findes forskellige OPP- strukturer og 
-relationer, der kan kombineres på kryds og tværs. Slut-
teligt kan typologien anvendes til at få et overblik over 
den empiriske udbredelse af forskellige former for OPP. 
Præsentationen her skal blot ses som et første skridt i 
retning af en mere veldefineret typologi.
Konklusion
På de forudgående sider er OPP-begrebets mangetydig-
hed forsøgt illustreret ved en gennemgang af den inter-
nationale OPP-litteratur. Der findes forskellige tilgange 
til OPP, og indenfor de forskellige tilgange dækker OPP 
væsensforskellige samarbejdsformer. Det kan argumen-
teres, at det er problematisk at OPP begrebet reelt ikke 
har en specifik betydning andet end, at offentlige og pri-
vate aktører samarbejder om noget, der i et vist omfang 
er reguleret på en ikke nærmere specificeret måde (kon-
trakt, organisation, netværk?). Det kan give anledning 
til misforståelser, samt at erfaringerne med én type OPP 
kan blive blandet sammen med erfaringerne fra andre 
OPP-typer. Derfor er det vigtigt eksplicit at slå fast, in-
denfor rammerne af hvilken OPP-tilgang bestemte erfa-
ringer og konklusioner hører hjemme. 
 Fremtidig forskning kan med fordel rettes mod at 
afdække samarbejdsprocesserne i OPP. Hvad sker der, 
når et OPP implementeres? Hvad kendetegner de fakti-
ske relationer mellem de involverede aktører? Hvilken 
’partnerskabskultur’ gør sig gældende i de enkelte pro-
jekter? Hvilke udfordringer opstår der undervejs i forlø-
bet? Hvilke partnerskabs- eller samarbejdskompeten-
cer er særlig vigtige i forhold til et velfungerende og 
effektivt samarbejde? Hvordan ændrer OPP-samarbej-
det sig over tid? Og hvilken betydning har de løbende 
samarbejdsprocesser for OPP-performance? Svar på 
disse og lignende spørgsmål ville bidrage til en mere 
komplet forståelse af hvilke mekanismer er afgørende 
for opnåelse af et effektivt OPP samarbejde.
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Noter
1 OPP i snæver forstand er mest udbredt i Storbritannien. En opgørelse viser, at omkring 700 aftaler var underskrevet i 2005 (Partnerships 
UK 2006). En oversigt over alle underskrevne aftaler i Storbritannien findes på følgende hjemmeside: www.partnershipsuk.org.uk. Det skal 
nævnes, at den britiske regering i løbet af de seneste år er begyndt at fraråde brugen af PFI-modellen i forhold til IT og teknologiprojekter, 
da erfaringerne på det område har været mindre gode.
2 Se Greve og Ejersbo (2002) for en beskrivelse af henholdsvis hårde og bløde kontrakter.
3 Bemærk, at de senere definitioner i høj grad er præget af den kontekst, de er opstået i (Holland), hvor der er mange byudviklings- og om-
rådeudviklingsprojekter kendetegnet ved en høj grad af interaktion mellem aktørerne og komplekse beslutningsprocesser (Klijn, Edelenbos 
og Hughes 2007).
4 Se også Klijn og Teisman 2004. 
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There are many different types and definitions
of public-private partnerships (PPPs) (Weihe,
2006). However, what is increasingly meant by
PPP is some version of the Private Finance
Initiative model (PFI), which was launched in
the UK in the early 1990s. This type of PPP has
become a significant element of public
infrastructure policies in many countries. In
the UK, PPPs comprise about 10–15% of total
investment in public services (Treasury, 2006a,
p. 1). It is therefore important to consider what
implications PPP policies have for public values.
PPPs are established with the ultimate aim
of achieving some sort of advantage by
delivering value that could not have been
achieved without collaboration (Huxham and
Vangen, 2000, p. 293). More specifically, the
rationale for implementing PPPs is that they
provide greater value for money than
conventionally procured projects, i.e. a more
optimal combination of whole-of-life costs and
quality of goods or services compared to the
outcomes of alternative ways of service delivery
(Treasury, 2006b, p. 7). Achieving some sort of
material value is thus the raison d’être for PPPs.
Different degrees or types of value can be
generated, for example ‘simple cost savings’ or
‘real synergy’. In the former case, collaboration
is limited to co-ordination of operations, and
therefore there is no basis for synergy. In cases
of real synergy, substantive surplus value is
achieved; for instance in the form of innovative
products (Klijn and Teisman, 2005).
This article argues that the extent to which
real synergy is achieved is partly contingent on
behavioural and operational aspects of co-
operation. Partnerships that demonstrate
certain behavioural characteristics are more
likely to produce synergistic results than
partnerships that do not show such
characteristics (for instance, Kanter, 2002). An
analysis of co-operative practices enables an
interim appraisal of the extent to which real
synergy can be expected to result from a PPP.
This article distinguishes between two
general categories of public values:
•Material values—tangible substance values
(for example those affiliated with the
rationale for implementing PPPs).
•Procedural values—the traditional values of
public administration such as equality,
transparency, democratic accountability and
governance by rule.
The article looks at the implications that PPP
infrastructure policies have for material and
procedural public values. Material value is, of
course, normally distinguished from the public
values discourse. But here I expand the notion
of public values to include values that refer to
material benefits.
For the past two decades there has been an
increasing focus on making the public sector
more efficient, more flexible and more cost-
effective. Performance and service delivery have
had more emphasis than traditional public
values such as universality, equality, and legal
security (Peters and Pierre, 2003, p. 4). Methods
of valuation that traditionally belong in the
private sector have been transferred to the
public sector. Therefore, insofar as PPPs are
evaluated in terms of material value, value is
taken to be a ‘public’ one in this article.
This article argues, first, that the way in
which PPPs are implemented and managed
over time can have consequences for
performance (the degree to which material
value is produced). Second, it contends that
there may be a contradiction between achieving
material value in the form of ‘real synergy’, on
the one hand, and safeguarding procedural
public values on the other. Third, it shows how
research from a sister field on the management
Public-Private Partnerships and
Public-Private Value Trade-Offs
Public-private partnerships (PPPs) are playing an increasingly important role in
infrastructure policies in many countries. This article reflects on the extent to
which PPPs deliver public value. The article also distinguishes between material
and procedural public values, and suggests that there may be an inherent
contradiction between achieving material value while at the same time
safeguarding procedural public values in PPPs.
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of alliances can shed light on the importance of
operational and behavioural dynamics in PPP.
Past Research
Previous research on PPPs has tended to focus
on material and economic considerations, in
addition to ex ante contractual issues (Ghobadian
et al., 2004, p. 289; Reeve and Hatter, 2004).
There has also been a considerable amount of
academic work on conceptual clarification (for
instance Weihe, 2006; Wettenhall, 2006) and
on PPPs’ performance (see Hodge and Greve,
2007).
What happens after contracts have been
signed, however, has received little scholarly
attention. Indeed, operational practice has been
more or less black-boxed. So we do not know
very much about how the public and private
actors in PPPs co-operate in practice, and how
this affects performance, which is, ultimately,
the level of (material) value expected to be
achieved via PPPs. A key assumption, here, is
that managing the partnership process is an
important aspect of effective co-operation.
Methodology
The arguments in this article build on findings
from a qualitative case study of co-operative
practice in five different PPPs in three different
policy sectors in the UK—transport, health
and defence. The case study approach adopted
follows the logic of ‘naturalism’ (as opposed to
positivism and constructivism). The objective
was to produce detailed knowledge about the
operational practice of PPPs. The approach
used here is innovative in the sense that it goes
beyond the formal PPP contract and investigates
what happens at the micro-level processes in
individual operational PPP projects.
A key case selection criterion was the
duration of the projects—each of the cases had
been operational for between two and five
years when they were selected. As an exception,
one of the cases had a phased roll-out of services
and became fully operational after it was
selected. Finally, access was also a decisive
factor with regard to case selection. The analyses
focused primarily on the post-construction
phase of co-operation, and the public-private
interface in the selected cases. In each PPP, a
number of key representatives from the public
and the private sector were interviewed, i.e.
public and private sector managers at different
levels of the partnership (for example special
purpose vehicle managers and board members,
managers at the prime subcontractor level,
and representatives from the public sector
commissioning body, in addition to public sector
project managers at a local level). This follows
the recommendations by Madhok (1995, pp.
72–73), who suggests that it is prudent to
interview both partners in a partnership. Since
different actors might have different
perceptions of the character of co-operation, a
more comprehensive picture can be attained
by interviewing representatives from both sides
of the contract. This is a novel approach to PPP
research.
Each project manager was asked to describe
the partnership relationship, the characteristics
of co-operation, and the pattern of interaction
in the partnership projects in which they were
involved. Since much of the collected data
consists of personal views, experiences and
expressions of the involved partnership
managers, the identity of the cases is not
revealed.
PPPs and Collaborative Advantage
Alliance research has demonstrated that in
order to achieve real synergy (i.e. a higher
order level of material value), certain elements
of co-operation are required (see, for instance,
Spekman et al., 2000). The formal deal itself
may be a necessary precondition, but it does
not guarantee effective co-operation. According
to alliance scholars (for example Contractor
and Lorange, 2002), critical ingredients in a
synergistic partnership are of a more intangible
nature. Indeed, they concern softer issues of
co-operation such as trust and the mindsets of
the involved actors. A key source of collaborative
advantage is that the actors succeed in moving
beyond a pure exchange relationship and move
towards a relationship characterized by
collaboration (Kanter, 2002), i.e. an inter-
organizational relationship marked by ‘high
connection’, ‘high intensity’, and ‘close
relationships’ (Keast et al., 2007, p. 12).
According to an international study of 37
companies, the most successful partnerships
are more familial and less rational (Kanter,
2002).
Various alliance scholars suggest that
organizations possessing some sort of
‘collaborative capability’ (Schreiner et al., 2005)
or ‘alliance competence’ (Spekman et al., 2000)
will be more successful in their alliance activities
than organizations that do not possess such
capabilities. The components of the capability
concept vary somewhat from study to study,
but a common denominator for many of the
approaches is that intangible behavioural factors
are stressed as being important for overall
alliance performance. Having the right
‘mindset’ and being able to ‘bond’ with other
105
PUBLIC MONEY & MANAGEMENT JUNE 2008
154
© 2008 THE AUTHOR
JOURNAL COMPILATION © 2008 CIPFA
of alliances can shed light on the importance of
operational and behavioural dynamics in PPP.
Past Research
Previous research on PPPs has tended to focus
on material and economic considerations, in
addition to ex ante contractual issues (Ghobadian
et al., 2004, p. 289; Reeve and Hatter, 2004).
There has also been a considerable amount of
academic work on conceptual clarification (for
instance Weihe, 2006; Wettenhall, 2006) and
on PPPs’ performance (see Hodge and Greve,
2007).
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achieved via PPPs. A key assumption, here, is
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and the private sector were interviewed, i.e.
public and private sector managers at different
levels of the partnership (for example special
purpose vehicle managers and board members,
managers at the prime subcontractor level,
and representatives from the public sector
commissioning body, in addition to public sector
project managers at a local level). This follows
the recommendations by Madhok (1995, pp.
72–73), who suggests that it is prudent to
interview both partners in a partnership. Since
different actors might have different
perceptions of the character of co-operation, a
more comprehensive picture can be attained
by interviewing representatives from both sides
of the contract. This is a novel approach to PPP
research.
Each project manager was asked to describe
the partnership relationship, the characteristics
of co-operation, and the pattern of interaction
in the partnership projects in which they were
involved. Since much of the collected data
consists of personal views, experiences and
expressions of the involved partnership
managers, the identity of the cases is not
revealed.
PPPs and Collaborative Advantage
Alliance research has demonstrated that in
order to achieve real synergy (i.e. a higher
order level of material value), certain elements
of co-operation are required (see, for instance,
Spekman et al., 2000). The formal deal itself
may be a necessary precondition, but it does
not guarantee effective co-operation. According
to alliance scholars (for example Contractor
and Lorange, 2002), critical ingredients in a
synergistic partnership are of a more intangible
nature. Indeed, they concern softer issues of
co-operation such as trust and the mindsets of
the involved actors. A key source of collaborative
advantage is that the actors succeed in moving
beyond a pure exchange relationship and move
towards a relationship characterized by
collaboration (Kanter, 2002), i.e. an inter-
organizational relationship marked by ‘high
connection’, ‘high intensity’, and ‘close
relationships’ (Keast et al., 2007, p. 12).
According to an international study of 37
companies, the most successful partnerships
are more familial and less rational (Kanter,
2002).
Various alliance scholars suggest that
organizations possessing some sort of
‘collaborative capability’ (Schreiner et al., 2005)
or ‘alliance competence’ (Spekman et al., 2000)
will be more successful in their alliance activities
than organizations that do not possess such
capabilities. The components of the capability
concept vary somewhat from study to study,
but a common denominator for many of the
approaches is that intangible behavioural factors
are stressed as being important for overall
alliance performance. Having the right
‘mindset’ and being able to ‘bond’ with other
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organizations are examples of such factors (see
Spekman et al., 2000; and Schreiner et al.,
2005). Generally, trust is a recurrent factor that
is believed to have significant performance
implications. Trust, inter alia, is believed to
lower transaction costs, enhance co-operation,
increase information-sharing, facilitate dispute
resolution and reduce the amount of formal
contracts and harmful conflict between co-
operating organizations (see Luo, 2002 for an
introduction to research on trust and strategic
alliances).
On the basis of research findings from the
alliance literature, a number of propositions
can be put forward regarding the co-operative
nature of different types of partnerships. More
specifically, the features of two ideal types—
‘collaborative’ and ‘exchange’ partnerships—
can be extracted (see table 1).
Operational practice that resembles the
collaborative partnership will generally achieve
more real synergy (higher levels of material
value) than the exchange partnership. Our five
case stories were constructed by using these
parameters as guidelines for analysing the
nature of co-operation. Key findings were:
•Intensity of interaction and interaction
patterns varied greatly from case to case.
•Relational quality varied considerably across
the investigated cases.
•Institutional context influenced the way that
PPPs unfolded.
Intensity and pattern of interaction ranged
from low to high. The involvement of different
institutional actors also varied from case to
case. In some cases, interaction was only between
the special purpose vehicle (SPV) and the public
sector counterpart; in other cases, the main
interaction was between prime subcontractors
and the local public sector partnership
managers. In yet other cases, a significant
amount of the interaction took place between
public sector advisors (consultants) and private
sector representatives from various levels, while
the public sector partners maintained a more
hands’-off approach (i.e. avoided becoming
too involved in the project during the
implementation stage).
There were significant variations in the
relational quality across the public-private
interface. While some cases displayed close-
knit and collaborative operational relationships,
others displayed rather distanced and
formalized relationships. There was a
considerable variation in levels of reciprocity,
degree of empathy for partner interests, and
the type of mindsets that the involved
partnership managers displayed. While some
partnership managers stressed the importance
of working together, acknowledging each
other’s differences and being flexible, others
focused primarily on the contract. As a
consequence, some managers said they felt
‘bogged down’ in the interpretation of words,
while others indicated that co-operation runs
very smoothly. Some partnership managers
stressed the importance of people and how well
they interact with each other, others simply
suggested that the relational aspect of co-
operation is insignificant. Only one case
resembled the collaborative partnership. Two
cases came closer to the exchange partnership,
and the last two cases were in between.
Finally, there was a pattern with respect to
the nature and intensity of co-operation across
the three policy sectors involved.
Comparatively, the two transport cases had
lower levels of relational quality, in addition to
the least intensive interactions. The defence
sector case displayed comparatively intense co-
operation and high levels of relational quality.
And the two health sector cases were in the
middle (somewhat closer to the transport cases
than the defence case).
Figure 1 illustrates the position of the
different cases in a comparative sense, but not
in an absolute sense, i.e. when a case is positioned
at the high-end of the continuum, this indicates
a high score relative to the other cases included
in the analysis. The exact position of each case
is debatable since the working relationships
were not measured in a quantitative sense, and
Table 1. Key features of co-operation.
The collaborative partnership The exchange partnership
Trust Distrust
Reciprocity, tit-for-tat strategies One-sidedness, non-mutual approach
Attentiveness/empathy for partner Incomprehension, minimal attentiveness
Positive and proactive attitude/mindset Unenthusiastic and reactive attitude
Close relationships Distanced relationships
Shared purpose/joint goals Split purposes
High intensity/connection Low intensity/connection
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the findings are based on the analyst’s
interpretation of ‘observed’ behaviour (for
example expressions, statements, and attitudes
of the interviewed managers). However, the in-
depth interviews revealed a significant difference
in partnership approaches across the investigated
cases. It is these differences that figure 1 loosely
illustrates.
Implications for Public Values
The majority of the analysed cases resemble the
exchange partnership more than the
collaborative partnership. This suggests that
material value in the form of ‘real synergy’ is not
being achieved. This does not mean that material
value is not achieved at all but that the highest
scale of synergy is perhaps not achieved. Some
studies of PPP performance have suggested that
material value is achieved. However, there is no
agreement in the academic literature on PPP
performance (for an overview of the literature
on PPP performance, see Hodge and Greve,
2007).
There are several reasons for most of the
analysed cases resembling the exchange
partnership. First, the nature of the PFI contract
does not invite the type of co-operation associated
with collaborative partnerships. The contracts
are extensive and detailed. At the outset,
therefore, there is little room for joint action
(Klijn and Teisman, 2005). Another reason might
be that both the private and the public sector
actors often hold a priori assumptions about the
motives and behaviours of their opposing
partners—a recurrent issue in the interview data.
This may lead to lower trust levels, which again
inhibits effective co-operation. Finally, differences
in public and private organizational cultures
may act as a constraint on the collaborative
environment.
How, then, can we explain why one of the
cases resembled the collaborative partnership
more closely? Differences in historical institutional
context between different public policy sectors
could be part of the explanation. Moreover, the
defence sector may be subject to less public
scrutiny than some of the other policy sectors.
This could influence partnership behaviour. The
distinct military background of the public PPP
managers in the defence sector could also play a
role. Finally, a more straightforward explanation
could be that both parties in this case considered
it a flagship project, which naturally leads to a
higher level of collaborative effort.
The features that, according to the alliance
literature, are most closely associated with
synergistic alliances run counter to traditional
procedural public values. Synergistic
partnerships are supposedly flat, non-
hierarchical and thus more irrational, personal
and unpredictable (see table 1). The point to
stress here is that there is a discrepancy between
the type of partnership features that supposedly
lead to collaborative advantage on the one hand,
and procedural public values on the other. While
synergistic partnerships are characterized by
close personal bonds and a culture of ‘leaving
contracts in the drawer’, public organizations
are ideally characterized by diametrically opposed
values. They are taken to be impartial and rule-
bound. The ideal bureaucracy is a uniform and
unbiased administration, not one that improvises,
bends rules and practices favouritism. Public
organizations cannot act in familial and ‘less
rational’ ways—traits which some alliance scholars
suggest are conducive to collaborative advantage
(Kanter, 2002).
A key challenge for today’s public managers,
including partnership managers, is to balance
the demands for achieving material value (for
example effectiveness and efficiency demands)
with safeguarding procedural values such as
transparency, legality, universality, equity, ethics,
and accountability. During the extensive new
public management (NPM) reforms of past
decades, traditional public administration values
have received relatively little attention.
Nevertheless, it is important to bear in mind that
Figure 1. Policy sector case differences.
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the constitutional objective of public
administration is not to promote efficiency, but
to prevent the exercise of arbitrary power
(Allison, 1979). Therefore it is important to
take into account not only effectiveness and
efficiency demands, but also the procedural
values of public administration. The complexity
of objectives in the public sector accentuates
the importance of clarifying different notions of
‘value’ and the trade-off between different types
of values promoted by different types of
(infrastructure) policies.
It is commonly suggested in the PPP literature
that the PFI version of PPPs is not a real
partnership because co-production is limited,
risk-sharing is absent, and relationships are purely
contractual (for example Klijn and Teisman,
2005). At a first glance, these claims seem valid.
Nevertheless, the case analyses here reveal that
PPPs sometimes do develop into real
partnerships—i.e. they become ‘genuinely
collaborative’, ‘exploit respect and trust as forms
of social capital’ (Wettenhall, 2006), and involve
‘close-knit’ and ‘intensive’ co-production (Klijn
and Teisman, 2005). This type of relationship
emerges during the long-term operational stage
of co-operation (see figure 2), which suggests
that collaborative advantage, in the form of
substantive surplus value generated jointly by
the public and private sector actors, is generally
limited in the early stages of co-operation. It also
suggests that synergy levels and degree of
innovation increase as the parties get to know
each other, which leads to greater levels of trust.
It is during the long-term service delivery
period—which typically lasts several decades—
that partnerships sometimes develop the features
that alliance scholars associate with synergistic
partnerships. This finding is consistent with
results from game theory (for instance Axelrod,
1984). Since the actors expect to be in the
partnership for several decades, they are not
looking to ‘hit and run’. A constructive working
relationship is more beneficial in the long run
and, as a result, PPP relationships can evolve into
collaborative partnerships over time. Therefore,
the ‘PPP concession’ should not be rejected a
priori as some authors, who argue that it is not a
real PPP (for example Klijn and Teisman, 2005;
Wettenhall 2006), want to do.
How to define and categorize different types
of PPP is under debate (Weihe 2006). Some
scholars classify different types of PPP along the
contractual dimension, others focus more on
relational and organizational features of
interaction (for instance, Klijn and Teisman 2005;
Wettenhall, 2006). The findings here suggest
that a more promising approach would be to
include the formal (contractual) dimension, in
addition to the informal (behavioural) dimension
of co-operation when categorizing different types
of PPP. The case analyses have shown that the
way in which co-operation proceeds in practice
can vary from project to project—despite the fact
that formal structures are relatively constant.
Typologies based exclusively on the contractual
dimension are limited since they do not say
much about actual co-operation. Moreover the
findings suggest that a partnership can
simultaneously be a ‘PPP contract’ and an
‘organizational co-operation project’ even
though, in the literature, a sharp distinction is
often made between the two forms of PPP (Klijn
and Teisman, 2005).
Conclusions and Suggestions for Future
Research
The findings reported here suggest that material
value (in the form of real synergy) is not achieved
in the majority of the analysed cases because the
co-operation is transactional—actual
collaboration is limited. Another finding is that
the co-operative characteristics, which tend to be
viewed as synergy-enabling features in the alliance
literature, threaten procedural value.
Operational practice was shown here to vary
Figure 2. Phases in a PPP.
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significantly from project to project. Since related
alliance research has demonstrated that this
part of the partnership can have significant
performance implications, more research
should be directed at investigating the
operational processes of PPPs, for example at
empirically mapping what goes on within the
‘black box’ of co-operation:
•How does interaction take place in practice?
•Who are the key actors?
•What is the pattern and frequency of
interaction?
•What is the content of interaction?
•How does institutional context influence the
way PPPs are implemented?
More qualitative research that can capture and
elaborate on soft concepts such as processes,
social dynamics, trust and goodwill is needed.
Two key managerial lessons emerged from
this work. First, managing the partnership
process is an important aspect of PPP since this
phase can have significant performance
consequences. Attention should therefore be
directed at managing partnerships, while
sufficient resources should be made available
for the continuous management of partnership
projects. Second, the balance between different
types of values should be consciously managed
by public managers. Neither an exclusive focus
on material values, nor a sole focus on
procedural values appears to be beneficial in
the long run. ■
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Beyond contracts: Utilizing alliance research vis-à-vis 
public-private partnership research 
 
Abstract 
Recently the concern has been voiced that we need to know more about the 
managerial challenges pertaining to public-private partnerships (PPP). Like PPP 
policy guidelines, most PPP research, focuses its attention primarily on the front end 
of the partnership process, especially the technical aspects of cooperation: 
accounting, insurance and financial issues, for example. Aspects that go beyond the 
formal structure of cooperation have only to a limited extent been analysed 
systematically vis-à-vis PPP. This is regrettable since there is a specific demand for 
more knowledge about the ex post contract-signature issues and the ‘people issues’ 
that may ultimately make or break a PPP. This article demonstrates how strategic 
alliance research can inform future PPP research on these matters of cooperation.  
 
“Compared with traditional managers, they [partnership managers] appeared to 
express much more confusion, talked of stressful work relationship environments 
and a sense of lonely pioneering in their work roles.” (Reeve and Hatter 2004, 7) 
Introduction 
This article departs from the observation that public-private partnerships (PPP) have 
hit the public management agenda globally, that it is widely spread, and that massive 
public as well as private resources are devoted to the implementation of PPPs. This 
necessitates and justifies research that addresses how this policy tool functions in 
practice. Regardless of whatever pros and cons there may be affiliated with PPP it is 
important to understand economical as well as social aspects of cooperation. This 
line of research is however currently missing in the PPP literature. Limited scholarly 
attention has been devoted to the “ongoing managerial life of a PPP” and to the 
cooperative practice at the micro-level of cooperation (Noble and Jones 2006). 
Processes for the ongoing management of PPP are still developing (Clifton and 
Duffield 2006, 573), and there is limited “navigational help” available for PPP 
managers who are now experiencing difficulties with managing PPP projects ex post 
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Abstract 
Recently the concern has been voiced that we need to know more about the 
managerial challenges pertaining to public-private partnerships (PPP). Like PPP 
policy guidelines, most PPP research, focuses its attention primarily on the front end 
of the partnership process, especially the technical aspects of cooperation: 
accounting, insurance and financial issues, for example. Aspects that go beyond the 
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more knowledge about the ex post contract-signature issues and the ‘people issues’ 
that may ultimately make or break a PPP. This article demonstrates how strategic 
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“Compared with traditional managers, they [partnership managers] appeared to 
express much more confusion, talked of stressful work relationship environments 
and a sense of lonely pioneering in their work roles.” (Reeve and Hatter 2004, 7) 
Introduction 
This article departs from the observation that public-private partnerships (PPP) have 
hit the public management agenda globally, that it is widely spread, and that massive 
public as well as private resources are devoted to the implementation of PPPs. This 
necessitates and justifies research that addresses how this policy tool functions in 
practice. Regardless of whatever pros and cons there may be affiliated with PPP it is 
important to understand economical as well as social aspects of cooperation. This 
line of research is however currently missing in the PPP literature. Limited scholarly 
attention has been devoted to the “ongoing managerial life of a PPP” and to the 
cooperative practice at the micro-level of cooperation (Noble and Jones 2006). 
Processes for the ongoing management of PPP are still developing (Clifton and 
Duffield 2006, 573), and there is limited “navigational help” available for PPP 
managers who are now experiencing difficulties with managing PPP projects ex post 
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implementation (Reeve and Hatter 2004, 7). The strategic alliance literature on the 
other hand has accumulated a significant stock of knowledge about non-contractual 
aspects of cooperation and how such factors can influence partnership performance. 
This article argues that this knowledge profitably can be utilized in relation to PPP 
research as well as PPP practice.1 
Two years ago Steve Kelman proclaimed that “Public Management 
Needs Help!” (Kelman 2005). The key message was that mainstream organization 
theory can help enrich our understanding of the public sector problems we are 
studying. Kelman points out that although much of the pioneering work in 
organization theory was written about public organizations, attention to public 
organizations has withered in recent decades (2005). I want to argue that strategic 
alliance research can help enrich our understanding of PPP. The common 
denominator for the two research fields is that they are both occupied with analysing 
cooperation across organizational boundaries. Similarly, in both cases the key object 
of study is typically the dyadic inter-organizational relationship.2 One field studies private-
private cooperation (alliances) and the other public-private cooperation (PPPs). 
Although both fields are studying the same object, i.e., inter-organizational 
cooperation, little to no cross-disciplinary communication has yet taken place. This is 
regrettable because, as already noted above; there is a specific demand for guidelines 
and instruction on how to handle the managerial challenges that PPP projects pose. 
This is further corroborated because alliance research suggests that such non-
contractual aspects of cooperation can have significant performance consequences. 
While there is a lack of guidelines in the PPP literature, the strategic alliance literature 
contains useful knowledge about managerial aspects of cooperation and other non-
formal facets influencing partnership performance.  
 The aim of this article is twofold. First, I want to demonstrate that alliance 
research can enrich our understanding of PPP and that it is an obvious area where 
public and business management scholars can join forces. Second, I want to draw 
                                                 
1 There are many different types and families of PPPs (Hodge and Greve 2007; Weihe 2005). In the 
context of this article, what is meant by PPP is ‘the infrastructure PPP’ (see Weihe 2005). This type of 
PPP involves a contract between a public and a private entity for the delivery of infrastructure-based 
services. The infrastructure PPP involves the bundling of private finance, construction, operation 
and/or maintenance into one contractual arrangement. This is also the context in which the PPP term 
is increasingly being used (Evans and Bowman 2005, 62).  
2 This distinguishes alliance research and PPP research from other related disciplines such as network 
research which studies multi-organizational relations (for instance, Agranoff and McGuire 2001); and 
governance research which is more inclined towards the changing institutional setup of society rather 
than features and mechanisms relating to the nature of bilateral organizational relationships (Kooiman 
2003; Lynn, Heinrich and Hill 2001). Similarly research on collaboration addresses collaboration as a 
phenomenon and not dyadic inter-organizational relationships (for instance, Sullivan and Skelcher 
2002; Wood and Gray 1991); and the same goes for the theory of collaborative advantage that 
explores in a generic manner the factors contributing to collaborative advantage (see Huxham and 
Vangen 2005). Therefore, in the context of this article, the mentioned research disciplines will not be 
addressed. What we are interested in demonstrating here is exclusively how the strategic alliance field 
contains lessons for PPP research practice. 
attention to certain aspects of cooperation that are often emphasised by alliance 
scholars but have until now been left more or less out of PPP studies. 
PPPs and alliances: Conceptual clarification 
Some preliminary conceptual clarification of both the PPP and the alliance term is 
needed. A PPP is commonly defined as “cooperation of some durability between 
public and private actors in which they jointly develop products and services and 
share risks, costs and resources which are connected with these products” (van Ham 
and Koppenjan 2001, 598). Alliances, meanwhile, have been defined as “voluntary 
arrangements between firms involving exchange, sharing, or codevelopment of 
products, technologies, or services. They can occur as a result of a wide range of 
motives and goals, take a variety of forms, and occur across vertical and horizontal 
boundaries” (Gulati 1998, 293).  It becomes clear from these two definitions that 
alliances and PPPs can constitute a variety of institutional forms of co-production. 
Both terms cover a parallel scope of formal arrangements (see table 1).  
 
Table 1 - Alliances and PPPs: an overview 
 









 Joint organizational 
expression 
 
Cooperation that involves partnership 
boards or forum  
Public-private limited companies (e.g. 
the LIFT program in the UK) 
Joint ventures, different types of equity 




PFI, BOOT, DBO, different types of 
service contracts 
buyer-seller agreements, other contractual 
relationships between private firms 
 
The table shows that the degree of formal integration between the involved 
organizations can vary significantly – in PPPs as well as alliances. Two general 
categories can be identified. First, both terms are used to describe inter-
organizational relationships based on joint ownership; for instance, a joint venture in 
the case of alliances, and a public-private limited company in the case of PPP (for 
some examples of this definition of PPP see Bergström 2007, 2; and Van der Wel 
2004). The point to stress here is that the alliance and the PPP term are used to 
describe cooperation that has reached some sort of joint organizational expression. 
Cooperative endeavours based on this type of formal structure are positioned in the 
high end of the integration continuum. Some PPP scholars suggest that ‘real’ 
partnerships involve this type of organizational arrangement (Wettenhall 2006, 
appendix 1), and that the contractual PPP is merely a “revamped form of tendering” 
(Klijn and Teisman 2005, 103). In relation to alliances, the concept initially referred 
mainly to joint ventures. However, as indicated in table 1, today the alliance term also 
includes a range of non-equity arrangements, for instance buyer-seller agreements 
(Casson and Mol 2006, 23).  
 The second general category is the contractual link. In relation to the PPP 
literature the most known example of the contractual link type of PPP would be 
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studying. Kelman points out that although much of the pioneering work in 
organization theory was written about public organizations, attention to public 
organizations has withered in recent decades (2005). I want to argue that strategic 
alliance research can help enrich our understanding of PPP. The common 
denominator for the two research fields is that they are both occupied with analysing 
cooperation across organizational boundaries. Similarly, in both cases the key object 
of study is typically the dyadic inter-organizational relationship.2 One field studies private-
private cooperation (alliances) and the other public-private cooperation (PPPs). 
Although both fields are studying the same object, i.e., inter-organizational 
cooperation, little to no cross-disciplinary communication has yet taken place. This is 
regrettable because, as already noted above; there is a specific demand for guidelines 
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This is further corroborated because alliance research suggests that such non-
contractual aspects of cooperation can have significant performance consequences. 
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 The aim of this article is twofold. First, I want to demonstrate that alliance 
research can enrich our understanding of PPP and that it is an obvious area where 
public and business management scholars can join forces. Second, I want to draw 
                                                 
1 There are many different types and families of PPPs (Hodge and Greve 2007; Weihe 2005). In the 
context of this article, what is meant by PPP is ‘the infrastructure PPP’ (see Weihe 2005). This type of 
PPP involves a contract between a public and a private entity for the delivery of infrastructure-based 
services. The infrastructure PPP involves the bundling of private finance, construction, operation 
and/or maintenance into one contractual arrangement. This is also the context in which the PPP term 
is increasingly being used (Evans and Bowman 2005, 62).  
2 This distinguishes alliance research and PPP research from other related disciplines such as network 
research which studies multi-organizational relations (for instance, Agranoff and McGuire 2001); and 
governance research which is more inclined towards the changing institutional setup of society rather 
than features and mechanisms relating to the nature of bilateral organizational relationships (Kooiman 
2003; Lynn, Heinrich and Hill 2001). Similarly research on collaboration addresses collaboration as a 
phenomenon and not dyadic inter-organizational relationships (for instance, Sullivan and Skelcher 
2002; Wood and Gray 1991); and the same goes for the theory of collaborative advantage that 
explores in a generic manner the factors contributing to collaborative advantage (see Huxham and 
Vangen 2005). Therefore, in the context of this article, the mentioned research disciplines will not be 
addressed. What we are interested in demonstrating here is exclusively how the strategic alliance field 
contains lessons for PPP research practice. 
attention to certain aspects of cooperation that are often emphasised by alliance 
scholars but have until now been left more or less out of PPP studies. 
PPPs and alliances: Conceptual clarification 
Some preliminary conceptual clarification of both the PPP and the alliance term is 
needed. A PPP is commonly defined as “cooperation of some durability between 
public and private actors in which they jointly develop products and services and 
share risks, costs and resources which are connected with these products” (van Ham 
and Koppenjan 2001, 598). Alliances, meanwhile, have been defined as “voluntary 
arrangements between firms involving exchange, sharing, or codevelopment of 
products, technologies, or services. They can occur as a result of a wide range of 
motives and goals, take a variety of forms, and occur across vertical and horizontal 
boundaries” (Gulati 1998, 293).  It becomes clear from these two definitions that 
alliances and PPPs can constitute a variety of institutional forms of co-production. 
Both terms cover a parallel scope of formal arrangements (see table 1).  
 
Table 1 - Alliances and PPPs: an overview 
 









 Joint organizational 
expression 
 
Cooperation that involves partnership 
boards or forum  
Public-private limited companies (e.g. 
the LIFT program in the UK) 
Joint ventures, different types of equity 




PFI, BOOT, DBO, different types of 
service contracts 
buyer-seller agreements, other contractual 
relationships between private firms 
 
The table shows that the degree of formal integration between the involved 
organizations can vary significantly – in PPPs as well as alliances. Two general 
categories can be identified. First, both terms are used to describe inter-
organizational relationships based on joint ownership; for instance, a joint venture in 
the case of alliances, and a public-private limited company in the case of PPP (for 
some examples of this definition of PPP see Bergström 2007, 2; and Van der Wel 
2004). The point to stress here is that the alliance and the PPP term are used to 
describe cooperation that has reached some sort of joint organizational expression. 
Cooperative endeavours based on this type of formal structure are positioned in the 
high end of the integration continuum. Some PPP scholars suggest that ‘real’ 
partnerships involve this type of organizational arrangement (Wettenhall 2006, 
appendix 1), and that the contractual PPP is merely a “revamped form of tendering” 
(Klijn and Teisman 2005, 103). In relation to alliances, the concept initially referred 
mainly to joint ventures. However, as indicated in table 1, today the alliance term also 
includes a range of non-equity arrangements, for instance buyer-seller agreements 
(Casson and Mol 2006, 23).  
 The second general category is the contractual link. In relation to the PPP 
literature the most known example of the contractual link type of PPP would be 
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some version of the UK based Private Finance Initiative (PFI) projects. These have 
been defined as “partnerships between the public and the private sectors for the 
financing, design, construction, operation and maintenance, and/or provision of 
assets or infrastructure and associated services, which have traditionally been 
provided by the public sector” (Evans and Bowman 2005, 62). It is increasingly in 
this particular context that the PPP label is being used (Evans and Bowman 2005, 
62). However, some PPP scholars complain that this version of PPP is far too 
limiting (Wettenhall 2005, 22) as it excludes all other cooperative arrangements than 
those that involve some combination of infrastructure and associated service 
delivery. The contractual link category is not limited to PFI type arrangements. Other 
types of contractual links such as service contracts can also be included in this 
category of PPPs (for instance, Jonston and Romzek 2005). The same is true in 
relation to the alliance term which includes a broad range of different types of 
contracts that fall ”between the extremes of discrete, short-term contracts and the 
complete merger of two or more organizations” (Contractor and Lorange 2002, 4).3 
 Two important findings emerge. First, both concepts are rather flexible and 
have been assigned a variety of meanings. The second and perhaps most important 
finding to emphasise here is that both terms cover a similar range of formal 
structural arrangements. The key difference is that they do so in different contexts. 
In the case of alliances, research is confined to private sector cooperation between 
firms. In the PPP context, one of the firms is replaced by a public sector actor. 
Given the common characteristics of the two concepts and the coverage of similar 
structural arrangements, there are obvious lessons to be drawn from the alliance 
literature. 
An overview of  the PPP literature 
Although research on PPP has proliferated during the past decade or so there are, as 
indicated above, some aspects of cooperation which have received limited attention. 
First, the literature is dominated by an institutional and organizational level focus to 
the detriment of a micro-level focus on the role of individual actors (Noble and 
Jones 2006, 891). Research efforts have moreover primarily addressed material and 
economic concerns (Ghobadian et al. 2004, 289), and focus has for the most part 
been directed at the front end of the partnership process; for instance at how 
contracts are designed, and at how risk is allocated between the involved parties 
(Reeve and Hatter 2004, 5). What happens after contract-signature has received 
limited attention; that is, operational processes at the micro-level have been more or 
                                                 
3 There could be argued to be even a third category of cooperation which is less formalized than the 
two other categories. I.e. a category, where cooperation is not based on formalized agreements 
(contracts). In the PPP literature, there are a number of scholars who use the PPP label to cover non-
contractual policy relationships, and other non-formalized and none-time-delimited relationships 
between private and public actors (for instance, Rosenau 2000). Likewise alliance scholars also address 
non-institutional relationships between firms: e.g. research adopting a social network perspective on 
alliances (Gulati 1998).  
less black-boxed. Formal and structural aspects of cooperation such as designing the 
contract, financial issues, insurance issues, accounting issues, allocating risk as well as 
political issues have been dealt with in quite some length (for instance, Coghill and 
Woodward 2005, Corner 2005; Evans and Bowman 2005). Additionally, substantial 
work has by now been done to explore the conceptual boundaries of the PPP 
concept (for instance; Hodge and Greve 2007; Van der Wel 2004; Weihe 2005; 
Wettenhall 2006). The same applies to work on the performance of PPP projects (for 
instance, Hodge and Greve 2007), and PPP research on policy related issues such as 
cross-country comparative studies of PPP policy development (for instance, Greve 
and Hodge 2007). Some work has moreover been conducted on PPP from a 
democratic accountability perspective, where questions concerning transparency and 
accountability have been addressed (for instance, Shaoul, Stafford and Stapleton 
2007).  
However, as already suggested above, little attention has been directed 
at PPP governance processes (including operational processes and behavioural 
aspects of cooperation). A few exceptions are Edelenbos, Klijn and Steijn (2007), 
Noble and Jones (2006), Reeves (2006); Reeve and Hatter (2004).  
Edelenbos, Klijn and Steijn have within the past few years conducted a 
couple of quantitative surveys measuring how behavioural factors such as trust 
influence partnership performance. In their most recent survey the general 
conclusion is that trust is an important factor in long-term public and private 
relationships (2007). Another PPP scholar has conducted a qualitative study 
(interviewing a handful of practitioners and including a mini-survey in the interviews) 
of the relationship characteristics in five PPP school projects in Ireland. He found 
that the contracting practice was not characterised by a shift to relational contracting 
as expected under PPP (Reeves 2006). In 2004, a report on management issues that 
arise in the post contract-signing phase of partnerships was published. The aim of 
this qualitative study was to uncover what makes a PPP successful beyond 
contractual factors (Reeve and Hatter 2004). It builds upon the managerial 
experiences of senior PPP practitioners involved in a ‘PPP practitioner Forum’ – a 
forum that was initiated by one of the authors. This qualitative study tells us what a 
PPP looks like from the inside. Moreover, it seeks to outline what principles a ‘real 
partnership’ needs to achieve in order to be successful. Finally, two Australian 
scholars have in a very innovative way analysed the roles and behaviours of 
boundary-spanning managers during the establishment of voluntary PPPs. Data was 
collected from ten PPPs and involved interviews, participant observation at 
meetings, organizational records and publicly available documents. Their study 
contributes in three important ways. First it identifies the critical role of boundary 
spanning managers in PPPs. Second they identify the main factors that shape the 
managerial environment that governs the behaviour of the boundary spanners. 
Finally, they outline how boundary spanners respond to environmental pressures.  
The mentioned research represents some first and preliminary attempts 
at analysing non-contractual aspects vis-à-vis PPP. Although each of these studies 
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contributes in important and innovative ways and provides useful insights into the de 
facto non-contractual challenges of PPP, much work remains to be done. For 
instance, the empirical studies have some limitations. In the Dutch research project 
on the importance of trust (Edelenbos, Klijn and Steijn 2007), for example, the 
selection of respondents is not a sample in statistical terms and it is also unclear what 
types of PPP projects are investigated. This is also the case in relation to Reeve and 
Hatter’s study as well as Noble and Jones’ study. It is somewhat unclear exactly what 
types of partnerships are analysed. Other concerns go to the generalizability of these 
initial findings? Are the findings case specific or country specific? Or perhaps even 
specific to an individual policy sector, e.g., schools in to the case of Reeves’ study 
(2006)? And would the findings vary across different types of PPPs? Finally we still 
know little about how cooperation evolves over time, what characterizes partnership 
behaviour in individual partnerships and the performance implications that these 
aspects of cooperation have. These are some of the questions that remain to be 
answered. 
 In policy practice, a similar bias in focus can be identified. In the UK, 
attention was only recently directed at the operational phase of cooperation in policy 
practice. This is reflected in the establishment of an operational taskforce by the HM 
Treasury in 2006. Moreover, there have been some recent official reports that have 
addressed issues related to the ongoing PPP relationship (for instance HM Treasury 
2006 and PartnershipsUK 2006). Because of the initial bias towards focusing on the 
front end of the PPP process, PPP practicians now experience difficulties with 
managing operational PPP projects. Some managers evoke analogies of ‘spinning 
compasses’, ‘lights going on and off’, ‘intermittent engine function’ and ‘radio silence’ 
when describing their experiences with managing PPPs (Reeve and Hatter 2004, 7). 
Identifying some promising learning potentials  
The alliance literature contains valuable managerial lessons. In particular, there are 
two areas in which this sister discipline can prove to be particularly valuable vis-à-vis 
PPP research: These concern a) research that analyses informal aspects of 
cooperation, and b) research on cooperative processes respectively. First, alliance 
scholars have accumulated a significant stock of knowledge about the importance of 
a broad range of informal (behavioural) factors in alliance relationships. Aspects of 
cooperation such as relational quality and trust between the partnering organizations 
have been studied in depth and are suggested to have significant performance 
implications (for instance, Dyer and Singh 2004; Zaheer, McEvily and Perrone 1998). 
Second, alliance scholars have identified partnership processes as being important 
performance antecedents too (Ariño and de la Torre 1998; Doz 1996; Ring and Van 
de Ven 1994). The key message in this latter line of research is that inter-
organizational relationships cannot a priori be designed to function in certain 
manners rather they can be viewed as “socially contrived mechanisms” that are 
constantly “shaped and restructured” by the involved actors (Ring and Van de Ven 
1994, 96). In this perspective, simple neoclassical accounts of economic action are 
not sufficient to explain partnership behaviour but need to be supplemented by 
analyses of social structures and social interaction (Granovetter 1985). Before 
elaborating further on this subfield of the alliance literature, potential problems with 
mixing the two research fields of public management and business management are 
addressed.  
Reasons for cautiousness  
In the context of public and private sector cooperation, there are of course reasons 
to be cautious when utilizing research findings from a research field (alliance studies) 
that deals exclusively with cooperation between private firms. It could be argued that 
the differences between public and private organizations are so great and the logics 
of cooperation so different that it makes little sense to transfer knowledge between 
the two fields. There may be several reasons for this. First, the alliance is situated in a 
competitive setting; the involved firms are cooperating with a potential competitor. 
In a PPP, the competitive element is not present to the same extent. This might lead 
to some differences in behaviour. Second, a PPP is situated in a political context 
while an alliance is not – at least not directly. Third, public sector goals may be 
viewed as more complex and diverse than private sector goals. Public goals are 
supposedly vaguer and more intangible than private organizational goals, and public 
sector goals can also be in conflict (Rainey et al. 1976, 237); there can for instance be 
a conflicting goal between effective and efficient cooperation on the one hand, and 
following the standard and rule-bound procedures of public administration on the 
other hand. Fourth, the public bureaucracy was “never designed to maximize on 
efficiency, flexibility and customer friendliness but rather to ensure a uniform an 
unbiased implementation of the law” (Peters and Pierre 2003, 6). Unlike business 
organizations, public organizations have a constitutional foundation, and therefore 
the objective of public organizations is not primarily the attainment of gain but the 
furtherance of the welfare of the society (Lynn 2003, 16-17. A fifth difference may be 
that public sector mangers enjoy less autonomy than their private sector counterpart; 
they may be less flexible because of a greater use of formal regulations and more 
levels of review in the public sector (Rainey et al. 1976).  
Scholars are increasingly proposing, however, that the differences 
between public and private organizations may not be so far-reaching after all. While 
early research was mostly preoccupied with stressing the differences, it appears that 
later contributions focus more on similarities between public and private 
organizations (for instance, Rainey and Bozeman 2000).   
Correspondingly, (business) scholars now suggest that the standard perception that 
private organizations are driven exclusively by a profit and market share motive is far 
too limited. Private sector organizations, so the argument goes, are becoming more 
political (for instance, Frankel 2004), and therefore the traditional definitions of 
private organizations are no longer sufficient. In a similar vein, the recent decades of 
worldwide New Public Management (NPM) related reforms of public 
administrations shows that public organizations are becoming more business-like (for 
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instance, Hood 1991). These developments suggest that perhaps the differences 
between what is purely private and what is purely public are becoming more blurred. 
To paraphrase Bozeman, perhaps the public-private dichotomy is more imagined 
than real (1987). This view is corroborated by the proposition that many of the 
“widely held a priori assumptions” about public organizations - i.e., untested 
assertions and foregone conclusions about the differences between public and 
private organizations – are not always supported by empirical research (Rainey and 
Bozeman 2000). As public and private organizations grow more alike, the 
disadvantages to be gained from lesson drawing across public management and 
business management research are perhaps diminishing too.  
Strategic alliance research – cooperative processes and 
behavioural factors 
The main objective on the following pages is to highlight the segments of alliance 
research that are relevant in relation to enhancing our understanding of non-
structural aspects of cooperation. The intention is not to provide a general review of 
the alliance literature (for that, see Auster 1994). Instead, my efforts here will be 
concentrated on outlining some of the key findings from alliance research relating to 
the importance of informal factors and processes in inter-organizational cooperation. 
These findings will illustrate the expediency of directing more attention towards the 
long-term nature of PPP projects and the resources required to manage these 
projects throughout the whole project life-cycle and not only at the formative stages. 
Strategic alliance research can be classified into two main tendencies 
(Aulakh and Madhok 2002, 26). First, there is the strand of research preoccupied 
with the motives underlying alliance formation. This line of research tries to explain 
why firms form alliances (for instance, Kogut 1988). The second strand of research is 
concerned with the topic of how to manage alliances. It can be divided into two 
subcategories: research that focuses on formal aspects of the relationship such as the 
choice of formal governance structures, and research that focuses on informal 
governance mechanisms (for instance, Ring and Van De Ven 1994). Amongst other 
things the first subcategory focuses on ownership structure and a variety of 
contractual mechanisms, while the second subcategory is more concerned with 
relationship processes (Aulakh and Madhok 2002, 26). Within this subcategory, 
scholars have argued that the pattern of interaction can be more important for 
efficiency than structural properties (Aulakh and Madhok 2002, 27; originally 
Granovetter 1985). It is the type of alliance research that falls under this latter 
subcategory that will be addressed here. Two key points can be extracted from this 
line of research: 
 
• The way partnerships evolve over time can have significant implications for 
partnership performance, and; 





First, alliance scholars have demonstrated that the way cooperation evolves over time 
impacts performance. Some suggest that the operational phase ultimately can 
determine the success or failure of cooperation (Thallman and Phene 2006, 140), and 
that “alliances fail for reasons other than the soundness of the business plan or the 
ability to execute according to that plan” (Spekman et al. 2000, 33). Others have 
similarly recognized alliance management as a source of competitive advantage 
(Ireland, et al. 2002; Kanter 2002), and that “managing the alliance relationship over 
time is usually more important than crafting the initial formal design” (Doz and 
Hamel 1998, xv). Correspondingly a study conducted by management consulting 
firm McKinsey has shown that 50 percent of alliances fail because of governing and 
operating processes (Bamford and Ernst 2003, 323).  
 In a process perspective, alliances can be viewed as evolutionary processes 
rather than a set of fixed formal structures (Ariño and de la Torre 1998; Doz 1996; 
Ring & Van de Ven 1994). They continuously evolve in their possibilities, and grow 
or fail just like relationships between people (Kanter 2002). A key point in this 
approach is that the way cooperation evolves is not exclusively determined by formal 
arrangements but instead relationships and psychological contracts supplement 
formal role relationships and increasingly substitute for legal contracts (Ring and Ven 
de Ven 1994, 91). In this light, it is important to look at the continuous cooperative 
processes and not – which has been the case thus far in the PPP field – confine 
research to the front end of the process (i.e. at pre contract-signature issues). Instead 
more attention should be directed towards how partnership plans are implemented, 
negotiated and continuously assessed and reassessed by the involved actors. Such 
processes can determine whether or not partnerships evolve into vicious or virtuous 
cycles of cooperation. Relevant research questions to ask could be: How do the 
involved actors relate to one another? What characterizes partnership relationships? 
How integrated are the involved partners in practice? And what is best practice in 
relation to the ongoing management of operational PPP projects? 
 
Informal (behavioural) factors 
Numerous alliance studies address behavioural aspects of cooperation. First, there is 
an extensive bulk of research which analyses how trust influences partnership 
performance. By and large this research suggests that trust lowers transaction costs, 
increases information-sharing, facilitates dispute resolution, reduces the amount of 
formal contracts, increases learning, and reduces harmful conflict (Das and Teng 
1998, 494; Dyer and Chu 2003; Luo 2002; Rousseau, et al. 1998, 394;). As an 
example, one study of buyer-supplier relationships found that the least trusted 
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instance, Hood 1991). These developments suggest that perhaps the differences 
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company had procurement (transaction) costs that were five times higher than the 
other comparable companies in the study (Dyer and Chu 2003).  
Second, research on trust and alliances is closely related to research 
that deals with the importance of relational quality in strategic alliances. Relational 
quality can be defined as “the extent to which the partners feel comfortable and are 
willing to rely on trust in dealing with one another” (Ariño, de la Torre and Ring 
2001, 111). Relational quality is a broader concept than trust as it also involves other 
aspects of cooperation such as the degree of compatibility of corporate cultures, 
compatibility of decision-making styles, degree of convergence of worldviews, and 
other organizational characteristics. Relational quality can also be understood as the 
state of trust and confidence between the cooperating parties (Büchel and Killing 
2002). Personal bonds, trust, and the reputation that the involved parties have for 
‘fail dealings’ can be variables that influence the degree of relational quality in a 
relationship (Ariño and de la Torre 1998, 307; see also page 324, endnote 4). 
Although relational quality is a somewhat elusive concept, alliance scholars seem to 
view it as an important concept. Generally, greater relational quality is believed to 
enhance alliance performance. For instance, one empirical study suggests that efforts 
at maintaining relational quality, after the contract has been signed – in addition to 
initial relational quality – are positively related to performance (Büchel and Killing 
2002, 751). The relationship itself can be viewed as a resource for value creation and 
realization, and therefore it is important for organizations to recognize beforehand 
the need to invest in the ongoing collaborative relationship in order to attain such 
synergies (Madhok and Tallman 1998, 326-327). This point is well captured in the 
following statement “perhaps the lack of a proper appreciation of the true value of 
relational assets prevents firms from enjoying the benefits from their alliances more 
fully” (Madhok and Tallman 1998, 336-337).  
Third, in addition to research on trust and relational quality, there are a 
growing number of alliance studies that address what sort of collaborative capabilities 
make an organization successful at cooperating with other organizations (for 
instance, Schreiner, et al. 2005; Heimeriks 2004; Duysters and Heimeriks 2002), i.e., 
what types of collaborative competences enhance a firms alliance performance. This 
line of research is typically captured under such terms as ‘collaborative capability’ 
(Schreiner et al. 2005), ‘alliance competences’ (Spekman et al. 2000), ‘alliance 
capabilities’ (Heimeriks 2004), ‘relational capabilities’ (Dyer and Singh 2004), 
‘relational assets’ (Dunning 2002) and ‘collaborative know-how’ (Simonin 2002). The 
underlying assumption of the capability research is that collaborative capabilities 
enhance alliance performance. Scholars generally distinguish between two groups of 
factors: structural and behavioural (Duysters and Heimeriks 2002, 2-3). The former 
group refers to tangible capability factors such as the presence of alliance functions, 
tools and other resources that aid organizations in managing their alliances (Duysters 
and Heimeriks 2002). The latter group of capability factors focuses on intangible 
aspects of cooperation such as trust and relationship quality.  
 Different authors stress different sorts of collaborative capabilities as being 
important for performance. Not only are structural factors such as alliance tools 
important but behavioural factors such as an organizations ability to conduct 
“meaningful social exchange” with other organizations (Schreiner et al. 2005, 9) and 
its “willingness and ability” to partner (Dyer and Singh 2004, 366-367) are discovered 
to be important for performance too. In this latter line of research, having the right 
technical skills does not automatically make organizations successful in their 
partnership activities. Rather alliances are viewed as “living systems that evolve 
progressively in their possibilities”, beside the immediate reasons for collaborating, 
the relationship itself offers unforeseen opportunities (Kanter 2002, 100), i.e., the 
relationship can be viewed as a rent-generating source in itself (Dyer and Singh 
2004).  
One category of behavioural competences is “having the right 
mindset”, e.g., being able to foster commitment and to build trust with the 
partnering organizations (Spekman et al. 2000). The vital starting point in a 
successful alliance is the adoption of a mindset and a set of attitudes by managers 
that allows them to function in environments characterized by instability, few fixed 
objectives, ambiguity, and evolving partner relationships (Doz and Hamel 1998, 32). 
In addition to enhancing general performance, relational capabilities are suggested to 
create a basis for learning and transfer of know-how across organizational boundaries 
(Kale, Singh and Perlmutter 2000, 218; Lorenzoni and Lipparini 1999). 
The capability literature is not very clear about how collaborative 
capabilities are acquired. Is it something that is learnt from experience? Or is it 
something which is more deeply embedded in an organization’s culture? Are alliance 
capabilities embedded at the individual or organizational level? And can they be 
managed? A few scholars have ventured arguments about these issues (for instance, 
Anand and Khanna 2000; Heimeriks 2004; Kale et al. 2002) but alliance as well as 
PPP scholars could with advantage look more into these issues in their future 
research.  
There has been some critique in the PPP literature that public sector 
organizations do not match the skill sets of their private sector counterparts. It has 
been argued that they do not have the adequate financial and commercial expertise to 
match their private sector counterparts (Wettenhall 2006, 2). In this light the 
capability perspective appears particularly relevant for the PPP community. 
 
Summary 
In the preceding two sections, I have introduced alliance research that in different 
ways addresses issues of cooperation that go beyond contractual aspects of 
cooperation. First, alliance research adopting a process perspective on cooperation 
was introduced. In brief, the essential argument is that alliances do not represent a 
fixed set of structures; rather, they continuously evolve. For the same reason, it 
becomes central to study how cooperation unfolds over time and which factors other 
than the nature of the deal render cooperation successful or not. Second, alliance 
119
company had procurement (transaction) costs that were five times higher than the 
other comparable companies in the study (Dyer and Chu 2003).  
Second, research on trust and alliances is closely related to research 
that deals with the importance of relational quality in strategic alliances. Relational 
quality can be defined as “the extent to which the partners feel comfortable and are 
willing to rely on trust in dealing with one another” (Ariño, de la Torre and Ring 
2001, 111). Relational quality is a broader concept than trust as it also involves other 
aspects of cooperation such as the degree of compatibility of corporate cultures, 
compatibility of decision-making styles, degree of convergence of worldviews, and 
other organizational characteristics. Relational quality can also be understood as the 
state of trust and confidence between the cooperating parties (Büchel and Killing 
2002). Personal bonds, trust, and the reputation that the involved parties have for 
‘fail dealings’ can be variables that influence the degree of relational quality in a 
relationship (Ariño and de la Torre 1998, 307; see also page 324, endnote 4). 
Although relational quality is a somewhat elusive concept, alliance scholars seem to 
view it as an important concept. Generally, greater relational quality is believed to 
enhance alliance performance. For instance, one empirical study suggests that efforts 
at maintaining relational quality, after the contract has been signed – in addition to 
initial relational quality – are positively related to performance (Büchel and Killing 
2002, 751). The relationship itself can be viewed as a resource for value creation and 
realization, and therefore it is important for organizations to recognize beforehand 
the need to invest in the ongoing collaborative relationship in order to attain such 
synergies (Madhok and Tallman 1998, 326-327). This point is well captured in the 
following statement “perhaps the lack of a proper appreciation of the true value of 
relational assets prevents firms from enjoying the benefits from their alliances more 
fully” (Madhok and Tallman 1998, 336-337).  
Third, in addition to research on trust and relational quality, there are a 
growing number of alliance studies that address what sort of collaborative capabilities 
make an organization successful at cooperating with other organizations (for 
instance, Schreiner, et al. 2005; Heimeriks 2004; Duysters and Heimeriks 2002), i.e., 
what types of collaborative competences enhance a firms alliance performance. This 
line of research is typically captured under such terms as ‘collaborative capability’ 
(Schreiner et al. 2005), ‘alliance competences’ (Spekman et al. 2000), ‘alliance 
capabilities’ (Heimeriks 2004), ‘relational capabilities’ (Dyer and Singh 2004), 
‘relational assets’ (Dunning 2002) and ‘collaborative know-how’ (Simonin 2002). The 
underlying assumption of the capability research is that collaborative capabilities 
enhance alliance performance. Scholars generally distinguish between two groups of 
factors: structural and behavioural (Duysters and Heimeriks 2002, 2-3). The former 
group refers to tangible capability factors such as the presence of alliance functions, 
tools and other resources that aid organizations in managing their alliances (Duysters 
and Heimeriks 2002). The latter group of capability factors focuses on intangible 
aspects of cooperation such as trust and relationship quality.  
 Different authors stress different sorts of collaborative capabilities as being 
important for performance. Not only are structural factors such as alliance tools 
important but behavioural factors such as an organizations ability to conduct 
“meaningful social exchange” with other organizations (Schreiner et al. 2005, 9) and 
its “willingness and ability” to partner (Dyer and Singh 2004, 366-367) are discovered 
to be important for performance too. In this latter line of research, having the right 
technical skills does not automatically make organizations successful in their 
partnership activities. Rather alliances are viewed as “living systems that evolve 
progressively in their possibilities”, beside the immediate reasons for collaborating, 
the relationship itself offers unforeseen opportunities (Kanter 2002, 100), i.e., the 
relationship can be viewed as a rent-generating source in itself (Dyer and Singh 
2004).  
One category of behavioural competences is “having the right 
mindset”, e.g., being able to foster commitment and to build trust with the 
partnering organizations (Spekman et al. 2000). The vital starting point in a 
successful alliance is the adoption of a mindset and a set of attitudes by managers 
that allows them to function in environments characterized by instability, few fixed 
objectives, ambiguity, and evolving partner relationships (Doz and Hamel 1998, 32). 
In addition to enhancing general performance, relational capabilities are suggested to 
create a basis for learning and transfer of know-how across organizational boundaries 
(Kale, Singh and Perlmutter 2000, 218; Lorenzoni and Lipparini 1999). 
The capability literature is not very clear about how collaborative 
capabilities are acquired. Is it something that is learnt from experience? Or is it 
something which is more deeply embedded in an organization’s culture? Are alliance 
capabilities embedded at the individual or organizational level? And can they be 
managed? A few scholars have ventured arguments about these issues (for instance, 
Anand and Khanna 2000; Heimeriks 2004; Kale et al. 2002) but alliance as well as 
PPP scholars could with advantage look more into these issues in their future 
research.  
There has been some critique in the PPP literature that public sector 
organizations do not match the skill sets of their private sector counterparts. It has 
been argued that they do not have the adequate financial and commercial expertise to 
match their private sector counterparts (Wettenhall 2006, 2). In this light the 
capability perspective appears particularly relevant for the PPP community. 
 
Summary 
In the preceding two sections, I have introduced alliance research that in different 
ways addresses issues of cooperation that go beyond contractual aspects of 
cooperation. First, alliance research adopting a process perspective on cooperation 
was introduced. In brief, the essential argument is that alliances do not represent a 
fixed set of structures; rather, they continuously evolve. For the same reason, it 
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research that deals with behavioural aspects of cooperation in a variety of ways was 
introduced. More specifically, research on the importance of trust and relational 
quality in alliances and also research on collaborative capabilities was introduced. The 
common denominator for these three approaches is that behavioural factors are 
identified as important performance antecedents in alliances.  
Some implications for PPP research 
Overall, alliance research suggests that the partnering relationship is a vital driver of 
collaborative advantage. These findings imply that PPP scholars might well direct 
more attention to behavioural and operational aspects of PPPs and answer questions 
such as: What happens after PPP contracts are signed? Who are the key actors? How 
do they relate to one another? What typifies the pattern and frequency of interaction 
between the involved parties? What characterizes the partnership relationship? What 
are the main determinants of productive cooperation? Does the public sector have 
the necessary skill-set for managing PPP projects? And how does all this relate to 
partnership performance?  
 The learning potential is however not limited to the identified areas of 
research. Strategic alliance research is an extensive body of literature which deals with 
many different aspects of cooperation. For instance, alliance scholars address issues 
relating to how to choose the most expedient formal governance structures, how to 
choose the right partner, and why firms engage in alliances in the first place. These 
are issues which are relevant for public organizations too. Moreover, 
methodologically I believe much can be learned from the alliance field since over the 
past decades the techniques and methods for studying alliances have been advanced 
and refined. This accumulated methodological experience could valuably 
complement our work on PPP. Recently PPP scholars called attention to the need 
for more “rigorous assessments” of PPP performance (Hodge and Greve 2007, 553). 
Measuring performance is at the same time a research topic that has at some length 
been addressed by strategic alliance scholars (see Olk 2006). This is an example of an 
area where methodological lessons from the alliance literature could inform PPP 
research.  
Generally, the adopted methodological approaches in the two research 
fields differ significantly. While strategic alliance research is dominated by large 
statistical data sets (Shenkar and Reuer 2006, 11), PPP research is dominated more by 
qualitative and case based research methodologies. It is important to note however 
that the PPP phenomenon has roots in the privatization literature, and that this 
literature does contain quantitative studies (for instance, Hodge 2000). But there still 
may be lessons to be learnt from the alliance literature, for example on how to 
operationalize and measure intangible aspects of cooperation such as trust and 
relational quality quantitatively. 
Due to the relative newness of the PPP literature it has, up until now, 
been somewhat eclectic and pre-theoretical. Admittedly, in the past two to three 
decades the PPP label has randomly surfaced the public management literature and 
the public policy literature (Weihe 2005). However it is only within the past ten years 
that PPP has been put firmly on the public management research agenda and the 
number of PPP related publications has exploded. Historically, much of the PPP 
literature has tended to be driven by an empirical motive, offering description of PPP 
policies and techniques in different settings. Certainly, solid theoretical analyses have 
been conducted but there are no generalized theoretical approaches to PPP. This is 
not the case in the alliance literature where there are a number of well-recognized 
theoretical models that underpin the majority of analyses of strategic alliances, e.g., 
transaction cost economics, industrial organization theory, the resource-based view, 
the dynamic capability view, the competence-based view, the knowledge-based view, 
evolutionary economics and organizational learning (for an introduction, see 
Heimeriks 2004, pp. 34ff). These theoretical perspectives may offer insights that can 
inform and supplement further development of theoretical models in the PPP 
literature.  
The findings from the alliance literature reviewed here do also have 
some immediate value for PPP managers. First of all, it directs attention towards the 
notion that ex post contractual issues are significant for overall performance. Second, 
that it may be useful to consider how relationship processes can be managed over 
time. Moreover, the findings propose that more resources should be devoted to the 
management of the PPP contract over the full life-time of the project (and not only 
the formative phase of signing up the contract). This is something which not enough 
thought has been devoted to in the past – neither in PPP policy practice nor in the 
PPP literature.  
Taking into consideration that value for money is a key rationale for 
implementing PPPs an effective cooperative relationship throughout the whole 
project life-cycle becomes all the more relevant. More effective cooperation, and 
ultimately better performance, can be realized by focusing more explicitly on ex post 
contract signature factors of cooperation. After all, well-managed trust-based 
partnership projects where processes are deliberately structured have proven to be 
cost efficient. The ever-increasing international dissemination of PPP as a policy tool 
only emphasises the importance of a more comprehensive approach to PPP, that is, a 
policy approach that takes into account not only the formative and technical aspects 
of cooperation but also recognizes the importance of the ongoing processes and the 
relational dimension of cooperation.  
Conclusion 
Public services are today increasingly being delivered in some sort of partnership 
between public and private organizations. This stresses the importance of bringing 
about sophisticated analyses of public-private cooperation that can feed back into 
policy decision-making processes and PPP practice. With this article I have illustrated 
the importance of directing more intellectual firepower at aspects of cooperation that 
go beyond the PPP contract. This has been done by drawing upon lessons from the 
sister field of alliance research. Alliance research on private-private business relations 
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has convincingly demonstrated that operational processes and managing the 
relationship over time influences partnership performance. Therefore, although 
careful consideration must always be given to the public-private distinction, alliance 
research is promising in the effort to fill some of the current gaps in the PPP 
literature. Alliance research can in particular enrich our understanding of the dynamic 
and evolutionary nature of cooperation and how non-contractual aspects - such as 
trust and relational quality - can influence partnership performance. Moreover, 
alliance research can be used in order to fill in the current knowledge gap that 
practitioners are experiencing when managing PPPs. By utilizing the knowledge 
accumulated in the alliance field, the potential of PPP research to relieve the distress 
that PPP managers are experiencing would be drastically improved. 
More generally, what is proposed here is a new PPP research agenda 
that puts organizational and managerial issues at the forefront of investigation. What 
are the managerial challenges that PPPs pose for the involved public as well as 
private actors? And how do such aspects of cooperation impact performance? This 
approach departs significantly from earlier proposed research agendas, which have 
primarily encouraged research on a range of technical, policy and performance 
related aspects of cooperation (see, Broadbent and Laughlin 1999). 
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has convincingly demonstrated that operational processes and managing the 
relationship over time influences partnership performance. Therefore, although 
careful consideration must always be given to the public-private distinction, alliance 
research is promising in the effort to fill some of the current gaps in the PPP 
literature. Alliance research can in particular enrich our understanding of the dynamic 
and evolutionary nature of cooperation and how non-contractual aspects - such as 
trust and relational quality - can influence partnership performance. Moreover, 
alliance research can be used in order to fill in the current knowledge gap that 
practitioners are experiencing when managing PPPs. By utilizing the knowledge 
accumulated in the alliance field, the potential of PPP research to relieve the distress 
that PPP managers are experiencing would be drastically improved. 
More generally, what is proposed here is a new PPP research agenda 
that puts organizational and managerial issues at the forefront of investigation. What 
are the managerial challenges that PPPs pose for the involved public as well as 
private actors? And how do such aspects of cooperation impact performance? This 
approach departs significantly from earlier proposed research agendas, which have 
primarily encouraged research on a range of technical, policy and performance 
related aspects of cooperation (see, Broadbent and Laughlin 1999). 
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Unravelling cooperation: Do infrastructure partnerships 
involve collaborative behaviour? 
 
Abstract 
This article analyses the character of cooperation in five operational infrastructure 
public-private partnerships (PPP) and demonstrates how cooperation unfolds 
differently from project to project. Contrary to the expectations in the literature, the 
analysis reveals that infrastructure PPPs sometimes develop the type of relationship 
features normally only associated with genuine partnerships. Moreover the analysis 
shows that there is a connection between these features and partnership performance 
as perceived by the involved managers. The article concludes that partnerships can 
emerge regardless of what type of structural (contractual) arrangement regulates the 
relationship. 
Introduction 
Although publications on PPP have proliferated in recent years, few studies have 
analysed how cooperation develops after contracts are signed (Ghobadian et al. 2004: 
8, 289; Reeve and Hatter 2004).4  Limited knowledge has thus been accumulated 
about active PPPs and about cooperative behaviour at the micro-level (Ysa 2007; 
Noble and Jones 2006).5  This knowledge gap is particularly prevalent in relation to 
infrastructure PPP. Indeed, if we want to reach a deeper understanding of public-
private partnerships (PPP), we do well to look beyond contracts and investigate how 
the involved actors cooperate in practice. We will have to investigate the real 
characteristics of cooperation in operational infrastructure PPPs. After all, 
infrastructure PPPs are normally theorized to be strictly exchange based and the 
                                                 
4 There is a body of literature which deals more generically with the issue of ‘collaboration’ and 
‘coordination’ (for instance, Huxham and Vangen 2005; Sullivan and Skelcher 2002; Keast et al. 2007; 
Wood and Gray 1991; Rogers and Whetten 1982; Thomson and Perry 2006). These contributions 
constitute important and pioneering insights about cooperation but do not address PPP specifically. 
Rogers and Whetten for instance address aspects of coordination within the public sector (1982), and 
Gray and Wood dissect the collaboration concept drawing upon studies addressing as diverse topics as 
collaboration in the garment industry and public policy initiation at state level (1991). 
5 Pioneering exceptions are Reeves (2006), Noble and Jones (2006) and Ysa (2007). Of these, only one 
study addresses the type of infrastructure PPPs analyzed here (i.e. Reeves 2006). There are moreover 
some innovative studies that address the performance implications of intangible aspects such as trust 
in relation to PPP - although without addressing features of cooperation of individual PPP projects 
(for instance, Edelenbos, Klijn and Steijn 2007) 
  
partnering relationship between the actors involved is not attributed significant 
importance. My empirical analysis, however, demonstrates that, contrary to the 
expectations in the literature, infrastructure PPPs can display the type of features 
normally only affiliated with ‘genuine’ partnerships (which in the context of this 
article are labelled governance PPPs; definitions follow below). Even when contracts 
are similar, the nature of cooperation nonetheless differs greatly. The findings 
suggest that partnerships, in the general understanding of the word, can also emerge 
in infrastructure PPPs.  
Extant theorization about PPP 
In the PPP literature, there is a common theoretical distinction between genuine 
PPPs and other forms of public-private mixing (Wettenhall 2006; Wettenhall 2007); 
between PPP concessions and PPP organizational cooperative projects (Klijn and 
Teisman 2005); between contracts and partnership arrangements (Klijn and Teisman 
2000); and between economic partnerships and social partnerships (Hodge and 
Greve 2005). These binary classifications have in common that they refer to a general 
theoretical distinction between contractual PPPs on the one hand and organizational 
or non-contractual PPPs that involve corporatist-like structures, joint organizational 
expression or network relations on the other hand (Hodge and Greve 2005; 
Wettenhall 2006; Wettenhall 2007: Klijn and Teisman 2005). The latter type will here 
be labelled governance PPP because of its emphasis on horizontal principal-principal 
relations, cooperation and trust between the involved actors. The governance PPP is 
in the literature seen as an integral part of the network society, where the public and 
private sector are intertwined (Klijn and Teisman 2000: 87), and the former (the 
contractual PPP) merely as part of already well-known policy measures such as 
privatization and contracting out (Shaoul 2003: 186). The binary conceptualization of 
PPP reflects a general division in the PPP literature where one branch of the 
literature addresses partnerships as something distinct from previous hierarchical and 
market arrangements and highlights the governance dimension of cooperation (for 
instance, Huxham and Vangen 2005), while another branch addresses public-private 
contractual arrangements used in the delivery of public assets and services (e.g. 
Ghobadian et al. 2004).  
The contractual PPP (which in the context of this article is labelled infrastructure 
PPP) can be defined as contractual ‘arrangements whereby private parties participate 
in, or provide support for, the provision of infrastructure’ and associated services 
(Grimsey and Lewis 2004: 2).6 Within this type of PPP there is a sharp division of 
                                                 
6 Thus in the context of this article an infrastructure PPP is a long-term contractual arrangement 
which involves the bundling of private finance, design, construction and operation of infrastructure 
assets and associated services into one contract. ‘Infrastructure’ should in this context be understood 
broadly involving social, economic, soft and hard infrastructure (Grimsey and Lewis 2004). It is a 
complex long-term contractual arrangement that normally spans 30-35 years. This type of PPP is in 
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risk and a sharp division of responsibilities between the involved public and private 
actors. The private sector actor commits to the delivery of a certain type of output, at 
a certain cost and within a specified timeframe. Co-production in this form of public-
private arrangement is limited. Judging from the structural dimension, then, there is 
little natural partnership between the public and private actors in an infrastructure 
PPP. For the same reason, the infrastructure PPP has rightfully been accused of 
being nothing but a revamped form of tendering (Klijn and Teisman 2005: 103), 
rebadged privatization (Coghill and Woodward 2005: 81) and the latest twist in the 
privatization book (Hodge 2004: 37). It concerns ‘neither a “partnership” in the 
general sense of the word, i.e. a relationship based on co-operation, mutual trust and 
sharing of benefits, nor a “partnership” in the strictly legal sense of the word’ (van 
der Wel 2004: 5). Somewhat ironically, although accused of not being a genuine 
partnership in the literature, in policy practice the PPP label is more or less 
exclusively used in relation to the infrastructure understanding of the term.  
The governance PPP on the other hand can be defined as a trust based public-private 
relationship which either involves a joint organizational structure (Wettenhall 2007) 
or non-formalized network structures (Klijn and Teisman 2005) such as efforts built 
on previous contractual relationships or extensions of corporatist-like arrangements 
(Hodge and Greve 2005: 334). This type of PPP involves consensual decision-
making, operates on the basis of complementarity and collaboration, achieves 
synergies between involved persons and organizations, and exploits respect and trust 
as forms of social capital (Wettenhall 2006; 2007). Co-production in this type of PPP 
is close-knit and intensive (Klijn and Teisman 2005: 102). A governance PPP, then, 
as opposed to the infrastructure PPP, concerns a partnership in the general sense of 
the word. Trust is a crucial feature in relation to creating added value in this type of 
PPP; the key to success in the infrastructure PPP on the other hand is the 
formulation of clear goals and clear rules for tendering (Klijn and Teisman 2000: 86). 
The infrastructure PPP is not expected to involve the type of relationship features 
affiliated with the governance PPP (e.g. trust, mutuality, close-knit interaction). Thus 
in the literature there is a tendency to equate certain types of formal structures 
(networks and joint organizational arrangements) with certain types of relationship 
features (trust, mutuality, cooperation, close-knit interaction). 
Contrary to this, the argument developed here is that the aforementioned 
relationship features can emerge regardless of what type of structural arrangements 
regulates cooperation. The empirical analysis reveals that even in the infrastructure 
type of PPP, cooperation can become close-knit, intensive and highly trust-based. 
Moreover, the data suggests that the way the involved actors cooperate in practice 
has some consequences for partnership performance. The findings of this study have 
conceptual as well as managerial implications. 
Methodology 
This analysis is based on a qualitative case study of five UK based infrastructure 
PPPs. The case study strategy has a distinct advantage when a how or why study is 
  
asked about a contemporary set of events over which the investigator has little or no 
control (Yin 1994: 4-9). The applied case study strategy belongs to the naturalistic 
strand of case study research where the aim is to provide a comprehensive and 
consistent picture of each case. Naturalism is a case-centered approach as opposed to 
a variable-centered approach and research efforts are directed towards revealing ‘the 
authentic nature of a social phenomenon or the detailed elements of a causal process 
by getting as close as possible’ (Blatter 2007). In the context of this article, the aim is 
to generate knowledge about the features of cooperation in operational PPPs. An 
important case selection criterion was the duration of the PPP projects. The selected 
cases have been operational for a similar amount of years.7 Choosing cases that have 
reached the same point in the partnership life-cycle makes the cases more 
comparable since different governance modes may be prevalent at different stages of 
the partnership life-cycle (Lowndes and Skelcher 1998). 
All in all, 43 interviews were conducted as part of the analysis. Data collection 
proceeded in two distinct phases. First, exploratory face-to-face interviews were 
conducted with public and private sector partnership managers at different project 
levels in each PPP. Second, in order to systematize and make more comparable the 
findings from the initial open-ended interviews, follow-up telephone interviews were 
conducted. As part of the follow-up interviews the partnership managers answered a 
questionnaire containing close-end questions about operational practice and the 
partnering relationship. The first phase of data collection involved 17 interviews 
(with 20 different people) (see table 1).  Following introductory questions about the 
features of the concerned PPP project, the partnership managers were asked to 
describe: a) the partnership relationship; b) the patterns and frequency of interaction, 
and c) barriers/enabling factors in relation to cooperation. The interviews were 
subsequently transcribed and analysed for recurrent themes and issues pertaining to 
the cooperative relationship.8  Quotations from the interviews are used 
illustratively/generically in the analysis below. 
 
                                                 
7 All the cases are in their relative early days of operation (approximately between 7 and 10 years have 
elapsed since financial close). 
8  In some cases, the interviews were not transcribed. This was due to bad sound quality and/or lack 
of information about the research topic. 
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Table 1 - Profile of respondents in the first data collection phase 










Public sector partnership 
manager (local and policy 
level representatives) 
1* 3*** 2**** 3***** 2****** 
Private sector partnership 
manager, (SPV level) 
1** 1 1 1 1 
Private sector partnership 
manager (prime 
subcontractor level) 
1 1 - 1 1 
Private sector manager 
(below prime 
subcontractor level) 
- - - - - 
Total 3  5 3 5 4 
* The public and private sector partnership manager at the prime subcontractor level were interviewed 
jointly. 
** The SPV manager here is a board member in three of the studied cases (case 1, 2 and 5). He is only 
included as a respondent in case 1. This interview had a general character. 
*** One of these three was a policy level representative. The other two were local project level 
representatives. 
**** The two public sector managers were interviewed jointly. 
***** Two of the local level representatives were interviewed together. 
****** One of these two was a policy level representative. 
 
The follow-up data collection phase involved close-end questions concerning four 
general themes: a) organizational characteristics (including interaction frequency), b) 
relationship characteristics c) management strategies, and d) project performance. In 
the context of this article, the analysis evolves mainly around theme b) and d). For an 
overview of the participants in the he latter phase of data collection see table 2. 
 
Table 2 - Profile of interview respondents in the second data collection phase 










Public sector partnership 
manager (local and policy 
level representatives) 
1 2* 1 1 1 
Private sector partnership 
manager, (SPV level) 
2 2 4 1 2 
Private sector partnership 
manager (prime 
subcontractor level) 
1 1 - 1 2 
Private sector manager 
(below prime 
subcontractor level) 
1 2 - - 1 
Total 5 7 5 3 6 
* Including one policy level representative. That person’s answers have not been included in the 
descriptive statistics as he is not directly involved in the concerned project. 
 
  
Interviewing both public and private sector representatives follows the 
recommendations by Madhok who suggests that it is prudent to interview both 
partners in a partnership (1995: 72-73). Similarly Aulakh et al. encourage inclusion of 
both partners when studying the social dynamics of partnerships (1997, 188). This 
gives a more comprehensive and valid picture of cooperation and is moreover 
innovative in the sense that few other studies adopt such an approach (a notable 
exception is Reeves 2006). This study is also innovative in the sense that it explores 
cooperation at the micro-level and ex post contract signature. It thus fills in an 
important empirical gap in the literature. 
Because much of the collected data consist of personal views, experiences and 
expressions of the involved partnership managers about the partnering relationship, 
the identity of the cases and the interviewed case representatives is not revealed.  
Analytical framework 
The analysis adopts a process perspective on PPP which means that partnerships are 
viewed as social systems that continuously evolve. The essential assumption in this 
perspective is that partnership success is not exclusively reliant on formal structures, 
or what happens prior to the signing of the contracts (Ring and Van de Ven 1994; 
Doz 1996; Ariño and de la Torre 1998). The formal deal itself is perhaps a necessary 
precondition but it does not ensure effective cooperation. A process perspective on 
PPP emphasises the importance of recurring relationship processes as opposed to 
focusing only on choosing the right governance structures. In this framework PPPs 
can be viewed as ‘socially contrived mechanisms for collective action, which are 
continually shaped and restructured by actions and symbolic interpretations of the 
parties involved’ (Ring and Van de Ven 1994: 96). Partnerships continuously evolve 
in their possibilities, and grow or fail just like relationships between people (Kanter 
2002). In this perspective, the pattern of interaction can be more important for 
efficiency than structural properties (Aulakh and Madhok 2002, 27; originally 
Granovetter 1985).  
That intangible aspects of cooperation are important performance antecedents has 
been compellingly demonstrated by strategic alliance research concerned with the 
management of relationship processes and informal governance mechanisms (for 
instance, Ring and Van de Ven 1994; Kanter 2002). Moving the partnering 
relationship beyond pure exchange (getting back what you put in) towards 
collaboration (creating new value together) is according to some scholars an 
important step in the direction of redeeming collaborative advantage (Kanter 2002; 
Dyer and Singh 2004). Trust, for example, has been identified as an important source 
of collaborative advantage (for an overview, see Zaheer and Harris 2006). There are 
many definitions of trust but in the context of this article, trust refers to the stable 
perception of one actor of the goodwill intentions and motives of the opposing actor 
(i.e. opportunistic behaviour is not expected) (Edelenbos, Klijn and Steijn 2007: 65). 
Associated research on relational quality similarly suggests that higher levels of 
relational quality imply higher levels of performance (Büchel and Killing 2002). 
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Relational quality has been defined as ‘the extent to which the partners feel 
comfortable and are willing to rely on trust in dealing with one another’. It involves 
degree of compatibility of corporate cultures, and decision-making styles, a 
convergence of worldviews, and other organizational characteristics (Ariño, de la 
Torre, and Ring 1998: 111). In the context of this article relational quality refers to 
relationship characteristics including attentiveness, commitment, community, 
intentions, tension, mindsets, personal bonds and joint effort among the cooperating 
parties.  
Partnership performance can be measured in a variety of different ways. Within the 
strategic alliance literature, scholars distinguish between financial and objective 
measures of performance on the one hand (for instance, profitability, growth, 
survival and duration), and subjective measures of performance on the other hand 
(perceived performance). Research has shown that there is a strong correlation 
between these two measures of performance (Geringer and Hebert 1991). There is 
increasing consensus in the strategic alliance literature that managerial assessments of 
performance (i.e. subjective measures) are a reasonable way to measure partnership 
performance (Kale et al. 2002: 573). In the context of this study, subjective measures 
of performance are applied: i.e. performance is measured as perceived performance 
where interviewed partnership managers have been asked rate performance on a 
number of different dimensions. Although alliance research suggests that such 
subjective performance measures are a reliable data source, the findings should 
nevertheless be approached with prudence. In particular, attentiveness should be 
given to the possibility that high levels of perceived performance in the early stages 
of operation do not necessarily mean high performance in the long-run 
(output/outcome performance). Since all the PPPs examined here are in their relative 
early stages of service delivery the findings concerning performance must be 
approached with reservation. 
A number of analytical parameters can be derived from the alliance literature for the 
analysis of cooperative practice in the selected PPP cases (see table below).  
 
Table 3 -The cooperation continuum 
 
The exchange pole (selfish cooperation) The collaboration pole (collective collabor.) 
Relational quality low
Contract-centred (clear rules) 
Incomprehension 
Split purposes (lack of sense of joint goals) 
Minimal joint action 
Low intensity/connection 
Distanced relationship (no bonding) 
Unenthusiastic and reactive attitude 
Relational quality high
Relationship-centred (trust) 
Attentiveness/empathy for partner 
Self-interest and collective interest aligned 
Joint decision and problem-solving 
High intensity/connection 
Close relationships (bonding) 
Positive and proactive attitude/mindset 
 
  
This general analytical distinction between an exchange pole and a collaboration pole 
provides us with a useful terminology for describing the features of cooperation – i.e. 
the partnership element – in the analysed PPP projects.9 The characteristics of the 
exchange pole and the collaboration pole resemble the type of features associated 
with governance and infrastructure PPP respectively (for instance, Klijn and Teisman 
2000; Klijn and Teisman 2005). As with all theories of organization and management, 
the process perspective persuades us to see some dimensions of cooperation as 
opposed to others. In creating ways of seeing, theories and metaphors about 
organizations also ‘create ways of not seeing. Hence there can be no single theory or 
metaphor that gives an all-purposive point of view. There can be no “correct theory” 
for structuring everything we do’ (Morgan 1997: 348). The analysis here offers 
important insights about cooperation in PPP and the partnering relationship but it 
also leaves other important aspects of cooperation aside.  
Analysis of  operational practice 
The findings from the empirical analysis can be summarized in the following three 
key points:  
 
There is variation in the way in which the involved actors cooperate (i.e. the cases are 
scattered along the exchange-collaboration continuum with the majority of the cases 
resembling primarily the exchange pole). 
There are two outlier cases, one of which displays many of the features affiliated with 
the governance PPP. 
There is a connection between how the involved actors cooperate and partnership 
performance. 
 
Preparatory, a brief description of the five examined PPPs is in its place.10  The first 
case concerns the construction, operation and maintenance of a military 
establishment in the defence sector (case 1). In addition to designing and providing a 
military facility, a number of related services are included in the project. The second 
case is a transport technology project which concerns the development, maintenance 
and operation of a system to manage traffic networks. This project also includes a 
small construction element (case 2). The third case is a traditional and relatively 
standard sized local authority road PPP which involves the design, build, finance and 
operation of a road (case 3). Finally, the remaining two cases are hospital PPPs (case 
                                                 
9 Although the dimensions of the continuum can be debated, in the context of this article it merely 
provides a useful tool to distinguish between different styles of cooperating. What is important to note 
here is that the core objective is to lay bare the features of cooperation in operational infrastructure 
PPPs not to develop the general theoretical understanding of concepts such as cooperation, 
coordination, exchange and collaboration and how they relate to one another. For efforts in this 
direction, see Keast et al. 2007: and Thomson and Perry 2006).  
10 Note that the details about the cases are concealed in order to not reveal the identity of the cases. 
The exact figures concerning capital value and project duration are not revealed. 
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provides us with a useful terminology for describing the features of cooperation – i.e. 
the partnership element – in the analysed PPP projects.9 The characteristics of the 
exchange pole and the collaboration pole resemble the type of features associated 
with governance and infrastructure PPP respectively (for instance, Klijn and Teisman 
2000; Klijn and Teisman 2005). As with all theories of organization and management, 
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for structuring everything we do’ (Morgan 1997: 348). The analysis here offers 
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military facility, a number of related services are included in the project. The second 
case is a transport technology project which concerns the development, maintenance 
and operation of a system to manage traffic networks. This project also includes a 
small construction element (case 2). The third case is a traditional and relatively 
standard sized local authority road PPP which involves the design, build, finance and 
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4 and case 5). Case 4 concerns the redevelopment of an existing hospital site and 
provision of maintenance and facility services. Case 5 concerns the new build of a 
hospital and provision of associated services. The capital value of the investigated 
projects varies between £65m to £234m with an average value of £147,3m.  The 
duration of the projects varies between 30 and 35 years with the exception of one 
case which has a somewhat shorter duration. 
The empirical mapping of cooperation reveals that operational practice in 
infrastructure PPPs generally has an affinity towards the exchange mode of 
cooperation. However the analysis also reveals that collaborative style relationships 
can assume importance. There are in particular two outlier cases in the data. These 
are the defence sector case (case 1), which can be positioned closest to the 
collaboration pole, and the technology transport case (case 2) which can be 
positioned closest to the exchange pole. The road case and the hospital cases (case 3, 
4 and 5) can be positioned somewhere in between the two outlier cases (see figure 1).  
 
Figure 1 - Positioning of the cases on the cooperation continuum 
 
  









Relative to the other cases, the defence case (case 1) displays by far the most 
collaborative features. In this case, relations at the public-private interface are 
informal, close, and affable and oriented towards working together in order to 
achieve joint goals. There are high levels of trust between the involved actors and 
they are committed to making the project a success for both parties. The actors have 
faith in the intentions of each other and do not suspect opportunistic behaviour. 
Moreover, there is a general understanding and accept of the interests of the 
opposing party, and an acknowledgement of the important role of compromises. 
‘You have to recognize each other, and why you can’t achieve what you both want to 
achieve’, one of the partnership managers says. Further the involved actors 
continuously find joint solutions that are satisfactory to both parties. The partnership 
managers highlight the excellent working relationship established at the public-
private interface and how they in different ways have managed to solve unforeseen 
problems that were not taken into account by the PPP contract. In the event of a 
specific crisis situation, for example, which was caused by extreme weather 
conditions, the parties managed to jointly find a solution without entering into a legal 
battle. Another similar example concerns indoor architectonic changes, which were 
necessary but unaccounted for in the contract. Also in this instance, a solution was 
  
found which was acceptable to both parties. A third example concerns asbestos 
contamination, ‘a contractual nightmare to sort out whose responsibility it was. But 
we did. You know we worked our way through it. And it took a long time but you 
know if you have got the relationship you can have that sort of conversation without 
getting into a contractual fight over it. And potentially it could have been quite 
serious’, one of the private sector partnership manager stresses. Many of the features 
normally only affiliated with the governance partnership are present in the defence 
case. Mindsets and attitudes are strikingly affirmative and there is a strong sense of 
commitment and collectiveness among the involved partnership managers. ‘We have 
established an extremely good relationship with them at the point were we are 
collaborating on other ventures’, one partnership manager explains. The public and 
private actors in this case have jointly developed a pilot for a new e-learning 
management system.  
Cooperation in the other outlier case, i.e. the technology transport case (case 2), 
diverges significantly from that in the defence sector case. Here, relationships are 
distanced and strained, and empathy for the opposing partner is limited. Trust levels 
are low and there is little faith in the intentions of the opposing party. Thus both 
partners in this project indicate that the opposing party displays behaviour which can 
be detrimental to the interests of themselves and/or project outcome more generally. 
One of the private sector managers, for example, suggests that from the public sector 
side ‘there is often the reason of: “Oh, why should we? That is what we said we 
wanted. We wanted a red car and you are going to deliver me a blue car. Why should 
we put up with a blue car…?” Even though it is a Rolls Royce…?’ Similarly, another 
managers notes that the private sector party’s ‘attitude to partnership is; “we ask and 
you give.” Except that we don’t often give. So they can’t understand why we don’t 
give them lots of money when they ask for it.’ This type behaviour differs markedly 
from that in the defence sector case where such signs of distrust were absent. 
Moreover, the governance processes in the technology case appear more contract-
centred relative to the defence case. This is captured in the following statement: ‘the 
contract has thousands of sentences that say you will do this and this and this and for 
every sentence we have to go through a process… we are demonstrating to the 
customer that we are doing all the sentences and so you bog down into interpreting 
words: What does this word mean…? Well, it could mean that or it could mean…, 
and literally we are on that level. So in that process, you completely loose the big 
picture because everybody is concerned…, are we doing what the contract says?’ 
Thus while in the military case, the involved actors have a constructive working 
relationship which enables them to solve unforeseen problems and issues and to 
create new solutions together, the technology transport case is marked by inertia and 
experienced by the involved actors as a public-private ‘battle’ as opposed to a 
partnership. 
Of the remaining three cases, the road case (case 3) is most similar to the technology 
case. This case further involves the least intensive interactions. In particular the 
extent of informal face-to-face interaction is limited due to the fact that there is no 
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partners in this project indicate that the opposing party displays behaviour which can 
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One of the private sector managers, for example, suggests that from the public sector 
side ‘there is often the reason of: “Oh, why should we? That is what we said we 
wanted. We wanted a red car and you are going to deliver me a blue car. Why should 
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managers notes that the private sector party’s ‘attitude to partnership is; “we ask and 
you give.” Except that we don’t often give. So they can’t understand why we don’t 
give them lots of money when they ask for it.’ This type behaviour differs markedly 
from that in the defence sector case where such signs of distrust were absent. 
Moreover, the governance processes in the technology case appear more contract-
centred relative to the defence case. This is captured in the following statement: ‘the 
contract has thousands of sentences that say you will do this and this and this and for 
every sentence we have to go through a process… we are demonstrating to the 
customer that we are doing all the sentences and so you bog down into interpreting 
words: What does this word mean…? Well, it could mean that or it could mean…, 
and literally we are on that level. So in that process, you completely loose the big 
picture because everybody is concerned…, are we doing what the contract says?’ 
Thus while in the military case, the involved actors have a constructive working 
relationship which enables them to solve unforeseen problems and issues and to 
create new solutions together, the technology transport case is marked by inertia and 
experienced by the involved actors as a public-private ‘battle’ as opposed to a 
partnership. 
Of the remaining three cases, the road case (case 3) is most similar to the technology 
case. This case further involves the least intensive interactions. In particular the 
extent of informal face-to-face interaction is limited due to the fact that there is no 
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co-location of staff. Also here, a clearly contract-centred approach is present, which 
the following statement by one of the private sector managers captures: ‘we know 
what our role is the client knows what his role is, and we manage that role between 
us together, you know in a constructive manner’. Ideally, one of the private sector 
managers suggests, the public sector client should be able to ‘stand back’ and let the 
private sector party manage the project. There is thus a pronounced difference in the 
rhetoric of the partnership managers when comparing the defence case with the two 
transport cases. The road case also, much like the technology case, differs strongly 
from the defence case in the sense that there is little sense community among the 
public and private actors, and little emphasis is put on the importance of working 
together. Further, personal ties at the public-private interface are comparatively weak. 
The two hospital PPPs display somewhat stronger relational ties than the two 
transport cases which is why these cases can be positioned somewhat closer to the 
defence case than the two transport cases. Relationships are fairly constructive and 
positive although the same degree of collectiveness as in the defence case is not 
detectable here. Further cooperation is not quite as positively portrayed here as in the 
defence case. This was particularly the case in relation to the new build hospital case 
(case 5) where one partnership manager expresses suspiciousness concerning the 
motives of the public sector partner suggesting that they are interested in finding 
ways of taking money away from the service provider. The relationship was 
described as an all against all battle. At the upper level management echelons in the 
same case however, relations are more cordial. Thus another manager asserts that the 
public sector party does not constantly come ‘around seeing how they can beat us up 
so that they can get money back because that isn’t their culture. Their culture is “we 
want a successful contract not one that is always in claims” and that is the same for 
us.’ In the rebuild hospital case (case 4), cooperative practice also appears fairly 
collaborative which is captured in the following statement ‘we have a very very good 
relationship with the client here, so things run very smoothly on site. That is not to 
say in other PFIs they don’t. Some can be very confrontational. But we built an 
excellent relationship with the client where we are actually seen as part of the team 
and we do work together.’  
The important thing to hold on to here is that there are huge differences in 
relationship styles, behaviours and attitudes, particularly between the two outlier 
cases (the defence case and the technology case). The defence case is consistently 
higher performing in relation to all the close-end questions concerning relationship 
features such as attentiveness, degree of focus on joint success and joint goals, 
intentions, mindsets and extent of joint efforts. The technology case on the other 
hand is consistently the lowest performing case. This is also the case in relation to the 
partnership managers’ ratings of trust at the public-private interface (see figure 2 
below). Trust ratings follow the same general case by case pattern which was 
illustrated in figure 1 with the defence case at the high end (with an average rating of 
8.75 where 10 is the highest score possible) and case 2 at the low end of the 
  
continuum (average rating: 6.49). The remaining three cases are again somewhere in 
between. 
In addition to important variations vis-à-vis the partnering relationship, there are 
moreover quite pronounced case differences in perceived performance. On a scale 
from 1 to 10, where 10 was the highest score possible, the highest average rating of 
performance was 9 (in the defence case) and the lowest average rating was 4.6 (in the 
technology case). 
 




Again, the remaining three cases are positioned somewhere between the two outliers. 
There is hence a pronounced connection between relationship features and perceived 
performance (see figure 5). The cases that display the highest levels of relational 
quality do at the same time also have the highest levels of perceived performance. In 
the figure below, the values on the y-axis (relational quality) represent summarized 
scores for each case in relation to how the partnership managers have responded to a 
number of close-end questions concerning relationship characteristics (e.g. empathy, 
mindsets, tension and personal bonds). The x-axis represents the perceived 
performance as rated by the partnership managers on a scale from 1 to 10 where 10 
is the highest score possible. There is a marked, almost linear, connection between 
the quality of relations (how the actors cooperate) and perceived partnership 
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A similar pattern emerges when perceived performance is measured as the degree of 
perceived satisfaction with project outcomes, and perceived degree of innovation, 
reputation enhancement and further cooperation between the involved parties. We 
should however, as noted earlier, be careful with drawing wide-ranging conclusions 
concerning the relationship between operational practice and partnership 
performance. Constructive and collaborative relationships in the operational phase 
may simply imply high process performance as opposed to output or outcome 
performance. Thus when the involved actors manage to establish a working 
relationship based on trust, commitment and empathy, they may simply become 
better at coping with unforeseen events not taken into account by the contract, and 
at finding effective and innovative service delivery solutions. In this sense the overall 
transaction costs of managing the project may be reduced but this does not 
necessarily imply good performance in relation to the overall output of the projects. 
The investigated projects are only in the early years of operation and will only be 
completed approximately 20 years from now. It is thus still too early to say anything 
final about performance. Further the direction of the causal effect can be debated. 
Are projects performing better because of better working relationships or is it 
perhaps the other way around? 
To summarize, there are marked cross-case variations and differences in how the 
public and private actors cooperate in the examined operational PPP projects. 
Although on the formal structural level the examined cases are similar, they are 
indeed quite different when we look beyond contracts and examine how the involved 
actors cooperate in practice. The defence case (case 1) displays comparatively very 
positive and proactive mindsets, alignment of self interest and close relationships, 
high levels of empathy, trust and strong commitment to making the project a joint 
  
success. The actors in this particular project have managed to establish a constructive 
working relationship where both parties are dedicated to creating new value together. 
This partnering relationship has spun off new partnership projects between the 
involved actors. The defence case resembles the collaboration pole the closest 
relative to the other four cases. The technology transport case (case 2) can be 
positioned comparatively closest to the exchange pole of the cooperation continuum. 
Behaviours and attitudes vary drastically between the defence case and the transport 
cases. The way the partnership managers describe their respective PPP projects is 
different. Moreover, the degree of ownership and bonding between the involved 
actors varies significantly. There is also a pronounced difference in the degree to 
which the involved parties share a feeling of working together towards a joint goal. 
While there is a clear sense of community in the defence case, this sense of solidarity 
was absent in case 2. This was also the case in relation to the road case (case 3). The 
health sector cases (case 4 and 5) generally portrayed positive attitudes but the same 
extent of trust, norms of reciprocity and positive relationships which were identified 
in the defence case were not identified in these cases either.   
Discussion of  findings 
Considering the type of PPP studied here the findings are surprising because the 
expectation is that the infrastructure PPP does not involve the type of behavioural 
features affiliated with the governance PPP. The findings suggest that certain 
relationship features can not be a priori affiliated with certain partnership structures. 
These two dimensions of cooperation do not follow each other in a linear manner. 
As noted by one partnership manager, ‘you can have partnerships whether you have 
PFI or not’. This point is corroborated in a recent study of operational partnerships 
for regeneration and management of city centres which suggests that ‘PPPs are 
processes rather than outcomes and may switch from one governance model to 
another in no pre-established order’ (Ysa 2007: 51). Another study of UK urban 
regeneration partnerships correspondingly finds that different modes of governance 
– hierarchy, market and network – can be present in the same organizational form 
(Lowndes and Skelcher 1998). Together with the findings here, this suggests that 
there may be some problems with distinguishing between governance PPP and 
contractual PPP. When looking beyond the formal structures, the infrastructure PPP 
can display the features that are normally affiliated with the governance PPP. The 
second hitch with the conventional distinction is that it implicitly suggests that 
relationship features are insignificant in the infrastructure PPP. Conversely, the 
findings here suggest that there is an important connection between the nature of 
cooperation in infrastructure PPP and perceived partnership performance. Thus 
interaction processes appear to condition the extent to which the involved actors 
manage to cope with change, disputes and create innovative solutions.  The 
importance of intangible aspects of cooperation such as trust is therefore not limited 
to the governance partnership type as sometimes suggested in the literature (see Klijn 
and Teisman 2000: 85-6). The managerial implication is that proper attention should 
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be devoted to processes and relationship features vis-à-vis infrastructure PPP. In 
other words, managerial efforts should not exclusively be directed towards getting 
the contract right but also towards managing the PPP relationship effectively 
throughout the full life-cycle of the project. In the early days of infrastructure PPP 
scant attention was given to organizational and managerial issues arising in the ex 
post contract signature phase. No policy guidelines were available on how to manage 
operational infrastructure PPPs. The implicit assumption was that once the PPP 
contract was signed, cooperation would follow the plotted course like a train on its 
track. This however, as we have seen here, is not the case. The initial contract is the 
baseline which conditions cooperation but it does however not exclusively determine 
the behavior of the involved actors. In other words, the deal itself does not 
determine whether cooperation will be a public-private partnership or a public-
private battle.11  
Finally, there is a third and more general quandary with the distinction between 
governance PPP and contractual PPPs. This concerns the circumstance that it is 
unclear what empirically constitutes a governance PPP. Both in policy practice and in 
the literature there are only few empirical examples available. The theoretical idea 
about governance PPP (i.e. that it constitutes a genuine or real PPP in the sense that 
it involves, for example, trust, reciprocity and mutuality) seems more prevalent than 
the actual existence of such notions in policy practice. ‘The linguistically correct 
interpretations of the term “partnership” are namely often so broad and general that 
as a result the term public-private partnership can be (and in practice is) interpreted 
in a multiplicity of ways’ (van der Wel 2004: 5). One example of a governance PPP 
concerns a loosely organized network structure (e.g. a public-private strategic 
planning committee for area development, see Klijn and Teisman 2005: 100-1). This 
example does not involve shared risk and joint production which, by the same 
authors, are argued to be defining features of a real PPP. Similarly, in policy practice, 
as already noted earlier, there is rarely any other meaning attached to the PPP label 
than the contractual understanding of the term. Public-private service delivery hardly 
ever takes place without the presence of contracts. The large divergence between 
how PPP is conceptualized theoretically and how it is applied in policy practice is 
unfortunate because it gives rise to misunderstandings.  
Concluding reflections  
If the contractual arrangement is not seminal for how actors cooperate in practice in 
infrastructure PPPs, what then causes the variation in operational practice which has 
been demonstrated here? Two factors emerge inductively from the data: a) the 
significance of institutional context, and b) the importance of individuals. First, the 
institutional context in which cooperation is embedded seems to permeate the way in 
                                                 
11 In recent years, increasing policy attention has been devoted to managing operational infrastructure 
PPPs. This is epitomized with the establishment of an Operational TaskForce in 2006 by the UK HM 
Treasury to provide help, support and guidance to public sector managers of operational PPPs. 
  
which the involved actors cooperate (i.e. certain policy sector patterns come into 
view).12 The hard contract culture of the road industry, for example, seems to 
permeate operational practice in the two transport cases. Several partnership 
managers point out that there are differences between the various policy sectors as 
well as between the public and the private sector. The defence sector is to a lesser 
extent subjected to public scrutiny in the sense that it does not deliver assets and 
services directly to the public. Defence sector projects are therefore not to the same 
extent in the public eye. This may create a more relaxed and informal atmosphere 
than is the case in relation to, for instance, hospital PPPs where the stakeholders are 
numerous and outcomes highly visible. Differences in professional backgrounds and 
training of personnel may also be part of the explanation, which also was suggested 
by some partnership managers. Further, the pure nature of the projects may give rise 
to different project dynamics. Constructing a road is after all different from building 
a complex military asset. Two further sector differences come to mind. One is the 
mere size of the PPP projects. While the health sector, for example has relatively 
many and small scale projects, the defence sector has fewer but bigger projects. In 
small scale projects there are fewer resources to manage the same levels of 
complexity relative to large projects. This may have implications for the operational 
relationship. Another sector difference concerns the level of service delivery. In the 
defence sector, the management of PPP contracts is highly centralized, while in the 
health sector it is decentralized to individual NHS Trust units. In the transport sector 
on the other hand, delivery takes place at different levels ranging from government 
agencies, city and county councils and local boroughs. This suggests that the extent 
of experience varies from sector to sector. Related research on strategic alliances 
(private-private partnerships) suggests that experience plays an important role in 
relation to partnership performance (Anand and Khanna 2000). In sum, policy sector 
differences such as institutional path-dependencies, differences in professions, 
differences in size and nature of projects, and differences in level of service delivery 
and thus experience may play a role vis-à-vis how the involve public and private 
actors cooperate ex post contract signature. There is a rich body of literature that 
suggests that various types of institutions condition social outcomes. This literature 
can profitably inform future research on how institutions condition partnership 
practice (for a recent overview of the literature on institutional theory, see Campbell 
2004). 
 The second emergent factor that influences cooperation concerns the 
importance of individuals. Behaviours, beliefs and attitudes of key individuals who 
occupy boundary-spanning positions in the PPP projects seem to play a significant 
role in relation to how cooperation materializes in practice. This is corroborated by 
                                                 
12 Institutional context is not a part of the research design of this study and has therefore not been 
analysed systematically. The primary objective here was to explore cooperation (how PPP actors 
cooperate in practice) not to measure correlation between different variables (what causes PPP actors 
to cooperate in certain manners). Nevertheless, some interesting findings emerge inductively that are 
reflected upon here. 
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research on governance PPP and alliances that highlight trust and relational aspects 
of cooperation as being important drivers of performance (for instance, Edelenbos, 
Klijn and Steijn 2007). The importance of people is a recurrent theme in the 
interview data (see box 1.1).  Comparing two similar hospital PPPs, one partnership 
manager notes that it was mainly due to the partnering approach of a key individual 
that transaction costs became several folds higher in one of the projects: ‘We were 
[…] constantly having to drive that relationship. Put lots of… You know I had to be 
there full time, and full time was you know 7 in the morning to 7 or 8 at night every 
day. Whereas I would go to [the other hospital PPP], similar sized project, similar 
complicated, I probably spent 8-10 hours a week there. A majority of the interviewed 
partnership managers suggest that individuals are central for an effective operational 
project.  
   
Box 1.1. On the importance of individuals – excerpts from interviews with partnership 
managers  
 
‘I think relationships need to be much better understood and exposed. […]. We all need to 
be re-educated.’ (public partnership manager) 
 
‘The whole process is about people. That is a key thing actually.’ (private partnership 
manager) 
 
‘I think […], the essence of all this is it doesn’t matter what you have got drafted or what 
contracts you’ve got. It still relies on the right people in the right place. You can’t really 
legislate for that. You can’t write that into a contract.’ (private partnership manager) 
 
‘It is like any relationship I think. You know it is about people.’ (private partnership 
manager) 
 
‘A lot still depends on individuals. I have been asked to go to a Trust that has entered into a 
difficult period/discussion with their bidders and it seems to me that there is no more than 
the actual confidence and competence of the project director.’ (public partnership manager) 
 
‘There is always situations that arise that are not covered and you need to be able to sit down 
and have a good working relationship to resolve any of the service issues that come out.’ 
(private partnership manager) 
 
‘Again it is down to personalities and how we work it and how we run it’ (private partnership 
manager) 
 
‘But what can turn an average project into a really good one, or a really poor one into an ok 
one is the softer skills of the people involved…’ (private partnership manager) 
 
‘I think that if you are going to have a partnership that will last that long because this is for 
30 years […] ….you need to have a much better understanding of each other. […]. I think it 
is people.’ (private partnership manager) 
  
 
‘You have to build the relationship up, as you go along. It takes the right sort of people. You 
have got to have the right sort of people. People how are prepared to negotiate, people who 
are prepared to be pragmatic, people how are prepared to, what can I call it, live with 
uncertainty with regards to confrontation.’ 
 
In this light, it is important to understand the determinants of the behaviour of 
individual partnership managers. Based on the interview data and the literature, the 
following three factors can be considered to play a role in this respect:  
 
• Educational background of partnership managers. 
• Managerial empowerment. 
• Features of the parent organization 
 
First, the educational background of the partnership managers may be a factor. ‘I 
think that quite often the style they take [the project directors] is determined by their 
background’, one partnership manager suggests. Lawyers, accountants, and engineers 
respectively may emphasise different aspects of a partnership.13 Second, an 
appropriate mandate to manage the PPP may be a prerequisite for effective 
management as a lack of management power can be argued to impede effectiveness 
(Kanter 1997). In this respect, experience and seniority may also play a role. Third, 
management behaviour is arguably conditioned by features of the parent 
organization and its PPP strategies. This finding is also highlighted in recent research 
on private-private partnerships (alliances) which argues that it is important for 
organizations not only to have strategic partnerships but also to have partnership 
strategies (for instance, Gomes-Casseres, Bamford and Robinson 2003). Further, as 
noted earlier, private partnership managers may display different behaviours than 
public sector managers due to general differences between public and private sector 
organizations. This was a recurrent theme in the interviews where stereotyped views 
of the opposing sector were thriving.  
Conclusion  
Although the scope for generalization of this study is limited, important patterns and 
lessons have emerged that, given the lack of a persuasive body of research on 
operational PPPs, are important to hold on to. The article demonstrates that 
infrastructure PPPs can sometimes assume the features normally only associated with 
governance PPPs. Therefore, certain type of PPP relationship features cannot a 
priori be associated with certain types of PPP structural arrangements. Under certain 
circumstances, even an infrastructure PPP can display the relationship features 
                                                 
13 While a lawyer may be preoccupied with legal aspects, an accountant may emphasise financial 
models, and finally an engineer may put more emphasis on technical solutions. These differing 
approaches may create different project dynamics. 
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normally only affiliated with the governance PPP. This finding constitutes an 
important input in relation to the ongoing conceptual debates about the meaning of 
PPP (van der Wel 2004; Klijn and Teisman 2005; Wettenhall 2007). The finding that 
there may be a connection between how the involved actors cooperate in practice 
and partnership performance further suggests that resources and management 
attention can fruitfully be directed towards the ongoing management of 
infrastructure PPPs. Correspondingly, future research can profitably address the 
operational processes in infrastructure PPPs. In particular we would like to know 
more about the managerial and organizational challenges that emerge in operational 
PPPs and how this relates to partnership performance. Further, more knowledge is 
needed about the factors and mechanisms that condition cooperative practice (such 
as for instance institutional context). This research agenda departs significantly from 
previously proposed agendas that highlight, for example, privatization issues, 
regulatory processes, value for money, risk transfer and the worth and merit of PPP 
as important research agendas (Broadbent and Laughlin 1999). Already at this point, 
however, we have strong reason to believe that partnership contracts in themselves 
are a very limited source of information about PPPs.   
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more about the managerial and organizational challenges that emerge in operational 
PPPs and how this relates to partnership performance. Further, more knowledge is 
needed about the factors and mechanisms that condition cooperative practice (such 
as for instance institutional context). This research agenda departs significantly from 
previously proposed agendas that highlight, for example, privatization issues, 
regulatory processes, value for money, risk transfer and the worth and merit of PPP 
as important research agendas (Broadbent and Laughlin 1999). Already at this point, 
however, we have strong reason to believe that partnership contracts in themselves 
are a very limited source of information about PPPs.   
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APPENDIX I  
 




This interview guide contains a number of open-ended questions. In the interview 
situation the interview guide will not be followed chronologically. Rather it will be 
used as an inspirational source throughout the interview situation. The key thing is to 
uncover the features of the interaction processes and the character of the cooperative 




Introductory questions (background) 
 
- Who: (information about the interviewee, background, job functions, 
previous experience with PFI/PPP). 
- PFI portfolio: General description of the organizations PPP policy/activities. 
- Background of the PFI project: (why was the PPP established, whose 
initiative was it, what was the reasoning behind this PPP, main objective).  
 
 
Questions concerning the partnering relationship 
 
- PPP actors and PPP structures (description of the actors involved and the 
structure of the project). 
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- Description of the partnering relationship at different levels of the partnering 
relationship (interaction patterns and quality of the partnering relationship). 





- Differences between policy sectors? 
- Connection between partnership behaviour and performance (importance of 
partnering relationship)? 
- Factors influencing/conditioning the partnering relations (e.g. institutional 
factors)? 
- Have relationships changed over time? 
- Important factors/competences in the successful management of PPP? 
(barriers / enabling factors)? 





















Project name: __________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Please indicate your project position:1 ______________________________________________________ 
 





Interaction Pattern (operational phase): The following questions concern the frequency of 
interaction between the key project actors. 
 
 
1. Please indicate the frequency of formal interaction between you/your organization and the other involved 
organizations (formalized meetings/other scheduled activities). 



























       
                                                 
 
1 Public sector manager (local level or policy level), SPV manager, SPV board member, prime subcontractor manager 
(construction), prime subcontractor manager (service), manager at the sub-subcontractor level or other? 
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Public sector, 
(local level) 
       
Public sector 
(policy level) 
       
Funders 
(Banks) 
       
 
 
2. Please indicate the frequency of informal interaction between you/your organization and the other involved 
organizations (telephone calls, mails, face to face meetings and other ad hoc interaction).  
 Never  Once or twice a 
month 
Once or twice 
a week 
3-5 times a 
week 
More than 5 
times a week 
Special Purpose 
Vehicle 








     
Public sector, 
(local level) 
     
Public sector 
(policy level) 
     
Funders (Banks) 
 
















Characteristics of Interaction (operational phase): The following questions concern relationship 
characteristics between the key project actors. 
 
 





a) Please rate the degree of trust between the SPV and commissioning public body (grades between 
1 and 10 where 10 is the highest score possible):_____________________________ 
 
b) Please rate the degree of trust between the prime subcontractor (service) and the commissioning 
public body: ____________________________________________________ 
 
c) Please rate the degree of trust between the prime subcontractor (construction) and the 
commissioning public body: 
 
 
4. Changes in trust levels over time (please indicate with a mark): 
 Strongly 
declined 
Declined Remained the same Increased  Strongly 
increased 
a) Have trust levels between the 
SPV and the commissioning 
public body changed over time? 
     
b) Have trust levels between the 
prime subcontractor (service) 
and the commissioning public 
body changed over time? 
 
     
c) Have trust levels between the 
prime subcontractor (construc-
tion) and the commissioning 
public body changed over time? 
     
 
 
                                                 
 
2 The following questions concern the degree of trust between the involved parties. ‘Trust’ refers here to the stable 
perception of one actor of the intentions of another actor (Edelenbos and Klijn, 2006). “The stable perception concerns the 
idea that the other actor will refrain from opportunistic behaviour in situations, which give him the opportunity. So an actor 
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idea that the other actor will refrain from opportunistic behaviour in situations, which give him the opportunity. So an actor 









5. Please indicate to what extent you agree with the statements in the table below about the character of the 
partnership relationship (put a mark in relevant boxes): 




a) The parties in 
this project give 
one another the 
benefit of the 
doubt. 
     
b) The parties in 
this project are 
attentive towards 
the interests of 
each other. 
     
c) The involved 
parties want the 
partnership to be 
a success for both 
the public and the 
private actor. 
     
d) The actors are 
not pursuing 
individual goals at 
the expense of 
the achievement 
of joint goals. 
     
e) It can be 
assumed that the 
intentions of the 
other parties are 
good in principle. 



















6. Please rate the degree of reciprocity in the operational relationship (grades from 1 to 10 where 10 is the 
highest score possible): 
 







between the key 
parties?) 
a) Degree of reciprocity in the relationship between SPV and public sector counterpart: 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
b) Have levels of reciprocity between the above mentioned actors changed over time (please 
highlight the correct answer below)?  
Strongly declined; Declined; Remained the same; Increased; Strongly increased 
 
c)  Degree of reciprocity in the relationship between prime subcontractor (service) and the public 
sector counterpart: ________________________________________________________________ 
 
d) Have levels of reciprocity between the above mentioned actors changed over time (please 
highlight the correct answer below)? 
 Strongly declined; Declined; Remained the same; Increased; Strongly increased  
 
e)  Degree of reciprocity in the relationship between prime subcontractor (construction) and the 
public sector counterpart: ___________________________________________________________ 
 
f) Have levels of reciprocity between the above mentioned actors changed over time (please 
highlight the correct answer below)? 
Strongly declined; Declined; Remained the same; Increased; Strongly increased 
 
 
7. Please indicate the extent to which you agree with the following statements about the relational quality 








There is limited tension between individual and 
collective interests  
     
The mindsets of the involved actors are 
positive towards the partnership 
     
The involved actors continuously adapt their 
cooperation to learning and feedback 
     
Over time organizational boundaries 
increasingly become blurred 
     
This project involves a high degree of joint 
effort from the involved actors 
     
There are strong personal bonds/close 
relationship between key project actors 
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The experience with cooperation has so far 
been primarily positive 
 
     
Conflicts are solved constructively and  
effectively  
     
When solving unforeseen conflicts/disagree-
ments we do not automatically refer to the 
contract 
     
Individuals are key to an effective operational 
PFI project 
     
There is a significant difference between how 
cooperation unfolds in different policy sectors 
(health, transport, defence, education etc.)  




Organizational characteristics (operational phase): The following questions concern among 
other things the organizational structure of the PFI, project characteristics, performance 
measurement systems and decision-making characteristics.  
 
 
8. Actors a) Have there been any changes in the composition of organizations in the SPV since the 
project reached financial close (if yes, please describe the changes)?____________________ 
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________ 
b) Has there been a change of prime subcontractors since the project reached financial close 




9. Project  
characteristics 























Please answer the following questions: 
 
a) What is the number of service measurement items in this PFI? Have there been any 





b) How were the measurement items developed (jointly, primarily by private or by public 








d) How much of the unitary charge is at risk (possible scope of financial deductions)? ___ 
_______________________________________________________________________ 









a) Has the PFI been refinanced at any point? If yes, how was the revenue split between the 
public and the private party?_________________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
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a) Please describe the review process in place for this project (i.e. the process in which the 
public sector reviews project design and processes that the private part wants to put in place 
during the post construction phase): ____________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________ 










a) Please rate the extent of joint decision-making across the public-private interface in the 
operational phase (grade from 1 to 10 where 10 is the highest score possible): ____________ 
 
b) Has this changed over time (please highlight the correct answer below)? 
 
Strongly declined; Declined; Remained the same; Increased; Strongly increased 
 
15. Please indicate the extent to which you agree with the following statements about the administrative capacity 








Communication is effectively managed across 
the public-private interface 
     
Coordination is effectively managed across the 
public-private interface 

















Management strategies (operational phase): The following questions concern management 







a) Has the public sector management team taken any deliberate action to change the 




b) Has the public sector management team taken any deliberate action to change the 
relational structure of the partnership (if yes, please describe which actions)? ____________ 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
c) Have there been managerial actions from the private sector party directed at changing 
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a) Please describe the review process in place for this project (i.e. the process in which the 
public sector reviews project design and processes that the private part wants to put in place 
during the post construction phase): ____________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________ 










a) Please rate the extent of joint decision-making across the public-private interface in the 
operational phase (grade from 1 to 10 where 10 is the highest score possible): ____________ 
 
b) Has this changed over time (please highlight the correct answer below)? 
 
Strongly declined; Declined; Remained the same; Increased; Strongly increased 
 
15. Please indicate the extent to which you agree with the following statements about the administrative capacity 








Communication is effectively managed across 
the public-private interface 
     
Coordination is effectively managed across the 
public-private interface 

















Management strategies (operational phase): The following questions concern management 







a) Has the public sector management team taken any deliberate action to change the 




b) Has the public sector management team taken any deliberate action to change the 
relational structure of the partnership (if yes, please describe which actions)? ____________ 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
c) Have there been managerial actions from the private sector party directed at changing 
partnership organizational structures (if yes, please describe which actions)? _____________ 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
d) Have there been managerial actions from the private sector party directed at changing the 








a) Have there been managerial actions from policy level actors (e.g. departmental level) 




b) Have there been managerial actions from policy level actors (e.g. departmental level) 






























a) On a scale from 1 to 10 where 10 is the highest grade possible, how would you grade the 
partnership performance? ____________________________________________________ 
 
b) On a scale from 1 to 10 where 10 is the highest grade possible, please indicate the extent to 












The partnership delivers value for money to 
the public 
     
The partnership delivers value for money to 
the private sector partnering organization 




To what extent to you believe that the outcomes are proportional to your organization’s input 
(perceived distributive fairness)? (please highlight the correct answer) 
 






a) Was construction finished on time? ___________________________________________ 
b) Was construction finished to the budget? ______________________________________ 
c) Have agreed upon service levels thus far been met in the operational phase? ___________ 
 
 








a) The partnership has led to innovative 
solutions. 
     



















c) The partnership has led to further 
cooperation between the involved actors (e.g. 
new spin offs). 
     
d) The partnership has realized cost savings.      
e) The partnership has realized substantive 
surplus value (real synergy). 
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Offentlige forvaltninger verden over har været præget af voldsomme reformbølger 
de seneste 20-30 år, og den private sektor er i stigende grad blevet inddraget i den 
offentlige serviceproduktion. Privatiseringer og udliciteringer kendetegnede således 
forvaltningspolitikken i mange vestlige lande op gennem 1980erne og 1990erne. De 
mange reformtiltag er i forvaltningslitteraturen kendt under betegnelsen New Public 
Management. En af de senere udviklinger i den moderne forvaltningshistorie er 
fremkomsten af offentlig-private partnerskaber (OPP). OPP har i dag fået en 
lignende udbredelse som de tidligere privatiserings- og udliciteringstendenser. De 
fleste vestlige landeforvaltninger har således forsøgt sig med OPP, og i 
forvaltningslitteraturen har antallet af publiceringer om emnet været hastigvoksende 
de seneste cirka 10 år. Trods den store udbredelse, i såvel teori som praksis, skorter 
der imidlertid med klassifikationer, endsige definitioner af OPP begrebet. Denne 
afhandling har to centrale formål. Det ene er at afdække OPP begrebets mangetydige 
betydninger. Det gøres ved at kortlægge hvordan begrebet bliver anvendt i den 
internationale forvaltningslitteratur. Analysen viser at begrebets grænser er slørede, 
og at betegnelsen OPP bliver anvendt om en mangfoldighed af offentlig-private 
samarbejdsformer dækkende over uformaliserede netværksbaserede relationer såvel 
som stærkt formaliserede kontraktstrukturer. På baggrund af analysen inddeles 
forvaltningslitteraturen i en række strømninger. Dermed skabes et overblik over feltet 
som ikke eksisterede forud for analysen. Denne del af analysen munder endvidere ud 
i en ny måde at klassificere og definere forskellige typer OPP på. OPP er et relativt 
ungt forskningsfelt. En markant barriere for udviklingen af feltet har været manglen 
på anerkendte klassificeringer/definitioner. Begrebsdefinitioner er en forudsætning 
for teoriudvikling. Ved at afdække OPP begrebets mangetydige betydninger, og ved 
at udvikle nye måder at klassificere og definere OPP på bidrager denne analyse 
væsentligt til den fremtidige teoriudvikling om OPP. 
Afhandlingens andet formål er at afdække hvad der kendetegner 
samarbejdsrelationerne i idriftsatte OPP-projekter. Det er en udbredt opfattelse 
blandt praktikere såvel som forskere at OPP bebuder noget kvalitativt nyt relativt til 
de fordums tiders privatiseringer og udliciteringer. Der findes således en udbredt 
teoretisk diskurs om at OPP indebærer tætte og tillidsbaserede samarbejdsrelationer, 
dialog og fokus på processer frem for output. På trods af sådanne udbredte 
forventninger og antagelser om samarbejdsformens karakter, så er der forbavsende få 
systematiske empiriske studier af hvordan samarbejdsrelationerne ser ud i praksis. 
Ved empirisk at kortlægge samarbejdets karakter i fem britiske OPP-projekter 
udfylder afhandlingen derfor et vigtigt hul i den internationale forvaltningslitteratur. 
Analysen bidrager til litteraturen på to centrale måder. Den viser, for det første, at 
forventningerne om kvalitativt anderledes samarbejdsrelationer ikke bliver indfriet i 
flertallet af de analyserede cases. Det forventede skift fra hierarkiske, 
kontrolorienterede principal-agent relationer mod fladere, tillidsbaserede principal-
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i den måde hvorpå samarbejdet udmønter sig i de forskellige cases. Den ene case 
udviser således mange af de førnævnte samarbejdskarakteristika som typisk bliver 
kædet sammen med OPP. Analyseresultatet peger på, at samarbejdsrelationernes kan 
udmøntes væsensforskelligt indenfor den samme type kontraktstrukturer. Dette 
peger videre på, at formelle strukturer kun giver en begrænset indsigt i samarbejdets 
karakter. For at få en dybere forståelse af OPP, er det derfor nødvendigt at gå bagom 
kontrakten og analysere hvordan samarbejdsformen udspiller sig i praksis. Der 
identificeres endvidere en sammenhæng mellem samarbejdspraksis og partnerskabs-
performance. De cases som involverer de mest tillidsbaserede og tætte relationer ser 
samtidig ud til at være de cases, der præsterer bedst. Analyseresultaterne har 
implikationer for OPP litteraturen og ledelsesmæssige implikationer. For det første 
giver resultaterne anledning til at revidere den eksisterende teoretiske diskurs om 
OPP. Der er en tendens i litteraturen til at forbinde bestemte samarbejdsstrukturer 
med bestemte typer samarbejdsprocesser. Resultaterne her indikerer at disse to 
dimensioner ikke følger hinanden. Dernæst peger resultaterne på at ressourcer og 
ledelsesmæssig opmærksomhed med fordel kan rettes mod de løbende 
samarbejdsprocesser, da dette kan få betydning for samarbejdets udfald. 
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i den måde hvorpå samarbejdet udmønter sig i de forskellige cases. Den ene case 
udviser således mange af de førnævnte samarbejdskarakteristika som typisk bliver 
kædet sammen med OPP. Analyseresultatet peger på, at samarbejdsrelationernes kan 
udmøntes væsensforskelligt indenfor den samme type kontraktstrukturer. Dette 
peger videre på, at formelle strukturer kun giver en begrænset indsigt i samarbejdets 
karakter. For at få en dybere forståelse af OPP, er det derfor nødvendigt at gå bagom 
kontrakten og analysere hvordan samarbejdsformen udspiller sig i praksis. Der 
identificeres endvidere en sammenhæng mellem samarbejdspraksis og partnerskabs-
performance. De cases som involverer de mest tillidsbaserede og tætte relationer ser 
samtidig ud til at være de cases, der præsterer bedst. Analyseresultaterne har 
implikationer for OPP litteraturen og ledelsesmæssige implikationer. For det første 
giver resultaterne anledning til at revidere den eksisterende teoretiske diskurs om 
OPP. Der er en tendens i litteraturen til at forbinde bestemte samarbejdsstrukturer 
med bestemte typer samarbejdsprocesser. Resultaterne her indikerer at disse to 
dimensioner ikke følger hinanden. Dernæst peger resultaterne på at ressourcer og 
ledelsesmæssig opmærksomhed med fordel kan rettes mod de løbende 
samarbejdsprocesser, da dette kan få betydning for samarbejdets udfald. 

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